A segurança da Europa em jogo

The EU has at times been described as an economic giant, but also a political dwarf and a military worm (EEAS 2022a). While this is a cliché, like many clichés it has a basic element of truth in it. The last two years saw a worsening of the EU’s strategic environment. One defining moment came when the Taliban took the Afghan capital Kabul in the summer of 2021, and thousands of EU citizens had to be evacuated under dangerous conditions. Today we are living through the most dangerous moment of the post-Cold War period, witnessing Russian aggression in Ukraine–a war is once again taking place on the European continent. Not only is the fate of Ukraine at stake, but also the wider principles of European and international security, as well as the world’s geostrategic order. 

In addition to what is happening at its eastern borders, the EU has an unprecedented number of conflicts brewing farther afield: Syria, Libya, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The EU has security interests at stake around the world, in the western Balkans, the Middle East, Africa and the Indo-Pacific. Threats come from everywhere and manifest themselves in all strategic domains: cyber, maritime and space. 

The pandemic has exposed and accelerated underlying trends. The world is marked by aggressive competition with US-China strategic rivalry as the main structuring force. There is a geographic power shift from West to East, from the Atlantic world to the Indo-Pacific. There is also a functional shift, away from governments. Our world is being transformed by financial markets, technology giants and media conglomerates–but also by crime syndicates, sleeper cells and hackers. 

While traditionally conflict situations were marked by military disputes, today we are facing invisible wars everywhere, and everything is being weaponized: migrants, vaccines, energy, technology standards, they have all become tools for political competition. 

It is also no longer possible to talk about climate change and environmental degradation without seeing the connection to security and defence matters. The direct and indirect effects of climate change, biodiversity loss and environmental degradation represent risks to the realisation of human rights, human and State security, undermining global peace and stability and often accelerating or deepening existing vulnerabilities and uncertainties.  

All of the above is happening while the multilateral system is at its weakest in 30 years. Because relations among the main actors are conflictual, international cooperation has ground to a halt. The United Nations (UN), the Group of Twenty (G20), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): the world needs them like never before, but all are weakened by distrust, vetoes, and infighting. 

The United Nations, the Group of Twenty, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe: the world needs them like never before, but all are weakened by distrust, vetoes, and infighting. 

The above demonstrates that we are dealing with a risky cocktail: more problems, which are more complex and serious, but less capacity to cope with them.

Step by step towards a Common EU Security and Defence Policy

Security and defence are inherently sovereign domains of utmost national importance. While economic integration came relatively easy to the EU’s member states, the same cannot be said about political integration, and even less about security and defence issues. 

European defence integration only gained momentum after the end of the Cold War, partly as a result of the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, when it became clear that the EU needed to assume its responsibilities in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. 

The 1999 Treaty of Amsterdam listed the conditions under which military units could be deployed. In 2003, the former High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr. Javier Solana, was tasked by the EU member states to develop a Security Strategy for Europe. The document, entitled A Secure Europe in a Better World (EUR-Lex 2011), analysed, for the first time, the EU’s security environment and identified key security challenges and subsequent political implications. 

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty was a cornerstone in the development of an EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The Treaty included both mutual assistance and a solidarity clause and allowed for the creation, as of January 2011, of the European External Action Service (EEAS) under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). This position has been held, since December 2019, by Mr. Josep Borrell (ES), preceded by Ms. Federica Mogherini (IT) and Ms. Catherine Ashton (UK). The two distinct functions of the post give the HR/VP the possibility to bring all the necessary EU assets together and to apply a comprehensive approach to EU crisis management. 

Since 2003, the EU has been deploying civilian and military missions around the world. By late 2021, around 5.000 military and civilian staff were deployed in CSDP missions and operations in three continents, working for a more stable world and contributing to a safer Europe. The most recent missions and operations are supporting security in the Central African Republic and enforcing the UN arms embargo on Libya in the Mediterranean Sea. The range of tasks is set out in the EU treaties, ranging from conflict prevention and peacekeeping, crisis management, joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance to humanitarian efforts, and rescue and post-conflict stabilisation (European Union 2021).

