COP30: How Brazil Can Pave the Way to the Next Decade of Climate Action

At the same time that the United Nations Conferences on Climate Change (COPs) cannot be seen as silver bullets, they are crucial in inducing practical measures to deal with one of the most relevant collective challenges of our times. In a moment of fragmentation in multilateralism and the lack of trust and cooperation, it is even more important to defend this space as a significant achievement in itself: more than 190 countries come to the table to decide by consensus and discuss collectively the next steps to implement decisions limiting the increase of the average global temperature and adapting to the irreversible impacts of climate change. However, for this regime to remain relevant and deliver what it was designed for, it is healthy to revise the way it works and rethink how its instruments can, in fact, support countries to implement its commitments–not only governments, but the whole society.    

The 30th edition of the COP, presided by Brazil in 2025, is particularly relevant for this purpose: beyond the fact that it marks the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement, this is the first COP in which the rules and transparency instruments of the treaty have been finalized and completed their first cycle, meaning it is now possible to assess whether the mechanisms created to support implementation are functioning. Furthermore, it is possible to measure whether its objectives related to emission reductions, increased capacity for climate adaptation and means of implementation are being met. Beyond reflecting on the past ten years, this can be a COP where countries renew their commitment to implementation, paving the way for the decade ahead.

The adoption of the Paris Agreement on climate change in 2015 represented a meritorious diplomatic advance and must be celebrated as such. Taking place at a particular moment for multilateral collaboration, it was possible to achieve consensus among all countries–and not only developed ones–to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to keep the average global temperature increase well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, while pursuing efforts to limit the increase to 1.5 °C. It also calls for the adoption of climate adaptation measures and the establishment of cooperation and financing mechanisms to achieve the Agreement’s objectives.

Since then, through the adoption of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), all signatories to the Agreement are expected to align their national policies with the pursuit of these goals. Several initiatives have been developed within and outside the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to facilitate its implementation, also considering the role of non-State actors. Year by year, the number of initiatives officially tracked through the Marrakech Partnership under the UNFCCC (2024) grows, demonstrating that there are thousands of collaborative platforms to accelerate action in sectors such as energy, transportation, industry, land use, cities, and coastal zones. Campaigns such as Race to Zero and Race to Resilience have attracted thousands of companies and subnational governments to collectively demonstrate action (Climate High Level Champions 2025a; 2025b).

Greenhouse gas emissions have continued to rise every year, with the exception of 2020, due to the Covid-19 pandemic; nevertheless, the pace of growth was reduced to one-fifth of the rate recorded in the decade prior to the adoption of the Paris Agreement (ECIU 2025). The increase in interest in climate discussions is also expressed by the number of civil society organizations admitted as observers to the negotiations, which has more than doubled since 2015, and now they are nearly 4,000 (UNFCCC n/d).

However, almost a decade after the adoption of the Paris Agreement, there is a lack of trust in the regime, a lack of ambition, and, more concerning, a gap in implementation. Even with full implementation of current NDCs, sectoral plans, and long-term strategies by all countries, current targets would still lead to a warming of at least 1.8 °C; and in a less optimistic scenario–considering the climate policies currently in place–warming could reach 2.7 °C (Climate Action Tracker 2024), therefore well above the goal set. And 2025 was marked by the lack of commitment from countries to present their NDCs by the deadline of nine months before COP30, which would have made it possible to have a good assessment and to prepare the next steps to discuss new cooperation mechanisms to accelerate implementation. 

There is also a gap in the means of implementation–finance, capacity building, and technology transfer. Only in 2022 did developed countries finally meet for the first time the target set by the Paris Agreement to provide at least US$ 100 billion per year in climate finance, achieving US$ 115.9 billion that year. Public finance accounted for the bulk of these resources, and mobilizing private capital remains a persistent challenge. Mitigation continues to dominate allocations, representing about 60% of the total, although adaptation finance grew to US$ 32.4 billion, still below the Glasgow Pact’s goal of doubling adaptation funding by 2025 (OECD 2024).

