BRICS in Times of Tectonic Shifts

Sixteen years ago, when the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, and China met in Yekaterinburg to form BRICS, it seemed as though reality was imitating fiction, or, more accurately, that the invention of a geoeconomic analysis by an investment bank had materialized as history (O'Neill 2001). Today, BRICS (or BRICS+), which began with four founding members and later welcomed South Africa, has expanded to include five additional emerging countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates, in alphabetical order of their English names).^[1] Moreover, it includes almost half the world's population, representing 38% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms—and a quarter of global trade and direct investment.

The idea of ​​bringing together developing countries to influence international forums and organizations is not new. In the post-war world, this idea dates back to at least the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77 at the UN, as well as the G24 within the Bretton Woods institutions. However, the BRICS has a distinctive characteristic. It was not just about bringing together lower-income countries to try to influence a world dominated by high-income economic powers and marked by a sharp polarization during the Cold War. Now it is about countries with increasingly greater economic clout to come together to claim their place of prominence in the global economic order of the post-Cold War world. It is no coincidence that the first meeting of leaders took place after the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, when these countries managed to escape relatively unscathed from the financial debacle whose epicenter was precisely the advanced economies of the Northern Hemisphere (Canuto 2010).^[2]

In this text, we propose evaluating the scenarios projected by the study that followed the original launch note for the BRICS acronym (Wilson & Purushothaman 2003), situating the current position of BRICS+, and briefly discussing the main challenges facing the Group in the future.^[3]

FROM INVENTION TO REALITY

Jim O'Neill's original article (2001) proposed to question the global economic governance led by the G7, presenting the rise of large emerging economies as a decisive element in establishing a new, more representative arrangement.

While the Bretton Woods financial architecture was established in the immediate post-war period, the formal articulation of the major global economic powers occurred in the mid-1970s, following the oil shock and the end of the post-war exchange rate parity system. The G7 initially evolved from discussions among finance ministers to include heads of government and state, a path followed (albeit more slowly) by the G20 a few decades later. In any case, the original G7 agenda, like that of the G20, was fundamentally economic, with the Group proposing to foster global economic cooperation, defend free trade, promote rapprochement with socialist economies, and articulate its position on the ongoing reform of the international monetary system (G7 1975).

Although the G7 incorporated Russia in the first decade of the 2000s, forming the G8, this arrangement did not survive the invasion of Crimea, when Russia began to be subjected to sanctions by the G7 countries. On the other hand, the global financial crisis (2008-2009), while not leading to an expansion of the G7, contributed to two important outcomes in global governance: (i) the elevation of the G20's level to heads of state and government; and (ii) the creation of BRIC, later expanded to BRICS, as a forum for coordination and cooperation between emerging economic powers.

The G20 was initially established as an initiative of advanced countries to "educate"—in terms of fiscal and regulatory policies—emerging economies. This was mainly in response to the spillover effects of the Asian and Russian crises in the previous decade, which had highlighted a strong financial interconnection between the two groups of countries. The elevation of the status of heads of state occurred in a context of a financial crisis that began in advanced countries, prompting non-advanced countries to increase their prominence—including financial—in multilateral activities.

Over these 16 years, the BRICS has been a relevant forum for coordination among emerging economies, driving the IMF's 2010 quota and governance reform and the World Bank's capital increases (2010 and 2018). Furthermore, it established two institutions that became part of the network of multilateral/regional development banks and the global financial safety net: the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), respectively. In the last two years, five more members have joined the BRICS, and more may join soon. Perhaps even more significant is the magnitude of these emerging economies and their growth prospects. Even so, questions remain about the Group's effectiveness and relevance in global economic governance (O'Neill 2021; 2024).^[4]

TIME TUNNEL: HOW THE BRICS HAVE EVOLVED COMPARED TO ORIGINAL PROJECTIONS

This section will contrast the evolution of the largest BRICS economies (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) with the projections made in a 2003 paper by Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman (W&P), examining growth and exchange rate assumptions (Wilson & Purushothaman, 2003). The projections in this paper used a simple Cobb-Douglas model for real growth, with projected labor force growth rates based on demographic data, investment set at recent average rates, and a productivity convergence rate of 1.5% per year.

