O Mundo Segundo Trump – E o Que Isso Significa para a Europa e a América Latina

When John Irving published his best-selling novel The World According to Garp in 1978, he could not have imagined that almost 50 years later a man whose eccentricities surpass even Irving’s extraordinary fictional characters would become President of the United States of America. If Donald Trump's first presidency held surprises for many experienced politicians and experts, his second term promises even more unconventionality and turbulence. Since his inauguration on January 20, the 47th President keeps the world in suspense. Whether it was his announcement to take back the Panama Canal, the proposal–or rather the threat–to make Canada the 51st state, the offer to buy and the serious aspiration to ultimately take over Greenland, his vision to expel the Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and turn it into a second Riviera, or the innovative method to calculate the amount of tariffs that exporting countries owe to the American customs authorities: Donald Trump's first hundred days truly offered a wealth of innovative ideas. Observers disagree on whether these ideas are part of a grand strategy whose beauty escapes the understanding of the uninitiated, or the President is playing by ear and simply following his instincts and gut feelings. Be that as it may, some foreign policy experts already regard Donald Trump as the most consequential President for international affairs since Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he is certainly the most disruptive one in modern history. It is therefore essential to try to understand the workings of the world according to Trump, what it is all about, what it means for his allies and neighbors, and how they can deal with it. But before we get there, we need to take a look at the present state of the world.

THE END OF THE LIBERAL WORLD ORDER

There is a broad consensus among international affairs commentators and writers that the world is in a state of disorder, which, in turn, is the result of the end of the liberal, rules-based international order. This order was set up by the United States (U.S.) and the victorious European powers of World War II, enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter, and applied by various multilateral institutions. Though its rules were regarded as universal, until the end of the Cold War their validity had been more or less limited to the Western world. The repressed societies of the Soviet bloc and the millions of civilians suffering from proxy wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Korea, and elsewhere were hardly aware of these liberal rules. 

With the end of the Cold War, however, the universalization of this rule-based order became so pronounced, that Francis Fukuyama was not alone in believing that he was witnessing the end of History. The bipolar world was replaced by a unipolar one in which the overwhelming political, economic, and military power of the U.S. was unchallenged by any peer competitor. The only remaining superpower adopted the role of a world policeman, taking upon itself the global responsibility to protect and to promote liberal values even if this required the use of military force. Looking back at the heyday of the unipolar moment in the 1990s, it is often neglected that this liberal rule-based order was not universal even then. The hundreds of thousands of people on the African continent who died in armed conflicts, from the rampant AIDS pandemic or from famine, were only the most visible outsiders of this order. September 11, 2001 was the first credible challenge to this order. Since then, it has been gradually disintegrating. Several factors have brought this about.

Initially and ultimately, the West itself undermined the belief in the values and their universality that has been the basis of the liberal order. The war on terror has been accompanied by excesses and human rights violations, which made the commitment to these values less credible. The full-fledged war of the U.S. and their allies against Iraq in 2003 was a fundamental breach of the norms of the UN Charter. And some would argue that also NATO’s intervention in Kosovo 1999 was a gross violation of these norms, though it was certainly more guided by human rights concerns than by geostrategic reasoning. Nevertheless, the perception in many parts of the world became more pertinent that the West was applying double standards in its pursuit of liberal values and that some States, especially one, were more equal than others. In 2007 this unsettling of liberal political values became supplemented and reinforced by the unsettling of economic liberalism. The financial crisis, which began in the world’s most capitalist country and then spread to the rest of the world, sowed deep doubts about the superiority of liberal and deregulated markets. All the more so because the Chinese version of State capitalism seemed to be better prepared to deal with the crisis than liberal capitalism. Finally, liberal values have come under domestic pressure in those countries that have traditionally been most committed to them and have promoted them most vigorously on the international stage. The rise of illiberal democracy, right-wing populism and xenophobia in Europe and North America contributed to the increasing discrediting of these values in other parts of the world.

These developments occurred in parallel with a global power shift. China in particular, but also other parts of Asia, benefited greatly from the economic globalization, markets opening, and establishment of global supply chains that followed the end of the Cold War. In 1995, the share of U.S. GDP in world GDP was around 25%, and that of China around 2.5%. While share of the U.S. economy remained pretty stable since, the latest figures for 2023 show a Chinese share of 17%. High economic growth rates enabled China to heavily invest in its military capabilities, to make attractive offers to other countries in the form of private investment, unconditional loans and infrastructure construction–signified by the Belt and Road Initiative–and, as a consequence, to create economic dependencies that can be used for economic coercion. In addition to these elements of hard power, China offered a development model quite attractive to authoritarian leaders in Africa, Asia and Latin America–a bit of an unusual form of soft power. 

