



CENTRO BRASILEIRO DE  
RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS

DOSSIÊ #3 | ANO 18 | FEVEREIRO 2019

## POPULISM IN EUROPE

Leslie Bethell

Reorienting multilateralism?  
International insertion in changed  
conditions of globalization

Anna Jaguaribe

Ética e Relações Internacionais

Embaixador Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa

América Latina – onde  
estamos e para onde vamos

Roberto Teixeira da Costa

#3

DOSSIÊ

# CEBRI DOSSIÊ

O CEBRI Dossiê é uma compilação de artigos produzidos por membros do Conselho Curador, *senior fellows* e convidados do CEBRI. A publicação contribui com a missão da instituição de incentivar o debate sobre relações internacionais e, assim, servir à formação de opinião e à formulação de políticas públicas.

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O Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI) é um *think tank* independente, que contribui para a construção da agenda internacional do Brasil. Há vinte anos, a instituição se dedica à promoção do debate plural e propositivo sobre o cenário internacional e a política externa brasileira.

O CEBRI prioriza em seus trabalhos temáticas de maior potencial para alavancar a inserção internacional do país à economia global, propondo soluções pragmáticas na formulação de políticas públicas.

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# CARTA AO LEITOR

Caros leitores,

Temos satisfação de publicar a terceira edição do CEBRI Dossiê. Trata-se de seleção de artigos sobre relações internacionais, produzidos por membros do Conselho Curador, *senior fellows* e convidados do Centro Brasileiro de Relações Internacionais (CEBRI).

O primeiro artigo, escrito pelo membro de nosso Conselho Internacional, Leslie Bethell, trata de tema historicamente controverso: o populismo. Leslie mapeia o fenômeno no mundo, mas foca-se na Europa. Se no imediato pós-guerra os grupos ligados a essa ideologia eram raros, a partir dos anos 1980 passam a ganhar espaço e nos últimos anos mostram-se presentes em praticamente todo o continente. Quais as possíveis razões de seu crescimento? A quem de fato dizem representar? E qual o risco que impõem à democracia liberal no continente? Essas são algumas das questões que o historiador britânico dedica-se a responder em seu texto.


Trazemos em seguida, a reflexão da socióloga e conselheira do CEBRI Anna Jaguaribe que trata das dificuldades correntes de organização econômicas multilaterais, ressaltando, porém, que as mesmas não impediram a ascensão de novos arranjos multilaterais. Anna trata da saída dos EUA do cenário multilateral, da ascensão da China no mesmo, bem como das muitas tendências que emergem do capitalismo globalizado, principalmente a consolidação de economias baseadas em inovação tecnológica. O multilateralismo, a seu ver, muda de figura, mas segue vivo.

Em “Ética e Relações Internacionais”, o Embaixador Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa discorre sobre a importância da diplomacia desde a Antiguidade aos dias atuais, ressaltando que ao contrário do que se previa, ela não só não perdeu espaço, como é mais importante do que nunca. O diplomata ressalta que é mais do que nunca importante, sobretudo para o Brasil, fortalecer a negociação diplomática e retomar a inserção internacional.

Por fim, Roberto Teixeira da Costa trata dos muitos desafios que se colocam para a América Latina em fase de ampla mudança na região. Em meio a transformações políticas conjunturais na região, problemas econômicos estruturais persistem, demandando planejamento de longo prazo. Uma guinada conservadora e um ocaso da esquerda na região exigem reflexão sobre o comportamento que o Brasil elegerá com o novo governo.

Esses quatro artigos oferecem um panorama de alguns dos temas de amplo debate da atualidade e de como boa parte deles pode afetar ao Brasil. Esperamos, sinceramente, que os textos aqui apresentados gerem reflexão e conhecimento sobre as questões elencadas.

Desejamos a todos uma excelente leitura,



**José Pio Borges**

Presidente do Conselho Curador do CEBRI



**Julia Dias Leite**

Diretora Executiva do CEBRI

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# Populism in Europe\*



## Leslie Bethell

Emeritus Professor of Latin American History and a former Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies, University of London, and Emeritus Fellow of St Antony's College and founding Director of the Centre for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford. Since his retirement from Oxford in 2007, he has lived in Rio de Janeiro. He is a member of the International Council of CEBRI. His essay 'Brazil and Latin America' was published in CEBRI Dossiê # 1 (October 2017).

At a conference 'To define populism' held at the London School of Economics in 1967, 52 years ago, the distinguished American political scientist Richard Hofstadter, author of *The American Political Tradition* [1948], *The Age of Reform* [1955] (on populism in the United States during the Progressive Era) and *The Paranoid Style in American Politics* [1964], gave a paper entitled 'Everyone is talking about populism, but no one can define it'. There have been hundreds of books, articles and lectures on populism since then - by historians, political scientists, sociologists, even economists, as well as journalists and political commentators. Almost all of them open with a declaration that there is no agreed definition of populism, not least because populism has had different connotations at different times over the past 100 years and in many different parts of the world, notably the United States, Latin America and Europe. In the study of both political history and contemporary politics, populism has been, and continues to be, an elusive concept, notoriously difficult to define, and highly contested.

Populism is perhaps best and most simply understood as a political phenomenon, encompassing those movements and parties, often but not always with 'charismatic' leaders, which aspire to power, reach power (usually, though not always, through elections), exercise power and retain power by claiming some kind of direct or quasi-direct, unmediated relationship and identification with 'the people', and mobilizing the 'people' against the established structures of power (political, economic, social, intellectual and cultural) dominated by the 'elite'. Populist *discourse* or rhetoric is built, simplistically, around a fundamental antagonism, what the Ecuadorean sociologist Carlos de la Torre calls 'a Manichean confrontation', between the 'people', loosely defined, and the 'elite', equally loosely defined. Populism is a political *language*, a political *practice*, a political *strategy*, not a political *ideology* like, for example, liberal-

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\* Revised, expanded and updated version of a lecture given (in Portuguese – 'O populismo na Europa') at the Academia Brasileira de Letras on 12 September 2017.



ism or socialism. Ideologically, populism has always been eclectic, vague, confused – and not to be taken too seriously, despite the heroic efforts of post-Marxist intellectuals, notably the late Argentine political scientist Ernesto Laclau and his wife, now widow, the Belgian political scientist Chantal Mouffe.<sup>1</sup>



In the **United States**, populism has had a long and distinctive history, beginning with the People's Party in the 1890s, then governor Huey Long of Louisiana and senator Robert "Fighting Bob" La Follette of Wisconsin in the 1920s, Father Charles Coughlin in the 1930s, governor George Wallace of Alabama in the 1960s, Ross Perot in 1992, Donald Trump in 2016.

In **Latin America**, the so-called 'classical populists', from the 1930s to the 1960s – Juan Perón in Argentina, José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador, Jorge Gaitan in Colombia, Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (but only in and after 1945) - mobilised the new, and newly enfranchised, urban working class and public sector white-collar urban lower middle class. (The mass of rural poor were largely ignored since they had no vote or their votes were delivered to local landowners and political bosses.) They were reformist, nationalist, developmentalist and opposed to existing oligarchies, but mostly hostile to the traditional parties of the Left. (And the Left was hostile to them - the non-Communist Left at least. Latin American Communist parties were often ambivalent towards populism).

The so-called 'neo-populists' emerged from the late 1980s, after many political scientists and sociologists had announced the end of populism in Latin America. Taking advantage of the persistence of extreme poverty and inequality – indeed their worsening during the 1980s and 1990s – and the 'third wave' of democratization, they were able to mobilize the previously politically unorganized and excluded low income and ill educated marginal sectors of the population, both the new urban poor, resulting from unprecedented rural-urban migration, and the rural poor, including in many countries the indigenous populations, which in most cases had been only recently enfranchised. The neo-populists thus significantly extending the social base of 'classical' populism. Bypassing established political parties which had proved ineffective in articulating or responding to the economic and social demands of the 'people' ('el pueblo', 'o povo'), they created new social and political movements and successfully contested democratic elections.

'Neo-populists of the Right' - Carlos Menem in Argentina, Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil – implemented 'neo-liberal' agendas that did little to improve the

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1. Ernesto Laclau, *On Populist Reason* (London: Verso, 2005); Ernesto Laclau & Chantal Mouffe, 'Populism. What's in a Name?' in Francisco Panizza (ed.), *Populism and the Mirror of Democracy* (London: Verso, 2005). See also, Cas Mudde & Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Populism', in Michael Freeden (ed), *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jan-Werner Muller, *What is Populism?* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); John B. Judis, 'Rethinking Populism', *Dissent* Fall 2016; and Cas Mudde & Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, *Populism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

condition of the poor who had elected them. 'Neo-populists of the Left' - Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, arguably Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil (at least from 2009-10) - adopted radical anti-poverty programmes and distributive social policies. They liked to describe themselves as '21st century socialists'.<sup>2</sup>



In the new democracies of **Western Europe**, after the Second World War (1939-1945), politics were overwhelmingly dominated by Conservative, Christian Democrat, Liberal, Social Democrat, Socialist and, in some cases, notably in Italy, Communist parties. The fascism of the 1920s and 1930s was totally discredited, and for several decades there were no significant parties of the radical Right, later described as right wing populist parties. The one exception was the **Freedom Party of Austria** (FPO), which included many former Nazis, and which was established in 1956. When, in 1969 Ernest Gellner and Ghita Ionescu published their classic edited volume *Populism: its meaning and national character*, one of the first studies of contemporary populism, based on the conference at LSE at which Richard Hofstadter offered the paper mentioned above, they began, paraphrasing the opening words of the *Communist Manifesto* ('A spectre is haunting Europe – the spectre of communism'), by announcing 'A spectre is haunting the world: populism', but admitted that it was on the rise everywhere *except in Western Europe*.

