Corredor Médio: conectando o Brasil à Eurásia via Azerbaijão

Global trade patterns are undergoing significant transformation. Supply chain shocks, geopolitical tensions, and the search for reliable alternatives to traditional maritime routes have pushed countries and companies to diversify their transport corridors. In Eurasia, this shift has elevated the profile of the Middle Corridor, a multimodal network connecting East Asia and Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

For Brazil, these developments are more than distant infrastructure upgrades. The Corridor creates a potential gateway to strengthen trade and investment ties with Azerbaijan and to reach new markets in Central Asia, regions where Brazilian presence has so far been minimal. Access to these landlocked economies has historically been hindered by geography, cost, and dependence on traditional routes, many of which have become less reliable due to sanctions, conflicts, and infrastructure gaps. At the same time, Brazil has been seeking to diversify its trade routes and reduce vulnerability to global disruptions, a goal that has become more urgent in a rapidly changing world economy. The growing use of the Middle Corridor, centered on Azerbaijan, offers Brazil a new logistical alternative to connect with Eurasia.

 Azerbaijan’s geography places it at the heart of this corridor, making it an indispensable partner for any effort to link Brazil with Central Asia. The country’s recent investments in ports, railways, and logistics hubs reinforce its status as a regional transit hub. For Brazil, this creates a unique entry point into Eurasia through a partner that shares a Global South perspective and growing interest in diversified trade relations.

This paper explores the intersection of these dynamics. It examines the development of the Middle Corridor and Azerbaijan’s strategic role within it, analyzes Brazil’s current logistical constraints in Eurasia, and assesses the state of Brazil–Azerbaijan relations. Finally, it offers policy recommendations to guide how Brazil can leverage the Middle Corridor and deepen its partnership with Azerbaijan.

THE MIDDLE CORRIDOR AND ITS STRATEGIC EMERGENCE

The Middle Corridor — officially known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) — is a multimodal freight network linking East Asia to Europe through Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Starting in Southeast Asia and China, it runs through Kazakhstan, crosses the Caspian Sea by ferry, and continues across Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye into Europe. The route blends rail, road, and sea transport and is widely viewed as a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (World Bank 2023, 12). 

In recent years, the corridor has made impressive progress. Transit times from China to Europe, which once took 38 to 53 days, have dropped to around 18 to 23 days, with goals to cut that further to 14 to 18 days by 2024 to 2025 (Mussayev 2024).  A major factor behind this improvement is the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway, launched in 2017. It connects the Caspian Sea to Turkey, filling a crucial gap in the route. 

Additional upgrades, like modernized ports, new rolling stock, and unified tariffs agreed upon by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, have also made the corridor more efficient. Still, some hurdles remain, especially at intermodal transfer points like ferry terminals on the Caspian Sea. To ease this, a new multimodal terminal opened in Poti, Georgia, in June 2025. Designed to handle 120 railcars and up to 200,000 TEUs a year, it is expected to enhance capacity, especially for westbound cargo to Europe and southbound shipments through the South Caucasus (TRACECA 2025).

Geopolitical events in 2022 significantly raised the profile of the Middle Corridor. Russia’s war in Ukraine and Western sanctions on Moscow pushed many freight companies to seek overland routes that bypass Russian territory, making the Middle Corridor the only practical land bridge between China and Europe. As a result, traffic increased sharply. In 2024 more than 27,000 twenty-foot equivalent units of goods moved from China through the route, which was a twenty-five fold increase compared to 2023 (Azerbaijan Railways 2025). This growth shows how quickly trade flows have shifted toward the corridor. By the end of 2024 China and the countries along the route were already operating hundreds of freight trains. In that year 358 container block trains transited, and plans were announced to increase the number to more than 1,000 in 2025 (Daly 2025).

This rapid expansion reflects growing political support. At the October 2023 Belt and Road Forum, President Xi Jinping pledged to “participate in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Corridor” and to develop new logistics links across Eurasia (Daly 2025). This marked a clear signal of China’s commitment to the corridor’s growth.

The Middle Corridor’s core countries include Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, with Türkiye providing the onward link to Europe. Central Asian nations are also becoming more involved through connecting routes. To coordinate operations, a Trans-Caspian International Transport Route association has been formed to streamline customs, align tariffs, and promote the corridor’s services internationally.

International financial institutions have also taken an interest. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank estimate that €18.5 billion in infrastructure funding will be required across Central Asia to realize the Corridor’s full potential (Azhgaliyeva, Mogilevskii, and Akbar 2024, 126).