European Security and Defence

Realising that Europe faces new and increasing threats that are not just military or territorial, in 2021 the debate about European security and defence switched gears. In her September 2021 State of the Union address to the European Parliament, the president of the European Commission, Ms. Ursula von der Leyen, called for the EU to take its work on defence to the next level, moving from a defence eco-system to a genuine European Defence Union. 

Shortly thereafter, the president of the European Council, Mr. Charles Michel, declared that 2022 would be the year of European defence, adding that a stronger EU role on security and defence would also strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. That same month, president Biden welcomed a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security, and is complementary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In October 2021, EU leaders discussed the impact of major geopolitical events and decisions, which had put into question Europe’s ability to defend its interests and vision. They agreed that Europe could not afford to be a bystander in a hyper-competitive world. 

European citizens are also aware of this new context, continuing to favour dialogue over confrontation, diplomacy over force, multilateralism over unilateralism. However, at the same time, and according to numerous opinion polls, the EU’s citizens want the EU to contribute in a more active way to their security and that of the world. They understand that the EU must connect the defence efforts of the member states, avoiding duplications and gaps in the EU’s critical capabilities, to be more efficient in providing this protection. The citizens know that the EU’s security starts away from its borders. Therefore, the EU needs to project its presence in the world, promoting security in its neighbourhood and with its partners. 

The Strategic Compass

In 2021, under the leadership of the HR/VP Borrell, EU member states set out to define a response strategy. Starting from a common threat assessment, they worked on a Strategic Compass (EEAS 2021b, 2021c, 2021d) aimed at providing an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030.  

The Strategic Compass represents a quantum leap forward when it comes to EU’s security. 

The Strategic Compass represents a quantum leap forward when it comes to EU’s security. The more hostile security environment requires the EU to increase its capacity and willingness to act, strengthen its resilience and invest more and better in the EU’s defence capabilities. It represents a political proposal to prevent the major risk that the EU is facing: that of strategic shrinkage, or the risk of being always principled but seldom relevant. 

Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Defence Policy, said on March 21, 2022 (EEAS 2022d): 

The threats are rising and the cost of inaction is clear. The Strategic Compass is a guide for action. It sets out an ambitious way forward for our security and defence policy for the next decade. It will help us face our security responsibilities, in front of our citizens and the rest of the world. If not now, then when? 

The Strategic Compass is grouped under four work strands – Act, Secure, Invest and Partner. One of its main provisions is that the EU should be able to rescue citizens in a situation like in Afghanistan in 2021, or intervene quickly in a crisis where violence is threatening the lives of civilians, as is the case with Ukraine. As part of the Strategic Compass, the EU will develop a Rapid Deployment Capacity to swiftly deploy up to 5.000 troops for different types of crises. 

The EU will further increase its readiness through regular live exercises, promote faster and more flexible decision-making and ensure greater financial solidarity by enlarging the scope of common costs. In addition, the EU will create an EU Hybrid Toolbox and expand its already existing capacity to tackle disinformation and foreign interference. 

The EU will also increase investment into the necessary strategic enablers and next-generation capabilities, such as high-end naval platforms, future combat air systems or capacities for space-based earth observation. The aim is to mobilise the entirety of the EU’s tools. 

Last but not least, through the Strategic Compass the EU will cooperate with strategic and like-minded partners and develop tailored partnerships, including with Latin America, through enhanced dialogues, cooperation, the promotion of participation of partners in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations supporting capacity-building. 

The Versailles Declaration, March 11, 2022^[1]

Before the Strategic Compass could even be adopted on March 21, the relevance of the EU’s renewed emphasis on defence and security matters was confirmed, when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, creating what EU leaders have termed a tectonic shift in European history. 

Confronted with growing instability, strategic competition and security threats, EU leaders convening in Versailles on March 10 and 11, 2022, decided to take more responsibility for the EU’s security and to take further decisive steps towards building European sovereignty, reducing dependencies and designing a new growth and investment model for 2030. 