Trade measures with high environmental and climate standards adopted by developed countries in the past few years, such as the European Union Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), have also created tensions with developing countries, which argue that these measures increase their costs to development and to climate efforts, while weakening multilateral spaces.

The outcomes of COP29 left significant challenges for Brazil in its preparation for the Presidency of COP30. The decision on new targets for finance and the ambiguity in the text frustrated developing countries and civil society around the globe. Besides the lower amount needed for emissions reduction and resilience-building in developing countries, the agreed text left many open questions about the qualitative aspects of the financial mobilization. The results of the negotiations on other relevant items also fell short of expectations, particularly on credible pathways to implement the decision of the first Global Stocktake (GST).^[1]

The context of the negotiations reflects the scenario of geopolitical fragmentation and difficulty in reaching consensus, leaving for 2025 and beyond fundamental issues for the implementation of the Paris Agreement: how to accelerate the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions; how developing countries will access finance, technology and capacity to reduce emissions, become more resilient to impacts and respond to climate risks and disasters; how the regime will support the implementation of the GST decision, especially regarding the transition away from fossil fuels. Furthermore, it is imperative to politically elevate the adaptation agenda. Although these topics have always been contentious issues at the Convention on Climate Change, the tension worsened due to the results of elections throughout 2024, especially in the United States, and the uncertainties they bring to multilateralism, as well as the aggravation of trade wars that have climate-related issues at their epicentre. 

Beyond the political scenario, science and reality are undeniable. Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement, scientific advancements have reinforced the urgency of accelerating mitigation and adaptation measures to address climate change. There is also a growing economic understanding of the various scenarios and the feasibility (or impossibility) of implementing the targets. The latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report states that human activities have unequivocally caused a temperature increase of 1.1 °C compared to 1850 levels. The report also indicates that approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people–nearly half of the global population–live in regions vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, exposed to risks related to extreme weather events, food insecurity, water scarcity, and the loss of cultural practices, among other threats. 

Adding to this, 2024 was the first year in which we surpassed 1,5 oC above the average global temperature (relative to pre-industrial levels), and once again the hottest year in history, as each year of the last decade was. The year was marked by extreme weather events worldwide, with Brazil experiencing the traumatic floods in Rio Grande do Sul and a prolonged drought in the Amazon region.

So, the challenge for COP30 and the next decade is to combine responses to science and people’s demands with policies and public resources, while creating enabling environments for cooperation and investments in decarbonization and resilience. It will only be possible by combining the Paris Agreement instruments with the interaction with non-State actors, particularly subnational governments and the private sector. 

ALL EYES ON BRAZIL

COP30 closes the cycle of three particular years for Brazilian protagonism in the international context: it follows the Brazilian Presidency of the BRICS+ in 2025, the G20 in 2024, and the Amazon Summit in 2023. These Presidencies took place amidst a complex global scenario, marked by armed conflicts and security risks, economic uncertainties, and the intensification of the climate crisis. Despite the challenging context, the cycle of Brazilian Presidencies delivered some innovative responses and ideas for cooperation instruments among countries amid multiple emergencies. In this session, we will highlight some of the achievements in these Presidencies, taking into account that the flexibility to guide the process is limited under the UN Convention.

At the Amazon Summit in 2023, the comprehensive Belém Declaration brought significant attention to climate change. It highlights the Amazon’s central role in addressing global climate and environmental challenges and presents the basis for coordinated action among Amazonian countries to prevent deforestation and forest degradation, while promoting climate justice and social inclusion (ACTO 2023). Although it has not gained the continued attention from Brazilian society, and is still in the first steps of implementation (Closs & Candido 2025), the declaration brings new approaches to regional cooperation that can inspire coordinated action to attract investments and technology. Due to its regional nature and its implementation under a dedicated institution–the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO)–the Declaration of Belém can serve as a foundation for concrete actions that deliver climate and biodiversity co-benefits, while also promoting economic development and reducing social vulnerabilities.   