Only in the early 1970s was the Austrian Freedom Party joined by the **Swiss People's Party**, the **National Front** in **France**, the **Progress Party** in **Denmark**, the **Progress Party** in **Norway** – and in 1978 by the **Vlaams Bloc** (Flemish Party) in **Belgium**. These parties of the radical Right were, however, politically marginal. They rarely captured more than five per cent of the vote in national elections - often no more than one per cent. **PASOK** (the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement) led by Andreas Papandreou in **Greece** is the only example of what we would now call a populist party having electoral success (and actually forming a government). And it was a populist party of the *Left* not the Right. PASOK won the election of 1981, after the fall of the military dictatorship, with 48 per cent of the vote. Its slogan was 'PASOK in office, the people in power'. For the next 40 years PASOK alternated in power with the Centre-Right New Democracy party.

From the late 1980s, however, European parties of the radical Right, some of which had already existed for more than a decade and some of which were newly formed, made modest progress by adopting a more recognisably populist stance. They were able to capitalise on the end of the post-Second World War economic boom which had delivered continuously rising standards of living, the beginnings of late 20th century globalisation, the adoption of neo-liberal economic

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2. On populism in Latin America, see Carlos de la Torre & Cynthia J. Arnson (eds), *Latin American Populism in the Twentieth Century* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). For Brazil, see Leslie Bethell, 'Populism in Brazil', in Leslie Bethell, *Brazil. Essays on History and Politics* (London: University of London Institute of Latin American Studies/School of Advanced Study, 2018).

policies, the dismantling of the welfare state, and in many countries growing popular hostility towards non-European immigrants, who had come to Europe in an earlier period of labour shortage, and considerable popular resistance to increased European Union integration and the free movement of goods, services and people under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

Austria's **Freedom Party**, led by Jorg Haider from 1986, won 17 per cent of the vote in the 1991 parliamentary elections and 27 per cent in 1999.

National elections in 1997 made the **Swiss People's Party** the largest party in the Swiss Federal Assembly, the **Progress Party** the second largest party in Norway.

In 2001, the **Danish People's Party**, which had replaced the Progress Party in 1995, became the country's third largest party, and both the **Sweden Democrats** (founded in 1988), and **True Finns Party** (founded in 1995) won seats in Parliament for the first time.

In the **Netherlands**, Pim Fortuyn formed the **List** party in 2002 and, within three months, it came second in the parliamentary elections with 17 per cent of the vote, despite the assassination of its leader.

In **France**, Jean-Marie Le Pen's **National Front** came second in the first round of the presidential elections in 2002, with 17 per cent of the vote, before suffering a massive defeat in the second round at the hands of Jacques Chirac.

**Vlaams Bloc** in **Belgium** won over 11 per cent of the vote in the elections to the Belgian Senate and House of Representatives in 2003, and 24 per cent in the elections for the Flemish Parliament in 2004, only to be declared illegal as a consequence of its openly racist policies.

In **Italy**, the newly formed **Forza Italia** won the Italian parliamentary elections in 1994 (and again in 2001). Its leader Silvio Berlusconi became Prime Minister in 1994-5 and again in 2001-6 – supported by another right wing populist party, the **Lega Nord** led by Umberto Bossi.

During the past ten years, and more specifically in the past four or five years, populist parties of the radical Right, old and new, in Northern and Western Europe, including all the Scandinavian countries, have had even greater success.

The **Freedom Party of Austria** came third in the 2013 Parliamentary elections and in the 2014 European elections, with 20 per cent of the vote (30 per cent in Vienna). In the October 2015 Parliamentary elections it performed better than the two mainstream parties, the Social Democrats and the conservative Christian Democratic People's Party, and in December 2016 its candidate Nobert Hofer came close to winning the presidency. He won in the first round with 35 per cent, but lost in the second 50.3 per cent to 49.7 per cent. After the election was invalidated, Hofer lost the re-run 54 per cent to 46 per cent. The parliamentary elections in October 2017 were won by the People's Party, now led by the 31 year old Sebastian Kurz, with 31.1 per cent of the vote, but the Freedom Party came a close second with 26.9 per cent and entered a coalition government with the People's Party.

In **France**, the candidate of the **National Front**, Marine Le Pen, came third in the first round of the presidential election in 2012 with 18 per cent of the vote and first in the 2014 European elections with 25 per cent. In the first round of the presidential election in April 2017 she came second, only to be defeated by Emmanuel Macron in the second round (though with 34 per cent of the vote).

In the **Netherlands**, the **Party for Freedom** (PPV) led by Geert Wilders, which had replaced the List Pim Fortuyn in 2006, came third in the European elections in 2010 and again in 2014 with around 15 per cent of the vote. In the run-up to the parliamentary elections held in March 2017 the PPV was ahead in polls, but in the end lost to the centre-right People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), in part because the VVD stole the PPV's populist clothes. 'All politicians should be populists. We are of the people', declared Mark Rutte, the leader of the VVD who became Prime Minister.

The **Progress Party** in **Norway** came third in parliamentary elections in 2013 with 16 per cent of the vote and in 2017 with 15 per cent and joined Conservative led coalition governments.

The **Danish People's Party** came third with 27 per cent of the vote in the 2014 European elections, and second with 21 per cent in the parliamentary elections in June 2015.

The **Swiss People's Party** won 30 per cent of the vote in the parliamentary elections in 2015, maintained its position as the largest political party in Switzerland, and continued to form part of the seven-member executive of the Federal Council that governs Switzerland.

In **Finland**, the **Finns Party** (previously True Finns) came second in the 2015 parliamentary elections with 18 per cent of the vote and joined a Centre Right coalition government.

The **Sweden Democrats** party, ostracised for many years because of its neo-Nazi roots, came third in both the European and the national elections in 2014 with 13 per cent of the vote. In the parliamentary elections held on 9 September 2018, although doing less well than anticipated, it increased its share of the vote to 17.6 per cent. It has 62 of the 349 seats in the Swedish Riksdag.

The **United Kingdom Independence Party** (UKIP), founded in 1993, which in twenty years had never won more than 3 per cent of the vote in either European or national elections, came first in the 2014 European elections with 27.5 per cent of the vote. It then came third in the 2015 British parliamentary elections with 12 per cent of the vote (although winning only one seat in the House of Commons because of the 'first past the post' electoral system). These results produced panic in the leadership of the Conservative party and led directly to David Cameron's disastrous decision to call a referendum on the UK's membership of the European Union and the popular vote (51.89 per cent to 48.11 per cent) in favour of Brexit. Some of the more opportunistic, hard-line 'Brexiters', notably the former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, would clearly like to turn the Conservative party into a right-wing populist party.

In **Belgium**, **Vlaams Belang**, which had replaced Vlaams Bloc, managed to win only four per cent of the vote in the 2014 European elections and has only a handful of seats in the Bel-

gian and Flemish Parliaments. The **New Flemish Alliance** (N-VA), founded in 2001, however, emerged in 2014 as the largest party in the Flemish Parliament and the largest Belgian party in the European Parliament.

In Italy, **Forza Italia** (renamed People of Freedom in 2007 but reverting to Forza Italia in 2013), won the 2008 parliamentary elections with 37 per cent of the vote, making Silvio Berlusconi Prime Minister for a third time. However, it went into decline after Berlusconi resigned in 2011 and two years later was convicted of tax evasion and banned from public life for six years. The **Lega Nord**, however, continued to attract the support of around 15 per cent of the Italian electorate. In the 2013 elections, the anti establishment **Five Star (Cinque Stelle) (M5S)**, founded by the comedian Beppe Grillo and Gianroberto Casaleggio in 2009, broke into the existing party system with 25 per cent of the vote. There was, and is, some debate about whether the M5S should be classified as a populist party of the Right. Indeed, some regard it as a populist party of the Left. The party, or movement, as it prefers to describe itself, insists it is *né di destra né di sinistra*, but it sits with the parties of the Right in the European Parliament. In May 2018, following the elections held in March, in which it came first with 32 per cent of the vote, the M5S led by Luigi Di Maio formed a government with the **Lega** (no longer Lega Nord) led by Matteo Salvini, which came third second with 17 per cent (more than Forza Italia). The aggressively nationalist Salvini has already emerged as the dominant figure in the coalition government.

Even **Germany** has an increasingly prominent right-wing populist party: **Alternative for Germany** (AfD), founded in 2013. In September 2016, it won seats in 13 of the 16 state parliaments. Its support has been as high as 15 per cent in the opinion polls, and in the elections held September 2017 it secured an astonishing 12.5 per cent of the vote and entered the Bundestag for the first time with no less than 92 seats as the third largest and main opposition party.

The biggest surge of right wing populism in these years, however, occurred in post Communist Central and Eastern Europe where Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic states joined the European Union in 2004, Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, Croatia in 2013.

In **Hungary**, for example, **Fidesz** (the Hungarian Civic Union), founded in 1998, won huge majorities in two national elections: 53 per cent of the vote, and 68 per cent of the seats in the National Assembly in 2010, 44 per cent of the vote and 67 per cent of the seats in 2014. It also won 51.5 per cent of the vote in the 2014 European elections. The legislative elections of April 2018 delivered another impressive victory for Fidesz, which again won two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly. The controversial right-wing populist Viktor Orbán has been Prime Minister since 2010.