In the resulting document–the Versailles Declaration of  March 11, 2022–EU leaders decided to invest more and better in defence and innovative technologies. They agreed to, amongst others, substantially increase defence expenditures in a collaborative way; to invest in capabilities necessary to conduct the full range of missions and operations; and to foster synergies between civilian, defence and space research and innovation. 

EU leaders also paved the way to prepare Europe for fast-emerging challenges by strengthening the EU’s cyber resilience, protecting critical infrastructure and fighting disinformation. In addition, the Heads of State and Government of the European Union put emphasis on the need to enhance the security and defence dimension of space industries and activities, and on the acceleration of efforts to enhance military mobility through the territory.  

The EU’s over-dependence on Russian energy and the resulting urgency for  increased energy autonomy was a further key dimension in Versailles. In this respect, EU leaders agreed i.a. to accelerate the reduction of the overall reliance on fossil fuel, diversifying energy supplies and routes, further developing a hydrogen market for Europe, speeding up the development of renewables and the production of their key components. 

Finally, the Versailles Declaration pointed to the need for the EU to build a more robust economic base by reducing the EU’s strategic dependencies in particularly sensitive areas: critical raw materials, semiconductors, health, digital and food security. 

NATO remains at the heart of Europe’s defence

The EU’s objective to strengthen its own approach to security does not come at the expense of NATO, which remains at the heart of Europe’s territorial defence. Out of the twenty-seven EU member states, twenty-one are NATO members, only Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden are currently not members (NATO 2021).

Sharing strategic interests and facing the same challenges, NATO and the EU are working side by side in crisis management, capability development and political consultations, as well as providing support to their common partners in the East and South. Over the past years, NATO-EU cooperation has reached unprecedented levels, with tangible results in countering hybrid and cyber threats; strategic communication; military mobility; defence capabilities, industry and research; military exercises, counter-terrorism, and defence and security capacity building.  

The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO and the NATO-EU strategic partnership is essential for the security and prosperity of the Euro-Atlantic area. This certainty was reaffirmed at the  March 24, 2022 extraordinary NATO Summit. As stated in the Summit’s communiqué, the EU and NATO will continue to further strengthen their strategic partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the organisations’ different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity. Political dialogue between NATO and the EU remains essential to advance this cooperation. The current strategic environment and the COVID pandemic underscore the importance of NATO-EU cooperation in the face of current and evolving security challenges, in particular in addressing resilience issues, emerging and disruptive technologies, the security implications of climate change, disinformation and the growing geostrategic competition.  

In other words, it is not either the EU or NATO; it is both (EEAS 2022a).

Rules-based multilateralism is part of the EU’s DNA

Multilateralism is in the EU’s DNA, which makes it a natural ally of the United Nations and regional organisations in supporting democracy and protecting human rights, fundamental freedoms and the respect for human dignity including gender equality, the rights of the child, and LGBTIQ rights (EEAS 2021a).

The EU has always defended and promoted those principles, and pushed back against attempts to undermine them. It will continue to stand up against any attempt to backtrack on the principle that all human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated. The EU will team up with all those who support democracy, access to justice, and accountable and inclusive institutions.

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has shown that, thirty years after the end of the Cold War, the world is facing a determined effort to redefine core tenets of the multilateral order. The outcome of this conflict will decide whether the post-war multilateral acquis (the body of what we have achieved) survives, centred on the UN, international law and universal rights. Alternatively, on the contrary, whether it will be replaced by a power-based, multipolar order, with zones of influence and a relativist approach to human rights. 

The EU also supports the reform process initiated by the UN Secretary-General to make the UN fit for purpose. The EU was instrumental in securing the adoption of the General Assembly resolutions that have enabled progress on the reform's three strands–management, peace and security architecture, and development system. A more accountable, transparent and efficient UN system will be in the interest of all. The EU, therefore, stands ready to support addressing remaining challenges and the implementation and impact on the ground. The revitalisation of the General Assembly, as well as a comprehensive reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), will be essential to ensure that the UN can truly live up to its responsibilities under its Charter in the 21st century (EEAS 2021a).