The greater growth potential of economies with lower per capita income is determined by their lower capital intensity (and consequent higher returns) and the possibility of utilizing technologies developed in advanced economies (catch-up) (Canuto 2021). W&P projections extend to 2050; however, we will focus on the 2025 horizon. It is worth noting that a complicating factor, from the perspective of global investment dynamics, is that the rise of these emerging economies would mean that the most significant global economies (in GDP terms) would no longer be the wealthiest economies on the planet (in per capita income terms).

Some of the study's central projections for GDP at market prices for the period were: (i) China would surpass France and the United Kingdom by 2005, Germany in 2007, and Japan in 2016; (ii) India would surpass Italy in 2016, France in 2019, and the United Kingdom and Germany by 2023; (iii) Russia would surpass Italy in 2019 and France in 2024; and (iv) Brazil would surpass Italy only in 2025. Furthermore, the combined GDPs of the four BRIC countries were expected to reach half that of the G6 (excluding Canada) by 2025, and China was projected to surpass half that of the US by 2023. The higher real growth rate would account for two-thirds of this BRIC convergence, while one-third would be attributed to exchange rate real appreciation.

Of course, long-term projections are subject to various types of errors. Slight differences in the estimated growth parameters can result in significant differences over time. Furthermore, the scenarios constructed assumed growth-promoting policies (the absence of which could lead to significant distortions), and it was also assumed that potential shocks would not be able to alter trends, causing only temporary deviations that would correct themselves.^[5] On top of this, a third of the relative advance would be due to exchange rate appreciation, the trajectory of which was driven by structural determinants (with increased productivity causing a convergence between nominal and purchasing power parity exchange rates).

To observe the performance of these economies in the period since 2000, it is necessary to consider not only the magnitude but also the possibly differentiated long-term impact of two major global shocks – the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, which prolonged in Europe until 2012-2013; and the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020-2022. Additionally, Brazil experienced a crisis between 2015 and 2016, and Russia was affected by the invasions of Crimea (2014) and Ukraine (2022), in addition to the sanctions that followed.

According to the IMF's World Economic Outlook database, the relative performance of the four BRICs, with GDP converted at current exchange rates at market prices, was as follows. Indeed, China surpassed France, the United Kingdom, and Germany between 2005 and 2007, as expected, and Japan in 2010, six years earlier than projected. The Indian economy also surprised positively, becoming larger than Italy's in 2015, surpassing France in 2019 and the United Kingdom in 2021. It is projected to be larger than Japan's economy starting this year (2025). Finally, Brazil and Russia surpassed Italy earlier than projected (in 2010 and 2012, compared to projections for 2025 and 2019, respectively). It turns out that the crises and shocks suffered by the Brazilian and Russian economies have allowed Italy to regain its position, which the Fund projects should be maintained until at least 2030.

Although Brazil and Russia's performance was lower than projected at the beginning of the century, the average real growth of these economies over the 25 years from 2000 to 2024 (2.4% and 3.4%, respectively) was higher than that of the G6 economies (in this group, only the United States came close, with an annual average of 2.2%). The growth differential for Brazil and Russia was expected, but not enough to reliably promote the convergence of these emerging economies into the group of major advanced economies.

The other element that would have promoted convergence, the structural appreciation trend of emerging market currencies, ultimately contributed little. Brazil's real effective exchange rate appreciated by nearly 90% between 2003 and 2011, then followed a downward trend, falling 43% by 2020. The ruble's real effective exchange rate, in turn, followed a similar trend, nearly doubling between 2000 and 2013, then declining 28% in the following three years, without regaining a consistent appreciation trend since then. In India's case, the exchange rate contributed little to convergence (real effective appreciation of 10% between 2000 and 2020 and fluctuating around that level since then); while China benefited significantly from currency appreciation between 2000 and 2015 (39%), but has since seen a real effective depreciation of 12.5%.

The story is somewhat different if we compare the evolution of these economies on purchasing power parity.^[6] Using GDP in PPP as a metric, the convergence of the BRICs to the G6 is an undeniable reality. Using PPP, the Chinese economy surpassed Japan's in 2001 and the US's in 2016. India surpassed Germany in 2005 and Japan in 2009. Russia surpassed France, the United Kingdom, and Italy between 2003 and 2004, and then Germany and Japan in 2021. Meanwhile, Brazil became larger than Italy, the United Kingdom, and France between 2008 and 2010. Thus, the combined economy of the four BRICs in PPP surpassed the G6 starting in 2019.