In short, what was once a niche trade route has become, in the words of many stakeholders, a “vital trade route” (Guliyev 2025).  For Brazil, this transformation matters because it opens the possibility of using Azerbaijan as a logistical hub to expand into Eurasia and diversify beyond traditional markets.

AZERBAIJAN’S STRATEGIC ROLE IN THE MIDDLE CORRIDOR

Azerbaijan’s geography makes it the centerpiece of the Middle Corridor. Positioned between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea region, the country serves as the central gateway where eastbound and westbound cargo flows meet. Freight from Central Asia must cross the Caspian Sea by ship and arrive at the Port of Baku before continuing west, while goods traveling east from Türkiye or Europe pass through Azerbaijan to reach Central Asia.

At the heart of Azerbaijan’s strategy is the Baku International Sea Trade Port, the country’s main maritime gateway on the Caspian. In the 2010s, the government relocated and expanded the port from its original site in central Baku to Alat, about 70 kilometers south, to develop a large-scale logistics hub. The first phase opened in 2018, enhancing capacity to 100,000 TEUs per year (Marty 2025, 2). The facility includes modern ferry terminals, rail links, storage areas, and a nearby free trade zone designed to attract investment in value-added logistics and manufacturing.

With the surge in activity along the Middle Corridor, Azerbaijan has moved ahead with the next stage of development. In December 2024, President Ilham Aliyev approved a new expansion plan with $12 million in initial funding to increase annual capacity from 100,000 to 500,000 TEUs (Marty 2025, 3). The long-term goal is to turn the port into a “key transport hub” for transcontinental trade (Guliyev 2025).

To improve coordination, Azerbaijan has signed “sister port” agreements with Kazakhstan’s Port of Aktau and Turkey’s Port of Samsun (Guliyev 2025). On land, Azerbaijan has upgraded its rail and highway infrastructure, with the centerpiece being the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway (BTK), launched in 2017 after years of trilateral cooperation. This 826-kilometer line links Azerbaijan with Türkiye’s rail system via Georgia. At launch, the BTK had a freight capacity of 6.5 million tons per year, with projections to reach 17 million tons by 2034. The line also shortened transit times, allowing cargo from the Caspian to reach European markets in 15 days (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Türkiye 2019).

Beyond the BTK, Azerbaijan is investing in north–south routes such as the International North-South Transport Corridor, linking Russia and India via Azerbaijan and Iran. While distinct from the Middle Corridor, such overlapping networks reinforce Azerbaijan’s role as a strategic transit point for Eurasian trade.

Azerbaijan’s strategy has been to engage both East and West. It aligns the Middle Corridor with China’s Belt and Road Initiative while also collaborating with the European Union and major financial institutions to secure investment and technical support. The EU’s Economic and Investment Plan under the Eastern Partnership, for example, includes funding for transport infrastructure in Azerbaijan and Georgia (EU Neighbours East 2021).

Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which share responsibility for the Caspian leg of the corridor, have jointly invested in new ferries and standardized procedures to streamline cargo transfers. This cross-Caspian ferry fleet is expanding as both Baku and Aktau acquire additional vessels and improve port operations (Guliyev 2025). 

The World Bank projects that by 2030, freight traffic through the Trans-Caspian route could reach 11 million tons annually, a significant increase from current levels (World Bank 2023, 7).

BRAZIL’S CURRENT EURASIAN TRADE ROUTES AND LOGISTICAL CONSTRAINTS

Brazil’s trade with Eurasia has traditionally relied on maritime transport, given Brazil’s location and the vast distances involved. In particular, China is connected almost entirely via ocean shipping. Brazilian soybeans, iron ore, oil, and other commodities sail from Atlantic ports (like Santos, Paranaguá, Itaqui) around the Cape of Good Hope or through the Panama Canal to reach China and other Asian markets. These voyages can take 30–45 days each way. Similarly, trade with Europe crosses the Atlantic by sea, typically a 12–15 day transit. Maritime routes have been cost-effective for bulk goods, but they are also lengthy and vulnerable to disruptions (e.g. port congestion or canal blockages). Brazil’s exports to South Caucasus, Central or Inner Asia are limited today, because those landlocked markets are hard to reach via traditional routes.