At the same time, we have witnessed a continuous weakening of multilateral institutions driven by two different dynamics. On the one hand, China has increasingly penetrated, instrumentalized and sidelined multilateral institutions and distorted their rules. The biggest victims of this strategy have been the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). On the other hand, these institutions have proved unable to adapt to the global power shifts and to reform themselves–be it the composition of the UN Security Council or the voting shares in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs): the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The consequence has been a significant loss of cohesive power and relevance: the UN Security Council has become increasingly unable to reach consensus on how to deal with violent conflicts, the IFIs hardly played any role in mastering the global financial crisis, the WTO has made no substantial progress in completing the Doha Round for further market liberalization, and the WHO has failed to manage the Covid-19 pandemic.

The declining willingness and ability of the U.S. to play the role of world police and the guarantor of peace and stability in many parts of the world amount to a third factor. The partial withdrawal from world affairs already began under the Obama administrations as a consequence of the Neocons’ failure to enforce liberal values by any means–including military force. At the same time, growing segments of U.S. society developed the conviction that the U.S. were overburdened by its international commitments, exploited by too many free-riders on their security guarantees and unfairly treated economically by friends and foes alike. These beliefs gave way to the first Trump administration, which already dealt a serious blow to the liberal rules-based order and to the Western alliance. But also the brief “America Is Back” phase of the Biden administration was marked by the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan that U.S. partners perceived as a betrayal.

In combination with the increasing discreditation of liberal values, the global power shift and the increasing irrelevance of multilateral institutions, the partial withdrawal of the U.S. from world affairs created a power vacuum that called for a renewed great power rivalry very similar to the period before World War I. For a while, the staging of this rivalry seemed to be confined to the realm of geoeconomics. Foreign policy objectives were pursued through the creation of economic dependencies and economic coercion, through competition for control of markets, critical raw materials and trade routes, and through the imposition of sanctions and boycotts. However, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has brutally reintroduced military force into the great power equation. The global financial crisis, China's resort to economic coercion and, finally, the fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine have raised awareness in the West of the vulnerabilities that come with globalization. Interdependencies that had previously been positively connotated were reassessed as relationships of asymmetric dependency–and a security threat. The discourse on the international economy has become increasingly dominated by terms such as resilience, and friend-, near- and re-shoring replacing concepts of efficiency, just-in-time, economies of scale and global value chains. The end of globalization as we knew it is the economic fallout of the disintegration of the liberal rules-based order.

The accelerating decline of this order and the end of the unipolar moment are paving the way for a new world order. What this will look like remains to be seen, but three possible blueprints for a future world order can be outlined: (1) a return to bipolarity, this time splitting the world in a camp dominated by the U.S. and another dominated by China; (2) the emergence of multipolarity; and (3) an order of non-polarity, meaning the complete fragmentation of world order.

MAKING SENSE OF THE WORLD ACCORDING TO TRUMP

Despite the fact that Donald Trump’s perception of the world and his ideas about the future world order will very much influence what kind of order we will end up with, it remains difficult to paint a complete picture of his vision for the world. There is no Trump doctrine, nor a discernible foreign policy agenda. Nevertheless, there are a few elements that seem to be constant and that seem to guide his view of international affairs: there is a clear mercantilist approach to trade and the international economy, which absolutizes equal or–even better–positive trade balances; there is the conviction that the U.S. has been exploited by its allies' free-riding on security; there is a disregard for liberal values and like-mindedness combined with an admiration for strong rulers; there is the self-perception of being a superior deal-maker who has neither permanent friends nor enemies, but only transactions with other peers; and finally there is a general skepticism towards the use of military force. But before we continue our efforts intruding into Donald Trump’s mind to understand how much these supposed constants actually shape his ideas about the world order, we make a detour to analyze the strands of thought probably shaping his administration’s foreign policy. There are three streams that can be distinguished: (1) spheres of influence; (2) reverse Kissinger; and (3) libertarianism.