The fact is that, although the four major emerging economies accounted for about 20% of the global economy at the beginning of the century, their greater dynamism meant that their contribution to global growth was already above 30% on average from 2000 to 2004. As their share of the world economy expanded and their growth outpaced that of advanced economies, their contribution to global growth rose to an average of 44% in the first quarter of this century (excluding the years of negative global growth, 2009 and 2020). In contrast, the G6's contribution to global growth gradually declined from above 20% to an average of 17.5% for the entire period.

In sum, the comparison of the BRIC countries' actual performance in this first quarter of this century, relative to the scenarios projected by Goldman Sachs economists, yields the following conclusion: (i) while China and India more than met projections, Russia and Brazil saw their performance affected by idiosyncratic economic shocks; (ii) exchange rate appreciation did not play the anticipated role in accelerating convergence; (iii) the relative economic weight of these countries in the global economy, measured in PPP, continues to grow and is already 22% higher than that of the G6, with the IMF projecting it to be 43% higher than the G6 in 2030; and (iv) the BRICs have indeed been crucial drivers of global growth.

The economic dimension of BRICS (now expanded to include 10 countries) goes far beyond the issues raised in the texts that coined the acronym. The BRICS countries have a significant and growing share of global trade; they are important sources and destinations of direct investment, although advanced economies still dominate these flows; they have accumulated massive international reserves; they hold a leading position in the international commodity market, especially food and energy; they hold strategic mineral reserves of crucial importance to the digital economy; and, particularly in the case of China, they dominate cutting-edge technological niches (Canuto 2023c).

On the other hand, BRICS brings together countries that are culturally, politically, and institutionally heterogeneous, facing diverse economic challenges in advancing their development paths. The low degree of economic integration among the BRICS countries themselves, which generally maintain more extensive and significant economic relations with the G7 countries, is also noteworthy. In some ways, several of the BRICS are subject to the obstacles posed by the so-called "middle-income trap," with demographic pressures and pressures arising from transformations in the labor market arriving before countries reach an income level compatible with that of advanced economies (Canuto 2021).

THE MACROECONOMIC CONTEXT IN THE EMERGENCE OF THE BRICS

When the BRICS was created a decade and a half ago, the global financial crisis heralded a structural rearrangement in the global economy, as if the financial meltdown of central advanced economies were opening space for emerging economies to fill in. On one hand, the BRICS was an expression of this rearrangement. On the other hand, it grouped economies that benefited from a virtuous cycle of global demand, in which the US appeared as the final consumer of last resort and China as a major provider of cheap manufactured goods, while also serving as the largest consumer of food and intermediate goods. While the US contributed to sustaining global demand with large fiscal and current account deficits, China presented itself as the world's leading saver, helping to finance these deficits while accumulating substantial international reserves, primarily in US Treasury bonds. This arrangement contributed to a period of low inflation, moderate interest rates, intense (albeit volatile) capital flows, exchange rate appreciation of emerging market currencies (albeit excessive), and a long virtuous cycle in commodities.

The post-crisis period represents the apogee of this model, but also the beginning of its disarticulation. The macroeconomic debate during this period raised new issues, or at least presented them in a new guise, repositioning certain alliances. Expansionary monetary policies in central economies, including the use of quantitative easing, sparked a debate on spillovers (known as the "contagion effect" in Brazil) and the use of capital flow management measures by peripheral economies, as floods of volatile capital could destabilize them. The discussion on micro- and macroprudential regulation, as well as more effective financial supervision, gained importance, aiming to mitigate identified vulnerabilities and prevent new vulnerabilities from emerging in the financial market, thereby causing even greater damage to the economy (Canuto 2013).

On the contrary, limited fiscal responses in some advanced economies highlighted the problem of sustaining global demand. Here, the US joined some emerging economies in calling for the use of fiscal space in large economies that could help stabilize and balance global demand.