Since the start of the pandemic, the term battle of narratives has often featured in the press. What started as a battle over which model was best at combating the pandemic has since turned into a battle over the very nature of the international order 

Since the start of the pandemic, the term battle of narratives has often featured in the press. What started as a battle over which model was best at combating the pandemic has since turned into a battle over the very nature of the international order (EEAS 2022c). The EU has been observing for a number of years that, in the multilateral organisation, there is a battle about the universality of human rights. Competing visions and agendas are at play to challenge the basic principles of international law, human rights, democracy and rule of law, hampering efforts to promote more multilateral governance and rules-based international cooperation. Authoritarian powers–not just Russia and China–seek to create new dynamics and to relativize the notion of fundamental individual rights, subjecting them to local and culturally determined limitations. Moreover, powerful non-state actors, including digital platforms and multinationals, have become shapers of international norms outside established channels. In this context, existing institutions upholding fundamental rights, universal values and international law, that form the bedrock of cooperative relations between countries and peoples, have been very often bypassed or misused for narrow national or ideological interests.

The EU, Latin America and the Caribbean represent one-third of UN members 

Latin America promotes a pluralistic vision of the international community based on rules, dialogue, cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution. Closely connected in terms of history, culture and values, the EU, Latin America and the Caribbean are among the most like-minded regions, making up together one-third of the UN membership. Together, they also account for seven members of the G20. 

Over the past decades, the political dialogue between the EU, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the different sub-regional groupings has contributed to the increased importance of security issues in and for both regions, and has revealed the need of constructing interregional instruments to meet those new challenges. Considerable progress has been made with the inclusion of citizen security as a priority area in EU-CELAC Action Plans, and the conclusion of framework agreements on the participation of some Latin American countries in EU crisis management operations. Further incremental improvements may be achieved with the inclusion of the security dimension in the other pillars of regional cooperation that would allow developing new concepts for interregional cooperation on defence and security (e.g. migration, maritime security and ocean life protection, climate change and energy, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control, and countering organised crime and terrorism). 

To complement this political dialogue between regions, the EU is also determined to deepen the bilateral relations with the Latin American countries, with a special focus on the two strategic partners in the region, Brazil and Mexico, and promoting the Association Agreements already in force or under negotiation. Those Agreements, based on the principles of democracy, respect for human rights–but also promoting sustainability–are our common roadmaps to the future. Brazil’s membership of the UN Security Council for 2022-2023 and of the HRC offers an opportunity to further advance EU-Brazil dialogue and cooperation at multilateral level. 

In Colombia, the EU has been accompanying, for decades, the country in its efforts for peace and security. The implementation of the 2016 Peace Agreement will remain at the centre of this engagement. The EU pursues an integrated approach to support the peace process, including through political and security dialogues, humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and the promotion of trade. The EU established the EU Trust Fund for Peace in Colombia: 20 EU member states, the UK and Chile have pledged a total of €130 million to the Trust Fund for projects focusing on rural local economic development and reincorporation of ex-combatants. 

Given the multifaceted threats and challenges to both regions from all strategic directions, there is scope for greater bilateral cooperation between the two, but also multilateral cooperation when the global security or stability is threatened, or when our fundamental values and principles are at risk. Latin America and the Caribbean responded like no other region in the world when it came to condemning Russian aggression at UN level. They recognised that this is not another war between Europeans that seems far away. The region was on the side of international law, the UN Charter, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and, ultimately, the values that unite us in peaceful and respectful coexistence. 

Covid: health as a security issue

The pandemic has triggered a serious and global crisis. It started to significantly shift the geopolitical balance of the world. The effects of the pandemic have deepened existing conflicts and crises, with a direct impact on the EU’s own security. Covid-19 has brought along new threats; it has uncovered strengths and vulnerabilities (European Commission 2020).

Already at the start of the pandemic, HR/VP Josep Borrell (2020) predicted that it would have significant implications for international defence and security:

One thing is clear: the Covid-19 crisis will be a re-defining moment for our societies, for our economies–and for our security and defence policy. Health now is a security issue.