A world structured in spheres of influence represents a cemented version of multipolarity. In such a world, the U.S. would ensure its security and economic welfare by controlling the Western hemisphere, resort to international restraint and withdraw from other parts of the world. How these parts are organized will be left to regional hegemons who have the power and the right of the might to regionally define and dictate rules and impose these by economic coercion or military force. In this scenario, East and Southeast Asia and possibly also Oceania would be dominated by China, while India would control South Asia and the Indian Ocean rim. Elsewhere we could expect a clash of rival powers: Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey would struggle for regional control in the Middle East, while Russia and the European Union plus the United Kingdom would fight over hegemony in Europe and Central Asia. Africa, lacking a real regional power, might be the victim of a new scramble of external forces for it. The U.S. would take a more or less neutral stance in these power struggles and then deal with the respective hegemon. Such a world is perfectly captured by the Melian dialogue in which–according to Thucydides–the Athenians unveiled their expectations towards their subordinated “partners”: “For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with specious pretences–either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are now attacking you because of wrong that you have done us (…); since you know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” (Thucydides 2025). In short, the U.S. would confine itself to the role of an equal in power, managing relations with other equals and accepting that they treat their subordinates as they wish. In turn, the U.S. would expect the other equals to respect the Western Hemisphere as its exclusive sphere of influence.

The reverse Kissinger-thinking understands and focuses on the rivalry with China as the essential challenge for the U.S.’s sole power-status and its economic wealth. Preventing, or at least slowing down, China’s rise to an equal or even superior power is the essential task of all its foreign policy efforts. A central element in this is the termination of the “no limits” partnership between China and Russia. Kissinger did this trick in 1971 by separating China from the Soviet bloc, and Steve Witkoff, Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, is expected to do the same magic now with Russia. If the price for this is the seizure of the Ukrainian occupied territories by Russia, the transformation of Ukraine into a Russian vassal state and the submission of the European allies to Russian hegemony, then, in reverse Kissinger-thinking, the U.S. should be prepared to pay it. This thinking assumes blind loyalty by the European allies in dealing with China and expects all other countries to make a choice of either following suit with the U.S. or joining the Chinese camp. In a best-case scenario, this would result in the isolation of China from the world and in pushing it back to middle power status. In a different scenario, this might lead to a new form of bipolarity in which the U.S. would either have to neutralize Russian power or somehow pull it into the U.S. bloc in order to ensure that this bloc can dominate the other.

The libertarian stream hardly thinks in terms of geopolitical power struggles at all. Its main enemy is not another State but the State as such, which limits the space for free enterprise and maximalization of private profits by regulation, sanctions, capital controls, taxes and so forth. Though they are ultimately not interested in geostrategy or great power rivalry, the libertarians’ interests are more compatible with those of the proponents of spheres of influence than with the reverse Kissinger apologists. To them a new bipolarity or an isolation of China would mean the complete loss of access to an important and attractive market, to an essential supplier of components and final products, as well as to a laboratory for technological innovation. In addition, it bears the risk of costly proxy or even direct wars. Meanwhile, a world of spheres of influence, though by far not perfect, still allows for economic exchange, selective technological cooperation and balanced trade, if the correct interfaces are established and mutually respected.

This analysis of the three strands of foreign policy thought that might shape the Trump administration international adventures suggests a preponderance of a spheres-of-influence worldview, raising the question of whether this also reflects in Trump's actions and rhetoric. His intention to “re-take” the Panama Canal and to integrate Canada and Greenland into the U.S., his renaming of the Gulf of Mexico as well as his open admiration for the achievements of the imperialist President McKinley reflect Trump’s focus on the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, remarks about not defending European allies against Russian aggression or Japan and South Korea against China if they do not spend enough on defense, questioning the binding nature of Article 5 of the NATO treaty, hints about not risking a war with China over Taiwan, a comment about "leaving Bangladesh to Modi", as well as his announcement to start negotiations with Iran, suggest that Trump's vision of the world is akin to the spheres of influence thinking. This apparent preference is also compatible with his indifference towards liberal values and his mercantilist trade policy as well as his mission to reduce the costs of the U.S. international engagement including commitments to international development and the divestment of the burden to protect European and East Asian allies. Initially, also Trump’s tariff policy imposing tariffs on allies and rivals alike seemed to support this interpretation of his words and deeds, and fit into a spheres-of-influence world view. However, since then, many allies have been exempted from tariffs additional to the 10% base line tariffs for at least 90 days, while tariffs on China have raised to 145%. This might be a hint that the rivalry with and the isolation of China will dominate Trump’s foreign policy agenda after all. But it might also reflect just the fact that China was the only major economy swiftly responding to U.S. tariffs by, in turn, imposing significant tariffs on U.S. exports.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR THE REST OF THE WORLD?

A world fragmented into spheres of influence or split into two antagonistic blocs augur ill for great parts of the world. In a world of spheres of influence, if Trump sees Europe as a sphere separated from American hegemony, who does he consider to be the hegemon there? His obvious sympathy for Vladimir Putin, his admiration of strong men, his indifference towards democratic values and his perception of European allies as free-riders on security and exploiters of U.S. wealth put into question whether President Trump would be willing to assign this hegemonial role to the European Union–all the more so as his administration is not the first one bothered by to complexities of European governance and foreign policies. Ceding Europe to an autocratic Russia is certainly one of several thinkable worst-case outcomes of the Trump administration. 