In **Poland**, the **Law and Justice Party** (PiS) was founded by the Kaczynski twins, Lech and Jaroslaw, in 2001. The party came second to the Civic Platform in the legislative elections of 2007 and 2011 and in the 2014 European elections with around 30 per cent of the vote. In May 2015, its candidate, Andrzej Duda won the presidency with 51.55 per cent of the vote, and in November it came first in the legislative elections with 38 per cent, winning for the first time in Poland's post-Communist history an outright majority of seats in the lower house, the

Sejm. Beata Szydło, vice-chairwoman of the PiS, became Prime Minister. Jarosław Kaczyński remains chairman of the party and the dominant figure in Polish politics. (Lech died in an air crash in 2010).

In the **Czech Republic**, **ANO** (Yes – and an anagram for Action of Dissatisfied Citizens), a populist party which likes to think of itself as more Centre-Right than Right, founded in 2011 by Andrej Babiš, one of the country's richest men, came second to the Social Democratic party in the 2013 parliamentary elections with 19 per cent of the vote. Another populist party, certainly on the Right, **Dawn of Direct Democracy**, founded in 2013, won 7 per cent. In the October 2017 elections ANO increased its support to 30 per cent. The **Freedom and Direct Democracy** party, which had split from the Dawn of Democracy in 2015, polled ten per cent. (Dawn of Democracy was dissolved in March 2018.) In July 2018, after months of negotiations, an ANO/Social Democratic coalition government was formed, supported by the Communists, with Babiš as Prime Minister.

In **Slovakia**, the ultra nationalist **Slovak National Party** (SNS) secured 8.5 per cent of the vote in the March 2016 elections. **Direction – Social Democracy** (Smer-SD), which had won 44 per cent of the vote (and an absolute majority of seats in Parliament) in 2012, won only 28 per cent of the vote in 2016. In October 2017 the SNS joined Smer-SD in a coalition government led by Robert Fico, who had been Prime Minister since 2012.

To summarise, some 20 right-wing parties across Europe, generally described as 'populist', have captured on average of 17 per cent of the vote in the most recent national elections and currently hold around twenty per cent of the seats in national Parliaments (twice as many as ten years ago). In the last European elections (in 2014) a right wing populist party secured over half the vote in Hungary and in six countries - Poland, the UK, Denmark, Switzerland, France and Slovakia - between one quarter and one third of the vote. Right-wing populist parties are in power in three countries – Hungary (since 2010), Poland (since 2015) and now in 2018's Italy. They share power in coalition governments in another seven – Switzerland, Norway, Belgium, Finland, Slovakia, Austria and (arguably) the Czech Republic.



How do we explain the striking growth of right wing populist parties in the vast majority of the countries in Northern, Western, Central and Eastern Europe in recent years?

It is important to emphasise that each of these parties to which I have referred has its own separate and distinctive history and identity. But, broadly speaking, they are all nationalist, and, with a few exceptions, hostile to the European Union or at least Eurosceptic, and to a greater or lesser extent they claim to represent the 'people,' the 'common people', against the 'elite', national, European and indeed global. They have successfully appealed to the millions of Europeans who have been negatively affected by economic globalisation and, more specifically by the 'Great Recession' which began with the financial crisis of 2008, that is to say, by the

crisis of neo-liberal capitalism. This has manifested itself in close to zero rates of growth, falling living standards, unemployment (over 25 per cent among 18-24 year olds in some countries), severe cuts in public services and extreme and ever worsening inequality. Growing numbers of 'globalisation losers', the 'left behinds', the 'precariat', the 'deplorables' (as Hillary Clinton unfortunately described the supporters of Trump) have been mobilised against the 'globalisation winners', the business and financial elite, the 'top one per cent', against the cosmopolitan liberal intellectual/educational elite (the global citizens), and against the politicians, policy makers and bureaucrats in the national governments and (in the countries that belong to it - Switzerland and Norway do not) the European Union - all of which are accused of having ignored or neglected the interests and the demands of the 'people'.

Populist parties have taken advantage of the contemporary crisis of representative democracy and the popular disenchantment with the established political parties that have ruled Western Europe since 1945, including, perhaps especially, the parties of the Left and Centre-Left, manifested in declining membership and identification, a declining share of the vote and declining voter turn-out in elections. In post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe it has been more a question of populist parties taking advantage of popular disappointment with the newly-established liberal democratic regimes. And everywhere the internet and social media have played an important role in the disruption of traditional politics in Europe – as, in some cases, has Russia's President Vladimir Putin.

Populist parties have all been able to exploit widespread and growing concern about one particular, defining issue: immigration, and the refusal or inability of the EU and national governments to control it. In the case of the UK, the concern has been primarily about immigration of low-skilled workers from Central and Eastern Europe (Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, etc.) following the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 and 2007. For the rest, the problem is non-European immigration on an unprecedented scale, from Central Asia, the Indian sub-continent, but more particularly from the Middle East and North Africa, following the US and European military interventions and subsequent civil wars there, and, not least, increasingly from sub-Saharan Africa. In 2015, for example, more than one million refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants, two thirds from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq, migrated to Europe. The migration crisis has changed the politics of Europe. In his brilliant *After Europe* (2017) the Bulgarian intellectual Ivan Krastev calls it 'Europe's 9/11'.

Part of the popular concern with immigration is economic: the competition for jobs, the driving down of wages, pressure on housing, health and education services ('welfare chauvinism'). Part, possibly the more important part, is socio-cultural: the loss of identity in the face of the sudden and mass arrival of hundreds of thousands of foreigners, most of them Muslims. A Pew survey in 2016 found an overwhelming majority of the citizens of ten countries (85 per cent in Sweden, for example) greatly concerned about the impact of immigration, and especially Islamic immigration, on both national and local community identity. A YouGov poll in the UK found 62 per cent of those interviewed agreed with the statement that in recent times Britain had changed beyond recognition and sometimes felt like a foreign country. Terrorist attacks, major and minor, sexual assaults and an increase in crime generally have served to intensify con-



cern about immigration, Islamic immigration in particular, which has been effectively exploited by Europe's xenophobic right wing populist parties, many of whom have cynically given to highlighting their Christian or secular/liberal credentials. For Victor Orbán the critical historical question is whether "Europe [will] remain the continent of the Europeans".

The political parties in Europe usually referred to as right wing populist parties, not fascist parties, even though some have their origins in fascism. (Europe does have its neo-fascist, neo-Nazi parties: for example, in Hungary, Jobbik, the Movement for a Better Hungary, which captured 20 per cent of the vote in the 2014 elections, and in Greece Golden Dawn, with 7 per cent of the vote in the 2012 and 2015 elections.) They are nationalist and xenophobic, often openly racist, certainly anti-Islamic, even anti-Semitic, but they are not anti-democratic, officially at least. Like other parties, they seek power legally by contesting competitive national and European elections; they do not openly foster para-military organisations and do not for the most part engage in violent political acts; and in most cases they abhor the cult of the strong leader. By raising real issues affecting millions of people to which the mainstream parties have given too little attention- and in some cases, by fostering radical experiments in direct, participatory forms of democracy - these parties claim to have strengthened democracy – even to be 'the saviours of democracy'.

Right wing populism does, however, pose a potential threat to representative liberal democracy in Europe. Once in power, populist parties and populist politicians have invariably been authoritarian. Since they alone represent 'the people', constitutional and institutional constraints on the 'will of the people' can be ignored or even removed. Elements fundamental to any democracy – the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, pluralism, minority rights, civil liberties, even the rule of law, can be treated as fundamentally hostile to the interests of the 'people', opponents are enemies of the people. 'Illiberal democracy' as practiced by Victor Orbán in Hungary is an example and a warning (and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, for example, wants Warsaw to follow Budapest).

Populist regimes invariably adopt 'irresponsible' macro-economic policies. In *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America* (1991) Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards famously defined economic populism as "the short term pursuit of growth and income distribution at the cost of inflation and large fiscal deficits". Furthermore, by making foreigners and particularly Muslim immigrants scapegoats for all Europe's ills and attacking the very concept of multiculturalism, right wing populism also threatens social stability and racial, ethnic and religious harmony. Finally, right wing populist parties pose a threat to the European Union which, with all its faults, has brought peace, prosperity and political stability to the continent - and effectively constrained nationalism. After three decades of European integration, the *disintegration* of the EU is conceivable, and some would even say likely.





There persist some doubts, which I confess I share, about whether populism, insofar as it has any real meaning, is a useful tool for a greater understanding of the recent political history and contemporary politics of Europe. Perhaps it is sufficient to refer to the parties discussed thus far in this essay as right-wing nationalist. In any event, it is important to recognise that not all manifestations of populism are the same. As in Latin America, there are in Europe, especially Southern Europe, populist parties of the *Left*: for example, **Syriza** in **Greece** and **Podemos** in **Spain**.

Syriza (the Coalition of the Radical Left), founded in 2004, was polling less than five per cent of the vote until, under the leadership of Alexis Tsipras, it came second in the 2012 national elections and second in the 2014 European elections (with more than 25 per cent of the vote). In the national elections held in January 2015 Syriza came first with 36 per cent of the vote and, in coalition with the right wing Independent Greeks party, was able to form a government.