Unlike with East Asia or Europe, Brazil does not have established trade channels with Central Asia or the Caucasus. Countries like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan remain distant, both geographically and logistically. Trade volumes are minimal despite the potential, largely due to the lack of direct transport links and the complexity of accessing these landlocked regions. Currently, a Brazilian product might be shipped to a European or Turkish port, then transferred by rail or ferry through Russia or Iran. These routes involve multiple handoffs, added time, and higher costs. For some time, the Trans-Siberian Railway through Russia offered a land-based alternative, but sanctions and geopolitical tensions have made that route increasingly unreliable. The southern corridor through Iran, using the port of Bandar Abbas and northbound rail, also faces obstacles due to sanctions, conflicts and infrastructure gaps.

The Middle Corridor introduces a new option. It offers an intermodal path linking Brazil to Central Asia through a mix of sea and rail, routed via Azerbaijan. A practical demonstration of this took place in late 2024, when Uzbekistan dispatched its first block train of goods to Brazil using this route. The shipment included 54 containers of urea fertilizer from Tashkent. It traveled by rail through Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to the Port of Turkmenbashi, crossed the Caspian Sea by ferry to the Port of Baku, and continued overland by rail to Georgia’s Port of Poti. From there, the cargo was shipped by sea to Paranaguá, Brazil. The total journey takes about 60 to 70 days (roughly 20 days overland to the Black Sea, followed by 35 to 45 days at sea to Brazil) (Kazimbeyli 2024). While not rapid, this pilot shipment proved that direct logistics between Central Asia and Brazil are not only feasible but already in motion. In the future, similar routes could be used in reverse for Brazilian exports (e.g. shipping Brazilian agricultural goods to Poti and sending them by rail-ferry to Central Asia via Baku). The corridor thus helps reduce the distance to previously inaccessible markets.

Despite these new options, constraints persist for Brazil’s Eurasian logistics:

• Distance and cost: Even with the Middle Corridor, shipments from Brazil to Central Asia involve long distances, including an Atlantic crossing, a ferry passage across the Caspian Sea, and extensive inland transit. These layers of movement add cost, particularly for smaller shipments. Unless cargo volumes are large enough to distribute expenses efficiently, the per-unit cost can be significant. This limits the competitiveness of the route for many types of goods. As noted, purely ocean-based shipping remains cheaper for bulk trade, though it cannot reach landlocked regions like Central Asia.
  
  To address these limitations, two key areas are receiving attention. First, countries along the corridor are working to increase freight volumes by expanding the use of block trains, which combine shipments into large units. Azerbaijan and its partners plan to increase annual block train traffic to over 1,000 trains by 2025 (Daly 2025). Second, ferry capacity across the Caspian is being increased through the procurement of new vessels and upgrades at the Ports of Baku and Aktau, aimed at reducing delays and handling times. A new Ro-Pax ferry is under construction at Baku Shipyard, alongside expanded terminals to handle rising cargo volumes (Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company 2024).

• Customs and regulations: Shipments along the Middle Corridor must navigate several border crossings, each with its own legal and regulatory requirements. This includes transitions into and out of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Caspian Sea, which operates under a separate legal regime. Without trade or transit agreements between Brazil and corridor countries, shipments may face added paperwork and bureaucratic delays.
  
  To reduce these frictions, countries along the corridor are working to harmonize customs processes. Concrete steps include the implementation of the electronic TIR (eTIR) system by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, and the adoption of single-window digital platforms that allow shippers to submit documents once and track goods across multiple borders (Dayar 2025).

• Awareness and partnership: Brazilian companies currently have little familiarity with logistics in Central Asia or the Caucasus. They would likely need reliable local partners. Conversely, Central Asian shippers may not know Brazil as a market. Forums or business matching would be required to generate deal flow that make use of these emerging routes.
• Lack of established shipping lines: Unlike the well-established Brazil–China maritime route, there are currently no regular shipping lines connecting Brazilian ports directly to the Caucasus or Black Sea for Brazil–Central Asia trade. Shipments would need to rely on ad hoc arrangements or be added to existing services bound for Europe or the Middle East. This adds uncertainty and possibly longer wait times.  

Nonetheless, these constraints are gradually easing as international corridors become more functional. The Middle Corridor’s expanding geography of users, now including countries like Uzbekistan trading with South America, shows that innovative logistics solutions are emerging. For Brazil, this means the previous barriers to engaging with Central Asia are beginning to lower.