If Trump hails the Western Hemisphere as Washington’s exclusive sphere of influence, the consequences would only be mildly better for Latin American countries. Frequent interferences in their domestic affairs, the support for right-wing populist leaders, and economic coercion to force the countries of the region in line with Washington will be the rule. Despite Trump’s skepticism towards the use of military force, if actors in the exclusive sphere of influence do not fall in line, even military interventions, which were quite common under past U.S. administrations, cannot be out-ruled. 

It surpasses the ambition of this essay what a world of spheres of influence would mean for other regions. In short, Chinese and Indian hegemony over East and Southeast Asia, and South Asia and the Indian Ocean, respectively, would not only deal a serious blow to democracy in Asia but also seriously endanger small and weak States across the region. Due to the lack of a single dominant power in the Middle East and Africa, both regions might be caught in an endless military competition between the aspiring regional powers and external forces.

The consequences of a new bipolar world look hardly any better than those of a fragmented one. If such a bipolarity resembles that of the Cold War, it will come along with numerous proxy wars at the fringes of the blocs and with far-reaching economic, societal and communicative decoupling of both blocs from each other. Both European and Latin American countries would not be allowed to choose which bloc to join, and a Western bloc under the control of a Trump or Trump-like administration will not show much respect for the interests and preferences of its allies, or rather, subordinates. And last, but certainly not least, a new bipolarity will certainly complicate efforts to address the global challenges humanity is facing: climate change, loss of biodiversity, sustainable development, demographic change and out-of-control artificial intelligence.

Fortunately, as the world seems to be the pawn in the hands of the U.S., China and Russia, the other countries are not without power but need to trust that they have more agency than they currently attribute to themselves. Hopes that this agency is sufficient to revive a liberal rules-based multilateral order might be over-optimistic–the more so as many countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa do not share European commitment to this order and its values (as discussed above). A more realistic vision for a more promising world order than the two described so far is a multipolar world not split in cemented spheres of influence but by a more flexible structure of poles that compete for support and loyalty. Such poles might exist on different levels, and only a few will have global outreach, certainly the U.S. and China, perhaps the EU and India and–more questionable–Russia. The scope of other powers such as Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, possibly Nigeria, will be a more regional one. Nevertheless, all of them enjoy a significant degree of strategic autonomy, which allows them to establish and preserve their own political, economic and social system. They will aim to expand the validity of their system, its rules and standards towards other countries–less by economic coercion or military force than by demonstrating its attractiveness and supremacy. The main currency of such a flexibly structured multipolar world would not be hard but soft power. In the international arena, systemic poles would have the responsibility to create proper interfaces to the other systems. This kind of multipolarity would only work if its poles comply with a small set of basic principles: territorial integrity, national sovereignty and peaceful conflict resolution, and are determined to react forcefully if these principles are breached. 

At present, a development in this direction does not appear to be particularly tangible, as the most powerful States seem to have little interest in it. However, if Europe and East Asian democracies use their economic potential to care for their own security and contain Russia and China, respectively, if those countries which benefited along with China from the recent global power shift–countries like India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia–use their agency to resist U.S. and Chinese pressure, an alliance of countries might emerge that is strong enough to push the world towards peaceful and constructive multipolarity. The aim of such an alliance would be nothing less than to prove wrong John Irving, who ended his famous novel with the sentence: “In the world according to Garp, we are all terminal cases”.

Notes

[1]See World Bank Group: GDP (current US$) - China, World, United States. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN-1W-US. 

[2]Some observers see this recourse to military means by Russia as an expression of the realization that it does not control the economic means to meet the challenges of a geoeconomic great power rivalry.

[3]Thucydides (The Melian Dialogue, Book 5, Chapter 17).

[4] To make a renewed recourse on Thucydides, the potential catastrophic consequences of a rivalry between an established and emerging power is known as Thucydides trap: “it was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable” (Thucydides).

References

Irving, John. 1978. The World According to Garp. United Kingdom: E. P. Dutton.

Thucydides. n/d. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Richard Crawley. The Internet Classics Archive. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. http://classics.mit.edu/Thucydides/pelopwar.5.fifth.html. 

Submitted: April 25, 2025

Accepted for publication: April 26, 2025

Copyright © 2025  CEBRI-Journal.  This  is  an  Open  Access  article  distributed  under  the  terms  of  the  Creative  Commons  Attribution  License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original article is properly cited.