Podemos, founded by the young political scientist Pablo Iglesias in March 2014, captured only eight per cent of the vote in the European elections in May but by November it had overtaken Spain's two main parties, the People's Party (PP) and the Socialist Party (PSOE), in the opinion polls. In the December 2015 elections it came a close third with 21 per cent of the vote. However, it was unable to increase its share of the vote in June 2016 despite merging with the United Left party in Unidos Podemos.

We could perhaps add to the list of populist parties of the Left Jean-Luc Mélenchon's **La France Insoumise**, founded in February 2016, which came fourth in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections, with just short of 20 per cent of the vote (30 per cent of the 18-24 year olds). Perhaps less convincingly, because it has existed for more than a hundred years, even the **British Labour Party**. Radicalised and energised by Jeremy Corbyn and firmly in the hands of the socialist Left of the party, the Labour Party came close to winning the general elections of June 2017 with 40 per cent of the vote. The party's slogan was 'For the many, not the few'.

Syriza and Podemos are not the same as the National Front in France, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands much less Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice in Poland. Populist parties of the Right opportunistically use popular discontents with the 'elite' and fear of the 'other' (racial, geographic, religious) to grow and eventually, they hope, reach power, but then fail to challenge entrenched elites when in power. Populist parties of the Left use the same discontents (with globalisation, neo-liberalism, inequality, austerity, the European Union, immigration - although they are usually deliberately ambivalent about immigration). The idea is 'to construct the people', as Inigo Errejón, one of the leaders of Podemos, and Chantal Mouffe have recently written.<sup>3</sup> The 'people' would be a social bloc of all marginalized groups, not just the blue collar, predominantly white, working class suffering from de-industrialization and the introduction of new technology, but the lower middle class, small businessmen, women, racial, ethnic and religious minorities, above all the young. The aim would be to revitalise democracy, win elections and once in power to challenge and eventually

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3. Inigo Errejón & Chantal Mouffe, *Construir Pueblo. Hegemonía y radicalización de la democracia* (2015) (Eng. trans. *Podemos. In the Name of the People*, London: Lawrence & Wishart, 2016). See also Chantal Mouffe, *In Defense of Left Populism* London: Verso, 2018.

overthrow the 'elite' and effect a significant distribution of wealth and power. The people against the elite would replace the old class conflict, and populist parties of the Left would displace the old parties of the Socialist and Social Democratic Left and Centre-Left which throughout Europe, co-opted as they were by neo-liberalism, are in decline.



Politically marginal phenomena only thirty years ago, populist parties, Right and, to a lesser extent, Left, have become a permanent feature of the European political landscape. It is impossible to say whether they will continue to prosper and grow or whether they have peaked and entered a period of decline. During the past two years populism of the Right has been consolidated in power in Hungary and Poland, has taken power in Italy and has made significant progress in Austria, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Sweden and almost everywhere else. But it has also suffered some significant setbacks: Nobert Hofer, the candidate of the Freedom Party was not in the end elected president of Austria; Gert Wilders' Party for Freedom did not win the Parliamentary elections in the Netherlands; and Marine Le Pen and the National Front did less well than expected in the French presidential and National Assembly elections. However, right wing populist parties, **two** of them with fascist origins, coming second (in **two** cases a very close second) in important elections in **three** major European countries is hardly cause for celebration. On the populist Left the Syriza government continues to struggle with Greece's intractable problems under extreme external constraints and the growth of Podemos in Spain seems to have stalled somewhat.

The future of populism in Europe will depend on a number of different factors:

- the speed with which the European economies, especially in the Euro Zone, recover from the Great Recession and in particular start to generate jobs;
- the economic and social policies adopted by the European national governments, in particular the way in which they deal with the immigration crisis;
- the extent to which the political parties of the Centre-Right and especially the Centre-Left are able to reconnect with the millions of voters who have abandoned them;
- the extent to which the European Union is reformed and democratised;
- the EU's treatment of Hungary and Poland (if these countries applied to join the EU today they would probably not be accepted);
- Central and Eastern Europe's relationship with Putin's Russia;
- and, last but not least, the political and economic fall-out from Brexit (if it happens).

In an article in the *Financial Times* in August 2018 ('Why we still have not reached peak populism') Gillian Tett recalled an interview in January with Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater, the world's largest hedge fund, in which he shared with her the findings of an in-house report on populism in the West (presumably Europe and the United States): the proportion of the population voting for populist candidates, it claimed, had risen to 35 per cent (from, on its reckoning, only 7 per cent in 2010). A study of populism in 31 European countries over 20 years by the *Guardian* newspaper and 30 leading political scientists, published in November 2018, shows the populist vote rising from seven per cent in 1998 to 25 per cent in 2018 and populist parties moving from the political fringe to the political mainstream.

In Europe the elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 (the first since 2014) will provide a clearer indication of the extent of popular support for right-wing populist parties in contemporary Europe. In preparation for May 2019 the infamous Steve Bannon, architect of Donald Trump's election victory in 2016, was in Brussels at the end of 2018 organising what he called 'The Movement' – to promote and inspire the European 'radical Right'. In Italy, Matteo Salvini dreams of mobilising 'an international alliance of populists' against the 'Europe of the elites'.

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# Reorienting multilateralism? International insertion in changed conditions of globalization



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## **Present Controversy**

The current trade wars between the US, China and the EU seem to be giving credence to the fact that the asymmetric multipolarity which characterizes the world today, diminishes rather than enhances, multilateral economic institutions and agreements (Laidi, 2018). The decline of multilateral economic institutions is particularly pertinent to Brazil who has been an active contributor to the multilateral system since its onset. For Brazil, multilateralism has been a path for insertion in the global economy but also a forum from which to express its international vision and ambitions (Fonseca, 2015).

The systematic withdrawal of the US from such relevant agreements such as climate, TPP, the Iran nuclear deal and the undermining of the WTO dispute settlement body indicates a policy of US retrenchment from multilateral institutions and of redefinition of national interests. A political stand which is at odds with the system of regulations and institutions which the US has helped put into place. It is also a strategy which goes against the global nature of the US economy and financing system.

The US policy of selective withdrawal from multilateral institutions is not new. It had already been in existence in the George W. Bush and Obama administrations. However, the present administration seems to be consolidating a path of rupture and change. The US speech in the UN General Assembly opposing patriotism to globalization, the fact that the last G7 meeting

ended without a final declaration and that the US has chosen to chastise Germany and Canada, its traditional allies, is a testimony to this trend.

For many analysts, this withdrawal from the multilateral world represents the end of a permanent tension in US foreign policy between Wilsonian and Rooseveltian ideas. That is, between the concepts that foreign policy should be shrouded in universal principles and the idea that foreign policy should be oriented by strategic national interests (Kissinger, 2014). In this context, the America First policy is not a digression, but an affirmative victory of the view that foreign policy should be constantly redefined and guided by national interests.

In the history of US foreign relations, policies which set forth strategic interests tend to be responses to perceived challenges of political ascension and position in the international economy. Such was the case of the Monroe Doctrine. After the Second World War (1939-1945), once the global expansion of the US economy was in due course, foreign policy came to be identified with the idea of universal principles or rules based institutions (Anderson, 2017).

The present exit of the US from the multilateral scenario is, for many analysts, more than a choice for a nationally oriented commercial policy. It is a political response to the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia and the need to guarantee international primacy in sectors which are believed to be threatened: finance, technology and military defense capabilities. However, it also reflects a perception of limits in the possibility or effectiveness of regulation of multilateral institutions.

Moreover, the exit of the US from the multilateral scenario is but one aspect of the changes occurring in international economic relations. Existing international regulatory institutions have for some time been under stress from emerging tendencies of globalized capitalism. The fragmentation of production spheres, global value chains, the rise of global investments and the shift in value from manufacturing to services have put a stress on the ability of traditional multilateral institutions to offer a regulatory environment in par with the contemporary production system. The diversity of political and economic organization of the countries participating in the global economy adds an additional governance difficulty.

The fact that the American retrenchment from multilateralism coincides with nationalist upsurge within the European Union points towards a more widespread political malaise: a general discontent with the losses produced by globalization but also a decline in faith on collective institutions to administer global capitalism. In Europe a nationalist turnabout is undermining the power of the existing European economic institutions already under stress by functional and representational discrepancies.

The divide between the scope of the global economy be it global value chains, services or investments and the national definition of economic and political interests increases tensions and heightens competition in the global economy. It also diverts attention from the profound changes in the technological paradigms of production and shifts in global asset values which are now taking place, leading many analysts to refer to the next years as the emergence of a “new economy”.

An economy where the growth drivers are increasingly dependent on technological innovations and investment capacities, where technological services rise in value in contrast to traditional manufacture and externalities and invisible rents associated with innovation determine geographies of production. The transition to a low carbon economy introduces various levels of complexity to this economic scenario and modalities of insertion in the global economy. Energy transitions are industrial policies and technological choices which compete for value and standards in the global market. As natural resources are transformed into economic assets their exploration and/or preservation opens up new avenues for regulation of public goods. A low carbon development model is an economic value which could also be construed as a political asset.

At present, old and new issues coexist in the trade dispute. Trade controversies and barriers to entry, issues which are particularly pertinent to developing countries searching to increase participation in the global economy are enhanced and coexist with complex issues of taxation of globalized services, intellectual property and regulation of non-tradeables and public goods.