The EU’s ability to contribute to vaccinating the whole world remains a central issue for its external policy. First, because the pandemic has truly demonstrated that no one will be safe, until everyone is safe. Everyone’s health can be better protected by vaccines, and the more people are vaccinated, the less risk there is of new variants emerging among unvaccinated parts of the population. Second, because demonstrating the EU’s solidarity will influence the future attitudes of many emerging and developing countries. Continuing investing in the production and distribution of Covid-19 vaccines worldwide is therefore one of the most important public spending priorities. Vaccinating the world will cost billions of dollars, but it should boost growth prospects sufficiently to keep economies alive and to raise tax revenues in countries many times over. In other words, what governments spend on vaccinations will pay for itself later on.

At the beginning of the pandemic, there was no funding, no global framework for a COVID vaccine–just the rush for every country to be the first to get one. Less than two months after the pandemic hit Europe, the EU stepped up to lead the global response. With civil society, the G20, the World Health Organization and others, the EU brought more than 40 countries together to raise EUR 16 billion to finance research on vaccines, tests and treatments for the whole world, demonstrating the EU's convening power in action. 

However, it is not enough to find a vaccine. The EU wishes to make sure that not only European citizens, but all men, women and children around the world have access to vaccines. This is why the EU joined the COVAX global facility in September 2020, and contributed EUR 400 million to help ensure that safe vaccines are available not only for those who can afford it, but for everyone who needs it.

The EU’s first priority in the context of the pandemic continues to be the speed-up of global vaccination. With less than 10% of global doses administered in low-income countries by the end of 2021, the scale of injustice and the level of urgency are obvious. Team Europe (the EU and its 27 member states) is investing one billion euro to ramp up mRNA production capacity in Africa. The EU committed to share 250 million doses, and by mid-2022 the EU will add a new donation of another 200 million doses. This is an investment in solidarity–but also in global health and security. Overall, the EU delivered more than 700 million doses to the European people, and more than another 700 million doses to the rest of the world, to more than 130 countries, including 125 million doses to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). In early May 2021, COVAX delivered 3.9 million Covid-19 vaccine doses to Brazil. 

In Brazil, the EU Delegation and the embassies of the EU member states also joined efforts with Brazilian institutions to accommodate the challenges of the Covid-19 pandemic. The support actions included two initiatives. Firstly, physical emergency aid provided mainly through existing projects financed by the EU and its member states. Work plans were adjusted in order to include actions to prevent and combat the pandemic. Projects included, for example, information campaigns, basic food baskets and hygiene materials. Seventy actions were supported for the amount of EUR 22.6 million in grants. Secondly, the EU financial institutions mobilised EUR 635 million in loans, for example, to support the Brazilian government's emergency aid programmes or to support the economic recovery of micro and small businesses in North-eastern Brazil.

At regional level, the EU contributes to implementing the UN ECLAC/CEPAL Plan for self-sufficiency in health matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, including vaccine manufacturing in the region, that was endorsed by the Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States on September 18, 2021, in which the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, participated.

Energy transition will change geopolitical balances

Energy has always been an important geopolitical issue. With high prices and gas supply’s challenges caused by the crisis with Russia, it is at the top of the EU’s agenda. Until recently, over 40% of EU gas imports came from Russia, and 60% of the energy revenues that Russia received came from the EU. Russia had already used energy supplies for political purposes in the past. During the weeks ahead of the invasion of Ukraine, although Russia had been fulfilling strictly its contractual commitments, Russian-state owned Gazprom had refused to send additional supplies to refill European storage facilities (EEAS 2022b).  

Together with the United States (US) and other partners, the EU opposes the use of energy supply as a weapon and geopolitical lever. The EU-US joint statement on energy security of January 2022 placed resilience to future price shocks and safeguards against geopolitical tensions at the centre of the transatlantic energy security agenda (European Commission 2022). The EU and the US are committed to ensuring the energy security of the EU and its neighbours, including Moldova, Ukraine and the Western Balkans.