Simultaneously, all of this made an important topic to the US, which had already been gaining traction in the pre-crisis period, to assume even greater prominence: the global current account imbalance. Although the US benefited from the absorption of foreign savings and the availability of cheap consumer goods, the imbalance also caused discomfort. The increasingly negative net international investment position and a rising public debt led the US to seek to decisively place the issue of global imbalances on the agenda of multilateral debate.^[7] The discussion then turned to exchange rate manipulation, as part of the imbalance was attributed to surplus economies preventing their currencies from appreciating. In some ways, the BRICS economies were in a constructive position; only two of them had surpluses: China and Russia, while Brazil, India, and South Africa were in deficit. Moreover, they allowed their currencies to appreciate significantly throughout the first fifteen years of the century. What is even more relevant is the fact that the contribution of emerging economies to global economic growth has become increasingly greater throughout this century.

The fact is that the BRICS emerged in a historical context in which debates were multifaceted and produced shifting groupings, depending on the issues at hand. There was hope that a truly multilateral environment would prevail in global economic relations. However, the second half of the 2010s took the global economy in a different direction.

BRICS IN A WORLD MOVING EASTWARDS AND APPEARING TO BE HEADING TOWARD A NEW POLARIZATION

The perception that multilateralism was a game played against US interests eventually gained ground in US politics. In addition, the identification of China as a rising superpower and, consequently, the United States' greatest economic adversary became prevalent. The first Trump administration solidified this view, which persisted even after the 2020 election. Thus, the theme of geoeconomic fragmentation remained a prominent feature in the multilateral macroeconomic debate (Canuto 2023b). Moreover, in the ongoing tariff war, the new US administration continues to direct its strongest measures against China.

As we mentioned above, this first quarter-century confirms China's and India's economic rise as an irrefutable historical fact. However, this rise occurs within a model that has the US as its economic and financial center and the dollar as, by far, the main international currency. Although the turbulence we are witnessing at the beginning of 2025 has its specific circumstances, it should not be treated as a blip along the way, but rather as part of an underlying process that has been ongoing for some time and is likely to cause significant turmoil in the years to come.

The primary difference from recent years is that the US government appears to be unwilling to continue playing its role as a leader in post-war multilateral arrangements and instead seeks to force adjustments in the conduct of its trading partners, generally by creating specific barriers that hinder China's emergence as a global economic leader. The coming years are likely to be marked by intense disputes between the dominant superpower and the rising superpower, posing risks (and potential opportunities) to the global economy. Indeed, a readjustment of this magnitude has historically been traumatic. This is, therefore, a very different context from that which prevailed at the emergence of the BRICS.

This new repolarization raises important questions for the BRICS partners. How can BRICS avoid becoming a supporting player in this "dogfight"? What space is created in this context for an agenda that allows the other BRICS partners to navigate without having to take sides in the dispute between the two superpowers?

In principle, greater global economic fragmentation/polarization is not in the interests of any of the BRICS members. First, China itself does not want to anticipate a confrontation with the US, but rather to give its economic strength time to consolidate before challenging US hegemony in global economic governance. This is especially true considering the strength of the US market and the role its financial system and the dollar play. It is well established that issuing the reference currency confers an ‘exorbitant privilege’. However, it also implies responsibilities that China would not be prepared or willing to assume at this time. The current model continues to serve the Chinese. For the remaining members (perhaps except for Russia and Iran), deepening economic fragmentation tends to be highly detrimental, even though it creates some limited specific opportunities. Greater fragmentation tends to reduce global growth potential, increase costs, and slow the expansion of international trade. Given the difference in magnitude and economic (and military) power between the two superpowers and the emerging market economies, it is best not to position oneself too close to either pole. As the Swahili saying goes, "when elephants fight [or make love], the grass suffers."

Then, what would be the role of BRICS in helping to prevent further polarization and ensure a better environment for emerging market economies? A promising path forward would be to defend and strengthen multilateralism, while advancing cooperation on issues in a way that does not exacerbate polarization or the potential for global conflict. This approach is what we will discuss and develop in the next section.

CHALLENGES FOR ADVANCING A BRICS+ AGENDA

BRICS aims to be a diplomatic alliance with a predominantly economic focus, but whose scope extends far beyond, encompassing issues such as global security, the environment, health, agriculture, social policies, and other related areas. However, our focus here is on the BRICS financial track, which involves the finance ministries and central banks of the member countries and their respective agendas.