## **Beyond or around the WTO?**

The standoff in economic negotiations in the WTO shows the operational limits of consensus based organizations in a widely diversified system of economic relations. The organization faces increasing difficulties in reaching agreement in global negotiations in a context of growing disparities of claims from member states. It is also challenged by the complexities and regulatory difficulties of innovation externalities and how they apply to trade. Moreover, the retrenchment of positions of the US and many European countries, with regards to the WTO, goes beyond the stalemate in negotiations or the complexities of technology. It indicates doubts about control and capacity of containment of the organization.

The institutions for economic regulation created in the post-Second World War and expanded and reformed in the beginning of the large globalization wave of the 1980's shared a vision that increased participation in trade and in rules based multilateral institutions would bring about a certain international synchronization or harmonization of economic models. The height of this vision is perhaps the idea, now disavowed, espoused by Francis Fukuyama of the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (Bethell, 2018).

The vision propagated by the traditional Bretton Woods institutions, but also by the OECD, that global economic relations can be regulated by a system of rules which stems from the very nature of capitalist relations no longer seems so evident or an accepted canon of major industrial countries. The entrance of China into the WTO changed this perception. In spite of tough entry conditions established by WTO members, China prospered while reaffirming its diversity as a state led socialist market society. In fact, the toughening of requirements for entry in the OECD show that traditional institutions are revising their understanding of what constitutes economic best practices.

The loss of faith in the natural convergences amongst industrial economies contrasts with the rising acceptance in and out of academic circles that in spite of the global nature of investment

and trade which would lead to the acceptance of the existence of a “global capitalism”, at the national level, varieties of capitalism, diversity more than homogeneity characterizes the international system (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Karo & Katell, 2014). While varieties of capitalism and disparate business models of competition may increase policy options for insertion in the global economy they also complicate regulatory policy spaces.

The search for common solutions for the financial crisis of 2007-2008 is a case in point. The crisis rekindled multilateral consultations and the search for collective solutions to what had become a global problem. The G20, formerly a consultation group restricted to finance, became a political governance/ consultation group. Quantitative easing, in different forms, became a worldwide policy response to the crisis. However, while the crisis enlarged the membership of the Basel group, it did not enhance the mandate or empowerment of global institutions. Rather, after the adoptions of tougher banking standards, economic policies, following the height of the crisis, returned to national “best practices” outside of the range of international regulations.

## **Re-orienting multilateral politics**

The difficulties facing traditional multilateral economic organizations have not prevented new multilateral arrangements from emerging. Since 2012, China has been championing the creation of several new multilateral institutions at the regional level, which have global scope and growing international participation. The fact that the traditional UN centered multilateral system is under fire, but a new system of regional multilateral institutions under the umbrella of China is gaining international strength and acceptance seem to indicate that multilateralism as a policy instrument is still very much alive.

The new institutions championed by China such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, The Silk Road Fund, The Financial facility of the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement, the New Development Bank and the BRICS compensatory facility have certain key elements in common. They are financial instruments with sectoral scope: infrastructure and related fields. They have been launched by China and backed by large Chinese reserves, although now the funding structure has been broadened within and outside the region. Their goal is furthering trade, production and connectivity without specific regulatory mandates outside the realm of the projects championed. While they favor green projects which can facilitate the transition to a low carbon economy, they are active in infrastructure and logistics as a whole. That is, they promote but do not purport to regulate transactions.

While the new multilateral institutions fill voids in finance and trade promotion, they do not address important gaps in the global economic regulatory environment. A situation which highlights the increasing discrepancy between the global nature of production, the increasing importance of public goods and the absence or aversion of compliance with norms which may transcend short term exchanges.

Moreover, the new institutions coexist with a proliferation of plurinational trade agreements between Asian countries and Asia and Europe and/or even Pacific Latin American countries.

The recent agreement between Japan and the European Union shows that, while evolving from an Asian trade environment, the trend is not conscribed to Asia. In fact, in spite of trade skirmishes between the US and the EU, a series of trade talks are under way, with the view of increasing advantages, but also regulations. A scenario which poses difficulties for countries which rely on the global agreements, fostered by the multilateral system for increasing insertion in the global economy.

## **Is a New Regulatory System emerging?**

The shortcomings in representation and regulation of the UN centered economic and political regulatory institutions are, of course, not new. The call for reforms of the UN has almost coexisted with its expansion. A call for reform is now underway at the WTO.

Emerging economies have, since the eighties, pushed towards the reform of the Bretton Woods Institutions, so as to guarantee a greater inclusiveness and wider representation. The creation of the G20 and the BRICS institutions are responses to evident gaps of representation. The functional limitations of the G20 and the BRICS reveal both flaws and potential reform paths of the existing post-Second World War institutional set up. The waves of expansion and retrenchment in international institutions respond to cycles of crisis when the need for governance becomes more evident and thereby acceptable.

The regulatory system of the traditional Bretton Woods institutions and the UN economic organizations were always more universal in principle than deed. They were limited as a covenant and in their geographical and political representation. The rules and regulations of the UN institutions have been forged by a coalition of interests which no longer represent the central forces of the international economy. The shift in economic value and growth from the Atlantic to the Pacific and the importance of emerging economies in global economic transactions weights on the operational capacity of the post war institutions.

In addition to problems of political and economic representation, existing multilateral economic institutions face the regulatory difficulties of a world of global production chains and very disparate business models amongst economic players. They struggle to provide level playing fields to all players in the system and guarantee systemic gains in exchange for compliance.

In this context, an important distinction is emerging between sector limited, plurinational versus global economic negotiations. The success of the WTO information technology agreement stands in sharp contrast with the stall in global WTO negotiations, indicating that partial regulations move forward especially when they operate within the economic model of global value chains. The reconvening of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), now without the United States and the emergence of the Pacific Alliance in Latin America also point towards the growth in plurinational trade agreements with more limited scope and regulatory ambitions.

Moreover, the difficulties facing regulatory systems today go beyond diversity of economic models and the struggle between interest and compliance, they also have to do with the pro-



found changes occurring in the production system, the nature of economic assets and the fact that value in today's economy is often more related to non-tradeable and externalities associated with the innovation economy.

The transition to digital and low carbon economy introduces new elements in global competition. Digitalization and the widespread application of 4.0 technologies to production will launch a race towards standards which will pose further complications to the system. In the "new economy", finance will extrapolate the limits of banking institutions and technology will be separated from manufacturing. While difficult to anticipate how these changes will affect regulatory norms at an international level it is clear that a race towards what may constitute global standards is taking place.

At the core of this challenge is how we define global production what is considered tradeable and non-tradeables and how norms can be established to regulate the externalities of production. Connected to this issue is also the transition to a low carbon economy. An important development question emerges: how can we set value and regulation to assets which are natural resources? This is a matter of great concern for emerging economies such as Brazil.

The model of global value chains which set the trend of the globalization wave of the last twenty years is in transformation. Relocation as an economic advantage is being balanced against the benefits of an innovation environment where industrial and service commons can contribute more to an innovation economy and production. In this new scenario, value added and trade will be more and more associated with services with all the normative difficulties associated which the regulation of externalities in services (Mazzucato, 2018).

## **Insertion in the global economy: before and after China**

For most emerging markets, the international economy is an uneven and unequal playing field where they struggle against important asymmetries to gain successful entrance. Access to capital, vulnerability to external shocks, and concentration of technology rents has placed most emerging economies in the bottom of the smile curve of global economic rewards. Few countries have managed to confront all the asymmetries of the international economy and complete industrialization with technological upgrading. Some have managed to move into a high income bracket and escape some technology rents. This is the case of Asian latecomers and now of China.

The multilateral system offered opportunities of inclusion and voice, a space to contend a level playing field in international regulation. In this regard, it has always been seen as an instrument of insertion in the global economy. Rules, while always drafted by the strongest economic players, were a manner to prevent a continuous strategy of kicking the ladder of countries ascending in the financial and technological race.

However, there is a dynamic interaction between successful national entries and global policy spaces. Because of relevant power asymmetries, opportunities for entry and exit are always a flux

and new entries alter the dynamics of competition. This is clearly the case for the value of commodities, agricultural products, energy and technology after the rise of China.

China rises out of the periphery with significant public goods and structural tasks to be performed. It will progressively dismantle impediments of entry into the global economy: stocking large reserves, enlarging trade networks, becoming a manufacturing hub with selective strategic and comparative advantage for production and service sectors and joining the WTO. Its economic expansion in the 1990's was achieved by capturing vast increases in world FDI, huge rise in US consumption and the fragmentation of the information technology industry which increased access to open ended technologies.

The Belt and Road Strategy is the result of accumulated capacities, resources and declining returns for investment at home. It was made possible by the experience gained in manufacturing with a global perspective. Accumulated resources and capacities motivated China's global investment drive. Investments expanded first in regional scenarios. Later, through the creation of a series of new financial multilateral institutions, China becomes a major financial player in the global economy.

Castro (2011) has shown that the rise of China has changed the political economy of international relations and reversed old theories concerning what is center and what are peripheries. The increased demand for commodities it engendered together with its capacity to produce low cost technology goods has altered the value of assets in the global economy. In so doing, it has reversed the prediction of Raúl Prebisch (1901-1986) regarding the inexorable decline in prices of commodities and natural resources. Climate change and its effects on agricultural production is an additional game changer, resetting the value of water, winds, and solar power and forest surfaces.