The Brazilian Presidency of G20 was the most remarkable in the triennium. Although G20 is a forum established to provide the world’s largest economies with a space to discuss crises, risks, and opportunities for economic cooperation–and not specifically dedicated to climate change–the climate agenda has gained particular relevance in the group’s discussions and communiqués in recent years, and was brought to the forefront under the Brazilian Presidency (iCS 2024). G20 countries account for approximately 85% of global GDP and around 80% of greenhouse gas (GHG) (NewClimate Institute & CEEW 2023), and are home to two-thirds of the world’s population. Any measures adopted by these countries are therefore of utmost importance for shifting the global trajectory of GHG emissions. Additionally, the limited time available to implement mitigation measures, combined with the widespread impacts of climate change already being felt worldwide, elevates the issue to a critical factor exacerbating economic and social crises.

Under G20, the Task Force for Global Mobilization against Climate Change (TF Clima), a discussion group aimed at coordinating responses from both the Sherpa and Finance Tracks to the climate emergency, and the recommendations of the Sustainable Finance Working Group, presented ideas to connect climate ambition with credible and concrete steps in implementation through finance and investment (G20 Brasil 2024a; 2024b). Final outcomes of both initiatives stress the need to scale up climate finance, noting that while global capital is available, significant barriers remain in mobilizing it effectively, especially for developing countries. While recognizing the lack of more ambitious targets and compromises in emissions reduction, in line with science, the most relevant messages are related to implementation. The declarations reinforce the role of national transition planning and country platforms in integrating climate goals into broader economic and social development strategies. They also provide recommendations to improve access to climate funds by streamlining requirements to make it easier for developing countries to access the resources.

Another innovation from the Brazilian Presidency of G20 was the emphasis on discussing nature-based solutions through the Finance Group, as well as promoting the initiative on Bioeconomy, which presented principles for the discussion under the group. Although they are too broad, it is a step to acknowledge the role of nature in the economy, presenting the basic conditions to make this combination fair and inclusive (G20 Brasil 2024). Finally, it is worth highlighting the focus on adaptation within the G20 Climate and Environmental Sustainability Working Group under the Brazilian Presidency, and the adoption of just transition principles by the Energy Working Group. 

The G20 plays a fundamental role in presenting concrete steps to promote reforms in the financial system and resource mobilization mechanisms (domestic, international, public, private, and concessional), as well as in promoting the integration of implementation measures for climate mitigation and adaptation to meet the ambition of the Paris Agreement. The dialogue can also support the development of NDCs that, among other instruments, serve as effective guides for the creation and implementation of climate policies worldwide–including better integration with National Adaptation Plans (NAPs), another instrument of the Paris Agreement–and the alignment of proposed measures and actions with national plans that guide economic development policies and investments, promoting resilience and decarbonization.

Regarding the Brazilian Presidency of the BRICS+, the discussions of the forum in 2025 also brought some interesting results related to just transitions, climate finance, cooperation in adaptation and risk reduction, and institutional innovation to promote climate action (BRICS 2025). The main outcome is a comprehensive declaration on climate finance, that identifies areas for cooperation and aligned positions on topics under development in the UNFCCC. The declarations and the platforms presented show how this heterogeneous group of countries can pivot their collaboration to climate action, and always based on pragmatism and economic benefits.

While it is important to recognize the complementarity and differences in mandates and opportunities for differentiated progress between the UNFCCC, G20 and BRICS+ processes, it is relevant to acknowledge that the innovations brought by the Brazilian Presidency to these forums reverberated in the way the country conducts its Presidency of the UNFCCC process.

Domestically, the Presidency of various international forums also encouraged greater social participation, bringing civil society, research institutions, subnational governments, and several other non-State actors closer to international decision-making. Although the actual influence on decisions is difficult to measure, this broad participation helps to mainstream the climate agenda into other debates and fosters greater interest in monitoring the implementation of the decisions adopted. Despite its flaws and limitations, the Brazilian initiative to strengthen social participation in an institutionalized manner is commendable.