By reducing the overall gas import ratio from Russia, the EU would be investing not only in the green transition, but also in reducing its strategic dependencies. In recent years, Russia has enhanced its resilience against economic sanctions by increasing its foreign currency reserves, more than the EU has done to enhance its capacity to face potential gas supply cuts. As indicated by the HR/VP, the EU needs to urgently consider developing strategic gas reserves and the possibility of joint gas purchasing. This would enhance the security of all at a manageable price. The starting point of the EU’s strategy is the European Green Deal and the energy transition that the EU wishes to accelerate in light of the climate emergency. 

In the end, reliable, affordable and secure energy can only come through a decarbonised energy system based largely on renewables.

There is a broad lesson in the events of the past months and years: in the end, reliable, affordable and secure energy can only come through a decarbonised energy system based largely on renewables. This is why the EU is also cooperating closely with the US on technology. Energy efficiency, renewables (such as wind power) and hydrogen are high on the EU-US common agenda. A new EU-US High-Level Climate Action Group was established in 2021, aligning EU-US positions ahead of the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) in Glasgow. This Energy Council will jumpstart the Transatlantic Green Technology Alliance on innovation and rapid, at scale deployment of key clean energy technologies globally, including heat pumps, advanced metering and long-duration energy storage, notably by reinforcing our common efforts on codes, standards, certification and regulatory frameworks.

The energy transition will continue to change geopolitical balances, shifting power from those controlling fossil fuels to those developing clean energy technologies. This will require countries that now heavily rely on fossil fuel exports to diversify their economies. The net zero and just energy transition is vital to save our planet, but will also have foreign policy benefits: a world run on clean energy will be a more stable and better world for all, although it will also create new dependencies because of the materials it requires. A new EU strategy on international energy will be published in the spring of 2022, to set out in more detail the EU’s response to the wider challenges on this issue.

The EU will continue to build a global energy transition that is socially just and takes care of the geopolitical challenges. 

Climate Change and Security

The EU recognises that the direct and indirect effects of climate change, biodiversity loss and environmental degradation represent risks to the realisation of human rights, and human and state security, undermining global peace and stability, often accelerating or deepening existing vulnerabilities and instability (Council of the European Union 2022). 

The EU welcomes the increased focus by the Security Council and other UN bodies on the climate, peace, and security nexus. Whilst vetoed, the broad support by 113 countries for the thematic UNSC Resolution of December 2021 on security implications of climate change was a clear indication that the importance of this concept, to which the EU remains committed, is widely acknowledged. In this context, the European Council welcomed the EU Concept for an Integrated Approach on Climate Change and Security (European External Action Service 2021), establishing a framework to address the climate, peace and security nexus in EU external action and calling for its robust implementation. 

In a context where climate diplomacy increasingly gains a pivotal role among the components of its foreign and security policy, the EU is intensifying work with multilateral and regional organisations, as well as with like-minded and strategic partners in the Americas, Asia and Africa. The aim is to promote a multi-stakeholder framework to raise awareness of the climate-security nexus, tackle crosscutting climate-related security risks, and support the prevention and resolution of climate-induced conflicts. The EU remains firmly convinced that the integrated approach on climate change and security in its dialogue and cooperation with third countries and regions would allow establishing environmental and sustainable peace and cooperation on a local, regional, and global scale. 

These issues should continue to be high on the agenda of the dialogue between the EU and Brazil. More broadly, the region of Latin America and the Caribbean is a vital partner for the EU in the promotion of an ambitious and determined implementation of the commitments made in the Paris Agreement. Many LAC countries pursue Pacto Verde policies, like the EU. The region’s immense biodiversity, the crucial need to preserve the Amazon rainforest and other precious biomes for climate stability, and the high climate vulnerabilities of many LAC countries are the basis for strong joint action and ambition in international climate negotiations. 

Notes 

[1] Informal meeting of the Heads of State or Government: Versailles Declaration, March 10 and 12, 2022.

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Submitted: May 4th, 2022

Approved for publication: June 2nd, 2022

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