The globalization wave of the 1990's, which opened windows of opportunities for many large emerging markets, came to a halt with the financial crisis of 2008. The increasing complexity of economic production changes strategies for insertion in the global economy. At the heart of the "new economy" are issues such as: standards for digital production and services, the commoditization of natural resources, and the importance of intangible and knowledge assets in the composition of value added. Competition for advantages in the new economy will be at the center of the global exchanges and limit the possibilities for insertion in the global economy. China is now positioning itself for this race and much of the ongoing controversy with the US has to do with policy space and regulating ascension to the "new economy". For emerging economies such as Brazil, the stakes are high and the coming years will bring a toughening of competition in old and new areas. It will be more difficult to market low technology goods, commodities will be subject to increasing standardization and changes in production paradigms will require increasing investments in technology and services. Moreover, multilateral negotiations and strategies which tended, in the past, to protect the asymmetric position of emerging economies have come to a halt. In the present international economic scenario, much effort needs to be employed to gain access or increase value added in particular sectors of production and services, without the benefit of wholesale negotiation tactics.

## Economies in transition

The advent of the digital economy and the transition to low carbon are two international benchmarks with significant consequences to trade, investment and international competition in the global economy. Most global economies have drafted plans to guide the transition to the digital economy aiming at the reorganization of production, services, exports and impact on employment. Germany's industry 4.0 is the best European example and China's 2025 its most comprehensive Asian counterpart. Central to these programs is the assumption that global competition for value added in products and services will depend on digitalization standards and inclusiveness and that global value chains will be redesigned according to competitive innovation criteria. The digital economy is not limited to any specific realm of production and services. In fact, the production of commodities and competitive agriculture are also part of this economic transition.

Technological innovation is already an important component of the production of commodities and competitive agriculture in big producing countries such as Australia and Brazil. However, what is a production trend at home is not necessarily translated into an export product. That is, innovation helps productivity in the agro-business but does not necessarily increase the competitiveness of the export product of large emerging economies such as Brazil. Large scale investments, service benchmarks and globalization of standards are still important key factors for increasing trade abilities. Digitalization is also a process with externalities within production and service sectors and the technological choices and standards adopted have implications for the overall economy and how its products enter into the global market.

In what concerns the energy transition, both European and Chinese economies have already stipulated a time frame for transition from fossil fuels and have adopted industrial and investment policies to facilitate the execution of these targets. Oil companies are hedging the transition by investing in alternative energy sources and products. There are multiple roads to the energy transition, but technological choices will also become industrial choices and transform global value chains. What standards and technical solutions are adopted will once again condition the terms of insertion in the global economy. While resource rich countries such as Brazil have the benefit of a green energy matrix, how they choose to adopt practices of resource efficiency, regulate and attribute value to its natural resources can be a significant determinant to their growth strategy. Once again, China will be a determinant player in this transition acting both as the prime consumer of energy, food products and commodities and a principal developer of digital technologies.



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# Ética e Relações Internacionais



## **Embaixador Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corrêa**

Vice-presidente do CEBRI. Serviu como Embaixador do Brasil no México, Espanha, Argentina, Alemanha, Santa Sé, e na Delegação do Brasil em Genebra (OMC e ONU). Foi duas vezes Secretário-Geral do Ministério das Relações Exteriores.

O sistema internacional nasceu e continua predominantemente marcado pelas relações de poder. Quem têm poder, manda. Quem não têm, se conforma em obedecer ou é forçado a buscar alianças que o fortaleçam. A chamada Era Trump está a nos levar por este perigoso caminho.

Não foram poucas as tentativas no século XX de relativizar esse conceito: os 14 pontos de Woodrow Wilson (1856-1924) e a Carta da ONU, para citar apenas os mais ilustrativos. Ambos acabaram submetidos à realidade pouco ética dos interesses nacionais.

A ética serve de modelo para a organização internacional. Em seu nome, busca-se reprimir atos ou decisões que reflitam interesses unilaterais dos parceiros mais fortes.

Entre a ação e seu resultado, tenta-se, em circunstâncias normais, o que veio a ser chamado de diplomacia. Diplomacia preventiva – usada para impedir a ação da força – e diplomacia conclusiva – usada para minimizar os efeitos do uso da força ou prevenir novas situações que o provoquem. São infindáveis as variedades de medidas que podem ser empregadas antes, durante ou depois do uso da força. A guerra usualmente dá-se quando essas medidas, aos olhos do atacante, esgotam-se e a intimidação não surte o efeito desejado. De alguma forma, pode-se simplesmente dizer que a ética, o convencimento, os meios pacíficos precedem eventuais agressões com uso de força. Algumas vezes têm êxito e impedem – mediante a intimidação – a guerra. É quando se obtém uma solução pacífica da controvérsia. Um lado cede ao fazer as contas e perceber que não teria recursos efetivos para enfrentar o conflito e muito menos vencê-lo. Em outras situações, o lado atacado prefere imolar-se a perder a honra. Deixa-se arrasar.

São raros - mas existem – os casos em que, defrontado com uma agressão iminente, um país consegue negociar uma solução equilibrada para o conflito. É tudo uma questão de poder ou

não poder. Algo que se aprende desde logo no ofício da diplomacia é que nada se resolve mediante generosidade. A parte que insinua generosidade num conflito é tida como fraca e fica, portanto, mais vulnerável.

Atribui-se a um analista francês, Guillaume-François Le-Trosne (1728-1780), uma descrição da diplomacia como certa arte obscura que se esconde nas entranhas do fingimento, que não se deixa ver e que acredita que só pode existir na escuridão profunda dos mistérios. Há outras descrições que também acentuam o lado por assim dizer vil da diplomacia: “Um Embaixador é um homem honesto que é mandado para o exterior a fim de mentir pelo bem de seu país”; “Um Embaixador é um homem capaz de mandar seu interlocutor para as profundezas do inferno e fazê-lo antecipar o prazer da viagem.”

Justamente nos anos 1960, quando eu me preparava para o ingresso na carreira, muitos analistas previam o declínio e o fim da diplomacia. O telefone vermelho entre Washington e Moscou tornaria tudo mais fácil, menos complicado, menos envolto em punhos de renda. Por um tempo minha geração temeu haver entrado para uma carreira condenada de antemão.

Pois aconteceu exatamente o contrário e os contatos instantâneos de cúpula muitas vezes criaram mais problemas do que resolveram e foram os aparatos diplomáticos que acabaram tendo que desenredar as situações mais complicadas. Além do mais, com a gradual expansão das atividades internacionais e posteriormente com a chamada globalização, a diplomacia passou a estar presente em praticamente todos os campos da atividade humana. Não mais apenas a paz e a guerra, mas todo um campo de atividades e decisões antes desregulado: transações financeiras, comércio, investimentos, meio-ambiente, ciência e tecnologia, direitos humanos. E muito mais....

Os ministérios cresceram e os diplomatas passaram a ter que lidar com temas que tradicionalmente estavam fora de seu alcance. Tornamo-nos, segundo algumas línguas maldosas, “especialistas em assuntos gerais”. As carreiras ao mesmo tempo se profissionalizaram e os aparatos diplomáticos cresceram, inclusive em função do aumento do número de países soberanos.

Outro aspecto que mudou foi o da relação entre a diplomacia e os serviços de informação. Antes, os segundos estavam integrados à primeira. Pouco a pouco foram se especializando e se separando. Hoje, muitas vezes, entram em conflitos internos.

Abba Eban (1915-2002), ex-ministro das Relações Exteriores de Israel (1966-1974), e extraordinário pensador em matéria de relações internacionais, diz em seu livro publicado em 1983, sobre a “Nova Diplomacia”, que os diplomatas quando não estão se queixando de sua impotência, ficam reduzidos a ouvir reflexões a respeito dos defeitos morais de sua profissão. Stalin disse certa vez que “falar de “diplomacia honesta” é como falar de água seca”.

Na verdade, a diplomacia (mesmo não conhecida por esse nome) vem da noite dos tempos. A Bíblia refere-se a inúmeros casos de reis, rainhas, generais e príncipes que trocavam mensagens com seus pares em suas regiões. A imunidade começou mesmo nessa época, de vez que as mensagens podiam ser frequentemente agressivas ou injuriosas. Algumas vezes era respeitada. Outras não, dando-se ao portador de más notícias a pena máxima.

As tradições diplomáticas modernas começaram a tomar corpo na Grécia. Foram os gregos clássicos que criaram termos como “armistício”, “arranjos”, “tréguas”, “alianças”, “convenções” e “paz”. Foram os gregos que começaram a usar procedimentos de arbitragem.

Abba Eban recorda que o elemento central da diplomacia grega era o “patriotismo”: “Minha cidade acima de tudo!”

Os romanos levaram a diplomacia a dar um passo adiante. Os enviados passaram a se imiscuir na vida das cidades em que estavam acreditados e a enviar relatórios para seus superiores. Essa tradição é que deu margem à reputação vigente até hoje de os Embaixadores não deixarem de ser espíões.

Contudo, foram os italianos na Renascença que tornaram comum a prática dos Embaixadores residentes. Desde então, a suprema ética do diplomata – e volto a Abba Eban – é a “razão de Estado”. Nicolau Maquiavel (1469-1527) sustenta que os padrões pelos quais se medem a moralidade de um indivíduo – a ‘ética’ – não se aplicam aos atos do Estado.