BRAZIL–AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: DIPLOMATIC AND TRADE TIES

Despite the geographic distance, Brazil and Azerbaijan have gradually built diplomatic and economic ties since Azerbaijan gained independence from the Soviet Union. Brazil recognized Azerbaijan in the early 1990s, and formal diplomatic relations were established in October 1993. While high level visits have been limited, reflecting that the two countries are not central to each other’s foreign policy agendas, engagement has grown in recent years. Notably, Brazil’s Vice President Geraldo Alckmin visited Azerbaijan during COP29, and a high-level Azerbaijani visit to Belém, Brazil is expected for COP30. Interparliamentary contacts and political consultations have also taken place, and both foreign ministries have expressed interest in forming a joint working group on trade and investment.

A symbolic milestone in this relationship was the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Trade and Investment in 2016. The agreement outlined areas for collaboration including energy, infrastructure, agriculture, innovation, and tourism, and established a bilateral joint working group. The first meeting of this Intergovernmental Joint Working Group on Trade and Investment is scheduled for 2025 and is expected to give new momentum to trade and investment discussions between the two countries (Guliyeva 2025). 

Another significant step in the relationship was the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture in 2024. Both parties committed to expanding collaboration in several areas, including the exchange of scientific and technological innovations, joint agrarian research, development of agricultural infrastructure, and the facilitation of trade missions. The agreement also serves as a legal framework to increase bilateral trade in agricultural products (Agricultural Research Center 2024).

Importantly, Brazil is among Azerbaijan’s top trading partners in Latin America. While bilateral trade remains modest in scale, it has been steadily increasing. In 2024, total trade volume reached 193 million US dollars, with Brazil’s exports dominating the exchange. The primary export is raw cane sugar, accounting for around 150 million dollars in 2024. Other key Brazilian exports include meat, machinery, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, peanuts etc. Brazilian meat (11 million US dollars in 2024) has particularly strong potential, as Azerbaijan imports both poultry and beef, though currently suppliers like Belarus and Ukraine have larger shares in that market (Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee 2024). Beyond food and industrial goods, Brazil has also exported aircraft to Azerbaijan. Embraer, for example, delivered several planes in 2013.

On the other side, Azerbaijan’s exports to Brazil have been limited but are beginning to grow, particularly in niche sectors. A notable example is fertilizer. Azerbaijan’s large urea plant, which began operations in 2019, produces nitrogen-based fertilizers that have found a ready market in Brazil’s agricultural sector. In 2021, Brazil was reported as one of the largest importers of Azerbaijani fertilizers, with shipments valued at 71 million dollars. This aligns with Brazil’s broader strategy to diversify its fertilizer supply, especially given the geopolitical risks associated with relying on traditional suppliers. Other Azerbaijani exports to Brazil have included small volumes of fuel oils and petrochemical products. In recent years, total exports from Azerbaijan to Brazil have ranged between 13 and 20 million dollars annually (Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee 2024). This figure may rise if fertilizer exports continue to grow.

In early 2025, Azerbaijan’s imports from Brazil surged, reaching 120 million dollars in just the first three months of the year, a fourfold increase compared to the same period in 2024. The spike was driven by Brazil’s first-ever gold exports to Azerbaijan, which accounted for about 80 million dollars. This reflected Azerbaijan’s rising demand for gold and growing interest in Latin American reserves. Mexico currently leads in gold exports to Azerbaijan, but Brazil appears to be gaining a foothold in this emerging trade flow (Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee 2025).

Although Brazil and Azerbaijan differ in size, geography, and alliances, they share a notable convergence in their global south outlook. Both countries have increasingly supported a more multipolar international order and a stronger voice for developing nations in shaping global rules and institutions. This alignment is reflected in Brazil’s leadership within BRICS and Azerbaijan’s leadership role in the Non-Aligned Movement.

Under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s current administration, Brazil has revitalized its engagement with BRICS, positioning it as a central pillar of its foreign policy. President Lula has described BRICS as a platform to “coordinate the Global South” and promote a “more balanced, multipolar order” in international affairs (BRICS Brasil 2025). Although Azerbaijan is not a BRICS member, it has shown interest in the grouping’s goals. In August 2024, Azerbaijan formally submitted its application to join BRICS, signaling a desire to align with its vision and priorities (Gavin 2024).