REIMAGINING GOVERNANCE: BUILDING THE BELÉM+10 AGENDA

Amidst the complex geopolitical scenario, the lack of response inside the regime and the need to build bridges among different international forums, in the end, the Brazilian Presidency has the chance to be remembered for building the basis for climate implementation in the next decade. Brazil holds notable relevance in the global climate change debate due to its abundance of natural resources, biodiversity, forest carbon stocks, and clean energy matrix; but also because of its leadership in environmental and climate discussions since, at least, the early 1990s, when the country hosted the 1992 Conference on Sustainable Development–which led to the creation of three United Nations conventions on the topic, including the UNFCCC. It’s undeniable that the results from its Presidencies in this lively triennium can reinvigorate this soft power, depending on the fruits that multilateralism will collect from the seeds planted now.

The main priorities established by the COP 30 Presidency are defending multilateralism, connecting climate decisions to people’s lives, and accelerating climate action. These priorities are anchored in four pillars: the Leaders summit; the negotiations agenda; the action agenda; and mobilization–all of them part of the global mutirão (a collective effort) called upon by Brazil (Corrêa do Lago 2025a; 2025b). 

The creation of high-level circles, the appointment of thematic and regional envoys and ad hoc advisory groups to support the Presidency is also an innovation, where it is possible to see the influence from the structures created while Brazil was leading the G20. Finally, the proposed structure for the Action Agenda, responding to the Global Stocktake and supporting the creation of acceleration plans for 30 different topics without the need to include them in mandated items in negotiations, can also be celebrated as an attempt to mark COP30 as “the COP of implementation”, as the Presidency has constantly defended (Corrêa do Lago 2025c). Independent of the COP30 outcomes, this kind of innovation can be continued to support the acceleration of implementation inside and outside the UNFCCC. It will require support from the incoming Presidencies and key influential actors, such as international and civil society organizations, implementation agencies, subnational governments, and the private and financial sectors. If successful, the mechanisms can support a greater participation in the next Global Stocktake.

While goals and political agreements are negotiated within the UNFCCC, it is in other political and economic forums that practical decisions are made regarding resource mobilization and the integration of the climate and development agendas necessary to scale implementation. Therefore, it is essential that the reform agenda outside the UNFCCC support the right signals to the negotiations, and vice versa.

It is clear that multilateralism is not an abstraction: it mobilizes changes in regulatory frameworks and governance structures. But when it comes to implementation, it has its limitations. So, COP30 and the upcoming COPs, as well as other international instances, can support sending the right signals to transform the climate discussion into a development and economic narrative. 

President Lula discreetly mentioned in 2024 the idea of creating a new council under the UN that could support (or enforce) holding countries accountable for their climate commitments. Even without detailing the proposal, the idea has sparked many discussions on the need to reform global climate governance–inside and outside the UNFCCC. Calling COP30 the “COP of implementation” or “the COP of the truth” has also increased the debate on how the international process can, in fact, support implementation. 

The bottom-up structure of the Paris Agreement, allowing countries to define their own contributions, resulted in greater inclusion, but also in misalignment across countries and in the underuse of NDCs as tools for public policy and economic decision-making. The gap between scientific recommendations and national climate targets and financing should have been addressed in the new round of NDCs. But the scenario in which even developed countries struggled to present their plans requires new approaches to evaluate ambition and mechanisms to support implementation. 

In the coming years, it will be necessary to develop and support governance and institutional frameworks for NDC operationalization, beyond the targets. Ideally, this support should be accompanied by mechanisms to promote NDCs and climate policies as development platforms, country-owned and ready to attract investments and international cooperation, while redirecting domestic resources. The so-called Country Platforms can support developing countries in linking climate plans to robust financing strategies, integrating domestic and international finance and promoting coordination among key actors (MDBs, UN agencies, climate funds, philanthropies, national development banks etc.).