Com o colapso do sistema italiano de equilíbrio de poder, seus métodos foram de certo modo incorporados pelos poderosos reinados em processo de unificação na Europa. Grotius falava de “um sentido de justiça e de razão” como base para a cooperação entre os Estados. O Cardeal de Richelieu (1585-1642), sob o Rei Luís XIII (1601-1643), na França, estabeleceu um Ministério das Relações Exteriores. A prática espalhou-se pela Europa. Acabaram incorporadas pelo Congresso de Viena de 1815 que reorganizou o mundo após a queda de Napoleão Bonaparte (1769-1821). A estabilidade passaria a ser mantida pelo Concerto da Europa (Áustria-Hungria, Grã-Bretanha, França, Prússia e Rússia), antecedente remoto do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, com praticamente o mesmo sistema hierárquico.

Ficou assim, de certa forma, assegurada uma expressão formal do sistema de “equilíbrio de poder” (“Balance of Power”). Não se falava então em ética nas relações internacionais.

O poder reinava e a paz seria garantida pelo seu equilíbrio.

As guerras Franco-Prussiana (1870-1871), as Primeira e Segunda Guerras Mundiais (1914-1918 e 1939-1945) destruíram, porém, esse equilíbrio. Além disso, acabaram dando margem a que, assegurado o equilíbrio alterado que emergiu desses conflitos, se buscasse trazer para o centro do sistema, considerações e práticas ligadas à ética, assim como a chamada diplomacia pública.

A peça introdutória desse novo período foram os 14 pontos de Wilson lançados pelo presidente norte-americano ao final da Primeira Guerra. Já no princípio, Wilson expressava uma utopia: “Acordos públicos, negociados em público, depois dos quais não mais haveria entendimentos internacionais privados de qualquer natureza; a diplomacia será sempre franca e transcorrerá em público.”

Pode-se dizer que começou então a fase em que nós nos achamos até hoje. Uma diplomacia pública e ética encarnada pelas organizações internacionais em coexistência com a diplomacia



secreta, tradicional, amparada na ameaça e/ou no uso da força. Não há dúvida de que é imperioso obter uma moralidade internacional compartilhada, e que, portanto, a implantação de uma ética social efetiva deve incorporar os modos de praticar as relações entre os países.

No entanto, o que se vê é que a própria Carta da ONU, ao criar o Conselho de Segurança com cinco membros permanentes com direito a veto, colocando-o, portanto, acima da Assembleia Geral, onde tudo é decidido por voto majoritário, sacramentou a desigualdade nas relações internacionais. Em seu “Paz e Guerra: Uma Teoria de Relações Nacionais”, Raymond Aron (1905-1983) é enfático: “As relações internacionais sempre foram reconhecidas por todas as nações pelo que efetivamente são: relações de poder! No nosso tempo, porém, alguns juristas estão intoxicados por conceitos e alguns idealistas confundem seus sonhos com a realidade”.

Onde fica em tudo isso a ética?

É a pergunta que me faço e tenho dificuldade em responder.

Fica no espaço? Na mente das pessoas? Nas instituições coletivas? Ou fica nos arsenais nucleares das grandes potências? Fica no Iraque, na Líbia, na Síria, na Ucrânia? Fica em Cuba? No Kremlin? Na Casa Branca? Nas regiões pobres da África, da Ásia, das Américas?

Difícil, talvez impossível, de responder.

Minha impressão é de que a ética fica na consciência das pessoas que se preocupam com as desigualdades que caracterizam o mundo, com a violência, com a fome, a falta de segurança.

Uma ética idealizada. Uma utopia. Um dever. A consciência universal. É sempre bom tê-la presente!

Lembro-me de uma das máximas de Montesquieu (1689-1755): “Se eu soubesse de alguma coisa que me fosse útil e que fosse prejudicial à minha família, eu a rejeitaria. Se eu soubesse de alguma coisa que fosse útil à minha família e que não o fosse para minha Pátria, eu tentaria esquecê-la. Se eu soubesse de alguma coisa que fosse útil à minha Pátria, mas que fosse prejudicial à Europa e ao gênero humano, eu a tomaria por um crime”.

São palavras que expressam um sonho, uma utopia. e bem traduzem os dilemas característicos da dualidade Guerra e Paz.

Assim sucede nesses momentos que estamos vivendo. Os EUA sob uma liderança despreparada e convencida de sua autossuficiência. A Rússia aproveitando-se dessa situação e do Brexit para recuperar espaços perdidos na sua periferia. A China, tão bem sucedida econômica e socialmente, busca exercer a influência que tem para evitar conflitos maiores. E a UE, aparentemente, nunca esteve tão debilitada.

Ainda não surgiu a liderança e não está clara a mensagem que estes nossos tempos carregam.


São esses, historicamente, sinais de descontrole que podem desencadear tragédias.

É hora de fortalecer a negociação diplomática. É profundamente penoso ver o Brasil – sempre tão atuante nos grandes momentos de transformação multilateral – completamente à margem, envolto que está na sua tragédia interna. Praticamente inerte no plano internacional. Nem mesmo se interessa mais ativamente por pertencer ao Conselho de Segurança da ONU. Como que desaparecemos!

Nestes tempos em que o Brasil emerge de uma eleição presidencial, é preciso pensar na política externa como instrumento de transformação e de prestígio. Que a nova Administração esteja preparada para conduzir este processo com lucidez e sentido oportunidade. À altura das melhores tradições do Itamaraty. E que instituições como o CEBRI continuem atuando para reforçar uma visão brasileira do mundo que nos ajude a recuperar uma credibilidade externa compatível com nossa importância regional e global.

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# América Latina – onde estamos e para onde vamos



## Roberto Teixeira da Costa

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**E**m seminário sobre as “Novas Dimensões do Comércio Global: Fim do sistema multilateral” falei sobre os desafios para o desenvolvimento da América Latina. De início sublinhei que hoje, mais do que nunca, continua sendo difícil analisar a América Latina como um todo.

Em termos de nossa região, temos tido períodos extremamente delicados, como, por exemplo, a crise monetária que chegou a níveis hiperinflacionários em alguns países, com moratória e renegociação da dívida externa, índices econômicos e monetários deprimentes. Lembro-me bem que, em um evento internacional que participei nos anos 1980, quando falava sobre nossa inflação, havia um sentimento de decepção e ao mesmo tempo uma certa curiosidade de como conseguíamos conviver com um desgaste da moeda que atingiu níveis estratosféricos. Fui colocado num debate em Washington ao lado do representante do Zimbábue, e só se falava nos tigres asiáticos. Resignei-me a descrever-nos como um gato, mais amistoso que um tigre.

Na crise de 2008, que se iniciou com a falência da Lehman Brothers, marcada como um dos trágicos momentos do capitalismo, a região havia se equilibrado e se encontrava em uma melhor situação para enfrentar a crise. Foram os benefícios do tão mal falado “Consenso de Washington”, um conjunto de regras de bom senso na gestão econômico-financeira.

Qual a situação hoje?

Em recente documento do Inter-American Dialogue, Michael Shifter indicava que nossa região não está em crise, mas parece paralisada e sem ideias!

Não sei se estou inteiramente de acordo, mas devo reconhecer que ele está certo quando afirma que carecemos de ideias. Não é novidade que nunca primamos por planejamento de médio-longo prazo. A inflação, em maior ou menor escala, criou uma mentalidade de curto prazo em nossa região, devido a um passado caracterizado principalmente pela falta de confiança em nossas moedas. As políticas adotadas eram de curtíssimo prazo e de sobrevivência. As crises externas e internas nos obrigavam a gestões emergenciais, sem nos ajudarmos uns aos outros e quase sempre ao reboque dos acontecimentos. Períodos eleitorais que se sucederam deram pouca ênfase a projetos estratégicos, pois o foco era apagar o incêndio. Nossos políticos, regra geral, e porque não dizer alguns empresários, não dedicavam maior atenção ao quadro internacional e suas repercussões sobre o país, preocupados que estavam em olhar sua própria casa e proteção do mercado interno.

E como estamos agora?

Olhando primeiramente os aspectos financeiros, sublinharia que não temos as ameaças hiperinflacionárias do passado e, à exceção da Venezuela, nossas moedas parecem relativamente protegidas e vêm fluando em função, principalmente, do comportamento do dólar nos mercados internacionais. No entanto, a valorização do dólar vinha provocando forte impacto nos preços internos. A política da taxa de juros que foi praticada pelo FED provocou uma valorização da moeda norte-americana. No entanto, no final de janeiro houve uma sensível mudança na política anteriormente anunciada. Indicaram maior cautela no aumento de juros, o que provocou um recuo da moeda norte-americana nos mercados mundiais e valorização das moedas nacionais.

Sobre pontos positivos, os processos democráticos continuaram se processando sem maiores distúrbios (novamente a Venezuela é uma conhecida exceção). Temos nos principais países liberdade de expressão, vários movimentos de busca de maior igualdade entre os gêneros, respeito pelas diversidades de raça, cor e orientação sexual. Sentimos aumentar a consciência sobre a proteção ao meio ambiente e reconhecimento de que precisamos continuar investindo maciçamente em saúde, em educação, de melhor qualidade e saneamento básico.

Os pontos negativos não são poucos. Nossas economias não vêm crescendo o suficiente para poder atender a políticas redistributivas. Com isso, as desigualdades sociais não diminuem como desejável, muito embora em alguns países, se perceba redução da pobreza.