The BRICS financial track operates along three main lines: (i) articulating common positions to be presented to multilateral forums, notably to support governance reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank); (ii) fostering initiatives and institutions that can expand the scope of member countries' activities (the NDB and CRA are the prominent examples, but there are several other specific initiatives); and (iii) stimulating technical cooperation and the exchange of experiences to benefit domestic policies.

Below, we offer some illustrative guidelines for how the BRICS agenda on the Financial Track could develop in the current context:

BRICS+ as a Global South leader in the multilateral debate

A change in global economic governance, particularly within the Bretton Woods institutions, is a founding agenda of the BRICS and a demand that has been a longstanding issue for decades. However, it is not an entirely harmonious topic within the current expanded composition of the BRICS, as the heterogeneity of its members means that some of them have specific interests that clash with the collective interest of emerging market and developing economies (EMDEs). In any case, in the context of emerging economies, the BRICS is well positioned to lead this fight for more representative governance of multilateral financial institutions. This role can be played by pursuing inclusive agendas that naturally attract the support of the vast majority of EMDEs. The BRICS can and should aspire to be the voice of other developing economies, advocating for a more representative economic order and more resources for the "global financial safety net" and multilateral development banks, including more financing to address climate change. One possible banner the BRICS could advocate is the sale of a fraction of the IMF's gold stock to support higher levels of concessional lending and more free technical cooperation from the Fund.

When countries face external financial shocks, they require financial buffers to mitigate their impact. The global financial safety net comprises the set of institutions and arrangements that provide a line of defense for economies against such shocks. From any country's perspective, there are three lines of defense in its external financial safety net: international reserves, shared resources (such as swap lines and plurilateral financing arrangements), and the International Monetary Fund. It is necessary to expand and facilitate access to the layer at the core of the global financial safety net: the IMF (Canuto & Amar 2024).

Expanding Membership and Deepening the NDB's Operations

The New Development Bank (NDB) is the most significant product of the BRICS in its 15-year history. With a capital of US$50 billion and a membership that is already broader than the original BRICS, the NDB is an important source of development finance and an integral part of the multilateral development bank (MDB) community. Perhaps the greatest challenge for the NDB is expanding its membership while more broadly incorporating local currencies into its financing operations. Additionally, as an institution with a structure and a growing technical team, the NDB can host several other BRICS initiatives.

Improving the CRA

The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) was established simultaneously with the NDB, pooling  US$100 billion in reserves from the five original members to provide mutual financial support. The central banks of the CRA member countries have developed the entire operational framework and have already conducted tests to ensure the mechanism's full functionality. However, to date, there has been no need to activate the Arrangement. As a mechanism for sharing reserves from countries that do not issue reserve currencies, the CRA must be perceived by all participants, not just those most likely to activate the mechanism, as an enhancement of their own defenses. An additional complication is that only China and Russia (among the current CRA members) have accumulated reserves based on current account surpluses. The reserves of the other countries were accumulated while still runnning current account deficits through an active policy of reducing external financial vulnerability, but at a very high cost, which must be more than offset by the additional security the mechanism provides.

In its current design, the security of potential credits under the CRA is partly provided by the link of access to IMF adjustment programs, which underscores the importance of maintaining a relatively low threshold for drawing on resources without a Fund program. This creates a trade-off intrinsic to the Arrangement, since the lower the unlinked threshold, the greater the security for countries that will lend reserves, but the lower the utility for countries that want to borrow. One possible way to increase the untied access limit would be to expand the capacity of the monitoring mechanism and establish conditionality (more fully replicating the IMF's functions). However, this could generate high costs for members and potentially deepen the rift between the mechanism's borrowers and lenders. However, under current conditions, one could explore the possibility of using local currencies (which is not a trivial change) and the ability to expand the mechanism to include new members, even without changing the current Arrangement model.