The Circle of Finance Ministers for COP30, convened by Brazil’s Ministry of Finance, brought together Finance ministries from over 30 countries to align on strategies to scale up climate finance in support of the Baku to Belém Roadmap to US$ 1.3 trillion. Acting as a high-level collaborative platform, the Circle identified five priority areas to make the global financial architecture more effective, inclusive, and results-oriented: scaling up concessional finance and optimizing climate funds; reforming multilateral development banks to expand lending capacity and support just transitions; strengthening domestic investment frameworks and country platforms; developing innovative instruments to mobilize private capital at scale; and enhancing regulatory approaches to integrate climate risks and align financial systems with the Paris Agreement. Moving forward, it will be crucial to ensure that the implementation of the Baku to Belém Roadmap–jointly led by the COP29 and COP30 Presidencies–becomes the foundation for a renewed multilateral process for scaling up climate finance within and beyond the UNFCCC framework. The continued collaboration among Finance ministries under the Circle, and the uptake of its recommendations, will be key to sustaining momentum, translating political commitments into investment pipelines, and building a coordinated financial architecture capable of mobilizing the US$ 1.3 trillion annually needed by developing countries by 2035. 

FINAL REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Every tenth of a degree matters. Although it may be counterproductive to require countries to resubmit their national emission reduction plans, it is essential to assess how to raise ambition in line with scientific recommendations, while simultaneously creating conditions to accelerate implementation and enable the “overdelivery” of commitments made for this decade and for 2035. 

Recognizing the need to innovate and evolve the climate regime does not weaken it–on the contrary, it strengthens it. Greater integration with discussions beyond the climate sphere is essential. Reforming the global financial architecture will be key to implementing climate action, as will dialogue with other UN-led agendas, such as biodiversity, desertification, and the newly established convention on tax. But there is also a lot of climate action outside the UN. COPs can become the space where these dialogues meet, creating a virtuous cycle of debate and implementation, acknowledging limitations and providing spaces for open dialogue.

From now on, the focus must shift toward implementation and accelerating positive trends. Lower implementation costs and enabling environments for emissions reduction and resilience in energy, transportation, industry, forests, and agriculture will naturally lead to increased ambition and implementation. Society is mature enough to engage more actively in climate discussions. It is necessary to innovate the format of public participation, making it more continuous and inclusive, beyond the UNFCCC constituencies. The growing public interest in climate issues will require redesigning how negotiations, side events, and discussions are observed and organized around COPs–and it will require creativity from other actors to not overwhelm COPs and structure different spaces of participation. This will be important for qualified information exchange and for reducing logistical challenges in future COPs.

Sustained climate action will require new social compacts, where emissions reduction and climate adaptation are non-negotiable shared benefits, reducing dependence on political leadership alone. This calls for new forms of social mobilization at the domestic level, not just internationally. NDCs and climate policies must respond to domestic interests, which is only possible in a political environment that enables greater ambition and stronger implementation monitoring. Since the agenda of international forums under Brazil’s leadership has placed the fight against inequality at the center, there is a unique opportunity to discuss how climate change exacerbates these inequalities and how to consolidate the transition to a less carbon-intensive economic model in a way that not only avoids worsening these conditions but, instead, generates economic and social benefits. Within this broader inequality arena, it is essential to leave a concrete legacy for just transitions and adaptation, particularly by addressing the vulnerability of countries with weaker economies and poorer populations.

In this context, advancing the work initiated under the Circle of Finance Ministers for COP30 and fully implementing the Baku to Belém Roadmap will be essential to ensure that finance becomes the backbone of climate implementation. The next phase must consolidate a permanent, inclusive multilateral process–within and beyond the UNFCCC–to scale up and track the mobilization of at least US$ 1.3 trillion annually for developing countries by 2035. This requires stronger coordination between Finance ministries, development banks, climate funds, and private investors, as well as reforms that align fiscal policies, financial regulations, and investment incentives with climate and development goals. Taking forward the Circle’s recommendations can help build the institutional foundations of a new global financial architecture–one capable of turning climate ambition into real investments, jobs, and resilience, while ensuring that the transition to a sustainable economy also drives equity and shared prosperity.

Note

[1]The Global Stocktake (GST), concluded at COP28 in 2023, is a five-yearly process under the Paris Agreement that assesses collective progress toward climate goals. It revealed that the world is not on track to limit warming to 1.5 °C and called for urgent, bold actions to close gaps in ambition and implementation. The GST informs the next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) due in 2025, guiding countries to strengthen climate policies and accelerate action (UNFCC 2023).

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Submitted: October 21, 2025Submitted: October 21, 2025
Accepted for publication: October 22, 2025

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