On the other hand, Azerbaijan has played a central role in the Non-Aligned Movement. During its chairmanship from 2019 to 2023, Azerbaijan worked actively to revitalize NAM’s influence on the global stage. In President Ilham Aliyev’s words, countries of the Global South now represent two-thirds of United Nations members, approximately 80 percent of the world’s population, and half of global trade. Their increased participation in building a more sustainable, fair, and secure world order, he argued, is “a natural process.” He also emphasized the need for inclusive dialogue and shared responsibility in addressing global challenges (Enveroglu 2025). These views closely parallel Brazil’s long-standing advocacy for reform of the United Nations Security Council and for greater representation of emerging powers.

STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BRAZIL

Azerbaijan’s emergence as a Eurasian transport hub and proactive global south actor presents several strategic opportunities for Brazil and to capitalize on them, Brazil should undertake a series of policy measures and initiatives. The following recommendations are intended towards Brazilian policymakers, with a vision to strengthening bilateral ties with Azerbaijan and leveraging the Middle Corridor for mutual benefit:

Strategic use of Azerbaijani infrastructure

Brazil can diversify its trade by leveraging Azerbaijan as a gateway to Eurasia. The Middle Corridor opens direct access to Central Asia’s markets and improves connections to Turkey, the Caucasus, and even Western China. These are regions where Brazil currently has a very limited presence, but which have growing demand for commodities and consumer goods. For example, South Caucasus and Central Asia’s agricultural import needs (meat, sugar, coffee, corn) could be met by Brazilian exporters if logistics are established. Likewise, Brazil could find new customers for industrial goods (e.g. airplanes, machinery) in these countries as they develop. Using Azerbaijan’s logistics infrastructure, such as storing goods at the Alat Free Economic Zone near Baku and then distributing via rail, Brazilian companies could consolidate a regional supply chain. This would reduce reliance on traditional markets and shipping lanes, in line with Brazil’s desire to be less vulnerable to global volatility.

Building on the Uzbekistan-to-Brazil train success, Brazil’s government could coordinate a pilot export using the Middle Corridor, for instance, sending a shipment of Brazilian goods to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan. This pilot, done in collaboration with Azerbaijani logistics companies, would test the route from the Brazilian side. The findings (cost, time, needed improvements) can inform future efforts. If feasible, Brazil could then work with Azerbaijan’s port and rail authorities to establish a “green lane” for Brazilian cargo: e.g., pre-clearing customs and prioritizing handling for goods with Brazil as origin/destination, to make the process efficient. 

In addition to rail and maritime routes, Azerbaijan’s Silk Way Airlines offers an emerging air cargo channel that could serve Brazil’s strategic export and import needs across Eurasia.  Azerbaijan’s geographic position makes it a viable transit hub for cargo heading to Central Asia, China, or returning to Brazil. Notably, in 2017, a 36-ton shipment from China to a Brazilian car manufacturing company was transported via Silk Way’s network (Silk Way Group, 2017). Expanding such operations could offer Brazil a faster alternative for high-value or time-sensitive goods.

Engagement in Eurasian transport infrastructure

Brazil, as a leading economy, can invest in or participate in the development of Eurasian transport networks, hence gaining both influence and business opportunities. One avenue is through the New Development Bank (NDB) (also known as BRICS Bank) of which Brazil is a founding member. Brazil could encourage the NDB to finance infrastructure improvements along the Middle Corridor, for example, upgrading railway lines in Kazakhstan or modernizing port facilities in Azerbaijan and Georgia, which would strengthen the route and indirectly support Brazilian trade. Another potential path is direct partnership: Brazilian engineering and logistics companies or leading construction firms could bid for transport and infrastructure projects, offering Brazilian expertise in road construction, rail operations, and airport management. Additionally, those companies could test services abroad via Azerbaijan. For instance, a Brazilian freight forwarder might set up a regional office in Baku to handle Latin America–Central Asia cargo, essentially becoming a pioneer in that niche market.

Additionally, port partnerships could be fostered. The Port of Baku already has sister-port agreements with Aktau and Samsun. Hence, Brazilian ports (for example, the Port of Santos or Paranaguá) might consider signing cooperation MoUs with Baku. This could facilitate knowledge exchange on port digitalization, customs procedures, and even pave the way for Brazil-Caspian shipping services if volumes grow. 