Há descrença nos sistemas políticos e na sua representatividade, apesar de existir o reconhecimento de que, fora do sistema democrático não há soluções aceitáveis. Isso nos remete à questão do equilíbrio entre os 3 poderes e à prevalência da judicialização em alguns países, como é o nosso caso. No campo institucional, o combate à corrupção vem sofrendo alguns retrocessos e não parece ainda existir, em toda região, consciência plena que o respeito a normas éticas, aos direitos adquiridos e a obediência à lei sejam preceitos, que deveriam ser respeitados integralmente. No nosso país, o Ministro Moro apresentou ao Congresso um conjunto de medidas de combate à corrupção, narcotráfico e contrabando.

No campo político tivemos mudanças relevantes, e registro uma análise de alguns países de nossa região, destacando:

1. Assistimos uma guinada conservadora com vitórias de centro direita na eleição de Macri na Argentina e de Iván Duque na Colômbia e de Piñera no Chile; e de Jair Bolsonaro no Brasil.

2. O contraste foi López Obrador no México, que em sua terceira tentativa chegou à presidência, com uma proposta de centro-esquerda.

3. A chamada linha bolivariana está enfraquecida com a situação caótica da Venezuela e a crise na Nicarágua. O ex-presidente Rafael Correa está sendo processado pelo seu sucessor Lenín Moreno. O Equador, bem mais próximo dos valores da economia de mercado, enquanto Madura busca maior aproximação com a China e Rússia como tábua de salvação.

4. Macri, após um começo esfuziante, às voltas com problemas sérios com a situação financeira externa, e obrigado a pedir apoio ao FMI. Altas taxas de inflação e crescimento insatisfatório também estão presentes. O fator confiança está em jogo. Como no Brasil o tema corrupção está na ordem do dia, atingindo diretamente a ex-presidente Cristina Kirchner com mandado de prisão. As próximas eleições serão um grande teste.

5. O Peru, fortemente afetado pela Lava Jato, onde a presença da Odebrecht foi devastadora, enfrenta uma crise no judiciário no combate à corrupção. Tivemos a renúncia de Pedro Pablo Kuczynski e com dois presidentes ainda foragidos. O novo Presidente, Iván Duque, questionou o acordo com as FARC e se colocou numa posição agressiva contra seu antecessor Juan Manuel Santos. A economia vem tendo bom comportamento, e principalmente vários projetos de mineração em curso. É um dos países da região de maior crescimento.

6. O Paraguai, elegeu Mario Abdo Benítez que na região tem recebido representativos investimentos de brasileiros e argentinos e também com bom desempenho na economia.

7. O Uruguai enfrenta o delicado vínculo entre governo e Forças Armadas ao autorizar a busca os restos de presos políticos desaparecidos em quartéis. A tensão entre o governo e militares está presente desde que a Frente Ampla assumiu o poder, e pela primeira vez o governo esquerdista pretende alterar o sistema econômico das Forças Armadas. A iniciativa do projeto de reforma do sistema de previdência militar, que reduz privilégios do setor, reacendeu a tensão.

Há movimentos de grupos políticos no Uruguai favoráveis a uma guinada pró-direita, seguindo os passos dos países vizinhos. Sua economia é fortemente dependente das economias do Brasil e Argentina.

8. No Chile, Piñera enfrenta dificuldades devido a insatisfação que o crescimento não reduza as diferenças sociais e que o sistema previdenciário tenha que ser reformulado para diminuir desigualdades.

9. No México, López Obrador, independentemente dos problemas herdados do narcotráfico (segurança interna, crescimento insatisfatório e problemas migratórios), terá que estabelecer um ‘modus operandi’ com os Estados Unidos devido ao novo acordo Nafta que foi finalmente assinado no domingo, 30 de setembro, inclusive com a participação determinante do Canadá que passa a se chamar USMCA, e que terá que ser sancionado pelo Congresso norte americano. O diálogo de Obrador com o setor empresarial e com os países da região, também é questão em aberto. No passado convivi com empresários e governantes que defendiam que o México deveria olhar mais para o sul em suas transações comerciais.

10. A situação da Venezuela agravou-se sensivelmente nos últimos meses e o desdobramento dessa interminável crise, que se arrasta por longo período, teve como evento importante a reunião do Grupo de Lima, que congrega os países da América Latina e que consideram que a eleição de Nicolas Maduro foi fraudada, e, portanto, não reconhecendo sua reeleição. Foi uma votação quase unânime, com uma exceção da posição do México.

11. Na sequência, os Estados Unidos, dentro de uma linha bem mais agressiva em relação a Nicolas Maduro, resolveu reconhecer Juan Guaidó, que havia sido destituído de seus poderes por uma assembleia constituinte, como Presidente interino da Venezuela, no que foi seguido pela maioria dos países do Grupo de Lima, além do Parlamento Europeu. No total 24 países reconheceram Juan Guaidó como Presidente, e também com o apoio da OEA.

Alguns países europeus, por seu turno, estão querendo que Maduro convoque rapidamente novas eleições, tendo lhe conferido um prazo que já se esgotou.

Ainda, ampliando o cerco ao governo venezuelano, os Estados Unidos anunciaram medidas fortes contra a petrolífera venezuelana PDVSA. Uma cartada de muito peso.

Na nossa região a pressão maior vem do Brasil, Colômbia e Argentina. Não sei se foi uma surpresa que a Rússia e China viessem a dar apoio a Maduro. Particularmente, a posição do chanceler russo Sergey Lavrov foi extremamente agressiva contra a posição liderada pelos Estados Unidos. Isso me fez lembrar da famosa frase de nosso grande craque Garrincha, que quando o Vicente Feola falava de uma estratégia do próximo jogo contra os soviéticos, ele candidamente perguntou: “Combinaram com os russos?”.

Essa posição de duas potências, Rússia e China, se opondo à posição norte-americana, coloca em debate que o tema Venezuela possa ultrapassar os limites de um problema exclusivo da América Latina. No que nos toca, convém não esquecer que a disputa comercial Estados Unidos X China nos atinge indiretamente e também, que os interesses chineses no Brasil e na região são extremamente relevantes.

Nesse complexo tabuleiro do jogo de poder, ficamos com a sensação que a Venezuela está sendo um excelente pretexto para que os Estados Unidos reafirmem na região seus interesses e influên-

cia política, ameaçados pelos chineses, que numa posição estratégica, vem ocupando um espaço cada vez maior na região, seja como investidores ou em financiamentos.

A pressão continuará se ampliando e seu desfecho não é previsível, mesmo com a deterioração venezuelana sob todos os aspectos econômicos, políticos e sociais. Nessa situação, surpreende que Maduro ainda mantenha um certo nível de apoio popular.

A variável importante continua sendo o apoio dos militares, muito embora tenham sido percebidas algumas fissuras nesse apoio. Maduro deixou claro ser contra a convocação de novas eleições. Os Estados Unidos devem ter pensado muito antes de dar as cartas que fizeram, e de qualquer forma a situação da Venezuela é crítica. Uma solução negociada seria a melhor solução. Porém, quando escrevi esse comentário parecia distante.

Muitos quilômetros de fronteira com a Venezuela, os interesses empresariais de diferentes grupos brasileiros, uma dívida vencida, além de problemas migratórios, nos atinge diretamente. Isso sem mencionar um possível conflito armado que teria sérias implicações.

Finalizando, e o futuro da América Latina? Não querendo falar em causa própria, o comportamento do Brasil será determinante para o futuro da região.

Até agora o Ministro das Relações Exteriores tem dado indicações claras de substanciais mudanças no Itamaraty e na nossa política externa. O que vimos indiretamente após sua posse foi um entrosamento com os EUA no que toca ao governo Maduro. Como disse, uma carta pessoal e institucional muito diferente das posições cautelosas e prudentes que caracterizam a política do Itamaraty.

Alguns aspectos no discurso do novo Ministro foram lidos positivamente, como por exemplo, uma maior abertura do Itamaraty; uma postura internacional mais de acordo com nosso porte e no que toca ao Mercosul, a de subscrever a visão de uma revisão para ajustar-se às novas realidades internacionais.

Independente do nosso desempenho, não vemos grandes transformações da América Latina no contexto mundial. Continuaremos sendo um ator de menor relevância nesse complexo cenário que estamos passando e que nada faz crer que tenhamos transformações profundas no curto e médio prazo. É necessário lutar para que tenhamos espaço no contexto global e que não sejamos um ator secundário, visto exclusivamente pela relevância de nossas reservas estratégicas.



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Leslie Bethell

Marcos Caramuru

Marcos Jank




Monica de Bolle

Sebastião Salgado



# ASSOCIADOS

Em fevereiro de 2019



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## Sócios Individuais

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Álvaro Otero  
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Tomas Zinner  
Vitor Hallack  
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# EQUIPE CEBRI

Em fevereiro de 2019

Diretora Executiva  
Julia Dias Leite

Gerente Geral  
Luciana Gama Muniz

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Monique Sochaczewski

Coordenadora  
Cintia Hoskinson

Assistentes  
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Gabriel Torres  
Teresa Rossi

Estagiários  
Luiz Gustavo Carlos  
Mônica Pereira

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Carla Duarte

Consultor  
Nilson Brandão/Conteúdo Evolutivo

Estagiária  
Nathália Miranda Diniz Neves

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## Eventos

Coordenadora  
Giselle Galdi

Assistente  
Beatriz Garcia

Estagiária  
Danielle Batista

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## Institucional

Coordenadora  
Barbara Brant

Assistente  
Gina Leal

Secretária  
Danielle Justa

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## Administrativo

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Assistente  
Ana Beatriz Paiva

Serviços Gerais  
Maria Audei Campos



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