The "BRICS Currency" Agenda and Its Alternatives

In the current context, there is a certain consensus among the BRICS countries that the international monetary system needs to be reformed to become more aligned with the principles of security, impartiality, and efficiency, better serving the interests of developing economies. The weaponization of the dollar in recent years, with the increasing use of unilateral sanctions (without UN approval), is a factor driving this discussion. Since the Johannesburg Summit (2023), the BRICS have been vocal on this issue, advocating for greater use of local currencies in transactions between member countries. One possible step forward could be toward a network of bilateral agreements for the use of local currencies (along the lines of the Local Currency Payment System (SML) in Mercosur). In any case, even in the case of Brazil and Argentina, which signed an SML in 2008, use of the system is practically limited to Brazilian exports, and their volume has not exceeded the equivalent of US$1 billion annually (while Brazilian exports to Argentina have hovered around US$15 billion in recent years). Ultimately, this is a delicate agenda, not only due to its economic aspects but also due to its geopolitical implications, and BRICS members should approach it with great caution, particularly in an environment already highly charged with tensions.

Fostering Infrastructure Investment

One possible avenue would be to mobilize the savings and investment capacity of certain BRICS members to support infrastructure development in other countries. Ongoing discussions suggest the creation of platforms or mechanisms to facilitate this process. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) demonstrates the potential for expanding infrastructure investment flows, particularly given the growing need to expand sustainable infrastructure and the pressures created by climate change. While the BRI's experience is valuable, the Chinese model is not replicable, nor would it be desirable, given the numerous problems created by excessive debt in low-income countries.

CONCLUSION: HOW TO NAVIGATE A COMPLEX GEOECONOMIC TRANSITION THAT IS LIKELY TO BE PROLONGED

On this note, BRICS, as a geoeconomic reality, has neither disappointed nor fully lived up to its initial expectations. As a project to expand the strength and voice of the Global South in global economic debates and arrangements, the BRICS will increasingly need to navigate complex processes going forward.

First, China's economic size relative to the other BRICS members, while comparable to the difference between the US and the other members of the G7, poses some additional challenges. While the G7 was established in an international context of consolidated US leadership and strong economic integration among its member countries, the BRICS brings together a group of more heterogeneous countries, including a subordinate economic power, whose rise will likely cause turbulence for a new alignment of geoeconomic and geopolitical spaces.

One may also question the extent to which the ‘middle-income trap’ will pose significant challenges for BRICS (Canuto 2021). The experience of countries that achieved high-income status late demonstrates that the most successful model was "export orientation." This model clearly has its limits, which are even more pronounced today, with the world's largest economy crusading against its trade deficits. Furthermore, before reaching high-income status, the BRICS countries are facing severe structural challenges related to global warming, an aging population, and changes in the world of work, among others. Therefore, despite the considerable economic potential of emerging markets, the challenges they face are equally substantial. Additionally, the current White House administration's stance, by intensifying the confrontation with China, makes it even more difficult for the BRICS to advance a common agenda without attracting the attention and possible retaliation of the United States. Hence, it is crucial to build a relevant agenda that positions BRICS within the broader political debate, deepening ties of cooperation and economic integration between countries, while avoiding a rupture or greater turbulence in the international monetary and financial system.

Notes

[1]Saudi Arabia has been invited to join BRICS+, but has not yet completed the procedures to become a member.

[2]The World Bank addressed the possibility of a shift in locomotives for global growth (Canuto 2010).

[3]The opinions expressed are personal in nature and do not reflect the position of the Central Bank of Brazil or the Ministry of Finance.

[4]For example, see Jim O’Neill in two articles in Project Syndicate (2021 and 2024) categorically stating that BRICS has not evolved to constitute an effective instance in global economic governance.

[5]Something already present in 2012 (Leipziger & Canuto, 2012). The pace of upward convergence among several non-advanced countries declined in the second decade of the new millennium.

[6]There is a broad consensus on the advantages of using PPP for international comparisons of economic size. Although GDP using PPP is more challenging to estimate, it is a more comprehensive measure because it better reflects an economy's non-tradable goods and services sector, thereby providing a more accurate measure of economic well-being. Furthermore, PPP exchange rates are much less volatile than market exchange rates. In its aggregations in the World Economic Outlook, the IMF uses rates estimated based on PPP. For a brief presentation of this issue, see Callen (2007).

[7]For some, the deindustrialization of the American economy would also be a symptom of this imbalance, later contributing to a political environment that questioned multilateralism and favored protectionist measures.

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Received: May 12, 2025

Accepted for publishing: May 19, 2025

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