Energy cooperation

Both Brazil and Azerbaijan are major energy players – Brazil in oil (with Petrobras pre-salt production) and biofuels, Azerbaijan in oil and gas (through SOCAR and the Caspian fields). There is room for mutually beneficial cooperation in energy technology, investment, and security of supply. For example, Petrobras and SOCAR could collaborate on offshore drilling techniques or petrochemical projects. Azerbaijan has experience in natural gas pipeline projects (it built TANAP and TAP to Turkey and Europe) which could be insightful for Brazil’s gas infrastructure expansion, while Brazil’s advanced work in deepwater drilling could benefit Azerbaijan’s efforts to develop smaller deep Caspian reservoirs. On renewable energy, Brazil’s expertise in ethanol, biomass, and increasingly in wind/solar can align with Azerbaijan’s plans to invest in renewables (Azerbaijan has significant wind potential in the Caspian and solar in its semi-arid regions).

In this regard, Petrobras and SOCAR can launch specific cooperative projects, such as create a joint working group on offshore petroleum technology and possibly renewable energy investment. This could lead to joint R&D. It might also explore LNG trade, Azerbaijan could be a source via the Southern Gas Corridor, diversifying Brazil’s gas import options.

A concrete example of Brazil–Azerbaijan cooperation is Petrobras’s partnership with Azerbaijan’s state-owned Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company (ASCO). In January 2025, ASCO began leasing an Aframax-class tanker to Petrobras under a three-year charter. The vessel completed its first charter voyage from Brazil to Singapore and Malaysia, and it has since also completed a delivery to Saudi Arabia. Petrobras has praised the arrangement and is reportedly considering leasing additional ASCO vessels to support its offshore operations (Azerbaijan Caspian Shipping Company 2025). 

Bilateral engagement and knowledge sharing

To deepen cooperation, the Working Group on Trade and Investment should hold regular meetings and be expanded to include cooperation on infrastructure and energy. The existing potential of the MoU on Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture should also be fully utilized. For instance, as noted, Azerbaijan has been exporting growing volumes of urea fertilizer, which directly supports Brazil’s agricultural sector. A long-term supply contract or partnership between Azerbaijani fertilizer producers and the Brazilian agro-industry could be developed within the framework of this agreement. Additionally, the MoU can serve as a platform to promote exchanges between Azerbaijan’s agricultural research institutions and Brazil’s EMBRAPA, focusing on areas such as farming techniques, cotton cultivation, and irrigation.

Facilitating business connections

Last but not least, Brazilian industry associations (e.g. CNI, ApexBrasil) should be encouraged to organize trade missions to Azerbaijan and Central Asia, using Baku as a regional base. Likewise, Azerbaijan’s trade delegations should be hosted in Brazil, particularly in sectors such as petrochemicals, cotton/textiles, and technology startups, where Azerbaijan is actively developing its capabilities. Joint business forums and roundtables are especially valuable for raising the visibility of bilateral opportunities. These can be organized in partnership with AZPROMO (the Trade and Investment Promotion Agency of Azerbaijan), which regularly holds business forums with international partners. Another promising step would be the establishment of a Brazil–Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce or business council, which could offer a platform for networking, collaboration, and private sector engagement.

CONCLUSION

The rapid rise of the Middle Corridor has transformed it from a niche route into a central artery of Eurasian trade. For Azerbaijan, this shift has reinforced its role as a pivotal transit hub between East and West. For Brazil, it has opened a new pathway into Central Asia and the South Caucasus, regions that were previously distant in both geography and policy.

The opportunities are clear. By leveraging Azerbaijani infrastructure, Brazil could expand its agricultural and industrial exports into new markets, while also strengthening imports of fertilizers and other strategic goods. Deeper cooperation in logistics, infrastructure, and energy could diversify Brazil’s global partnerships and align with its broader strategy of reducing dependency on traditional routes and Atlantic-only markets.

At the same time, challenges should not be underestimated. The Corridor remains costly and complex, with multiple handoffs, evolving customs regimes, and uncertain volumes. Brazil also lacks established shipping lines and sufficient awareness of Eurasian logistics among its business community. These structural obstacles mean that realizing the Corridor’s full potential will require sustained investment, institutional cooperation, and consistent political support.

In short, the Middle Corridor should not be seen as an immediate solution but as a long-term strategic opportunity. If Brazil works with Azerbaijan and other corridor countries to address the logistical and regulatory barriers, the route can become a viable bridge linking South America with Eurasia. Balancing ambition with realism will be key to ensuring that this emerging connection strengthens Brazil’s trade resilience in an increasingly unpredictable world.

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Submitted: July 9, 2025
Accepted for publication: September 1st, 2025

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