"Brazil is committed to dialogue, consensus, and the strength of the Global South as drivers of positive transformation in the international order"

Ambassador Mauricio Carvalho Lyrio is the Secretary of Climate, Energy, and Environment at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Brazil's BRICS Sherpa.

Before assuming his current position, he was Brazil's ambassador to Australia (2021-2023) and Mexico (2018-2021). At the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he has served, among other positions, as Chief of Staff to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (2016-2017), Secretary of Diplomatic Planning (2013-2016), Minister-Counselor of the Brazilian Mission to the UN in New York (2011-2013), and Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008-2010). He also served at the Brazilian embassies in China, Argentina, and the United States. He was the Secretary for Economic and Financial Affairs from 2023 to 2025, a role in which he served as Brazil's G20 Sherpa.

Born in Rio de Janeiro, he holds a bachelor's degree in Communication and a master's degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-RJ).

Source: Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Below is the written interview given to the editors of CEBRI-Journal.

Brazil’s 2025 BRICS presidency has the motto "Strengthening the Global South cooperation for more inclusive and sustainable governance" and is structured around six thematic priorities. How does Brazil intend to articulate these different areas, ranging from global health to the governance of artificial intelligence, into a coherent political narrative capable of translating the demands of the Global South into concrete proposals within BRICS and in broader multilateral forums?

Mauricio Lyrio: I believe BRICS has a dual purpose. The first, which is at its core, is the defense of multilateralism and the reform of global governance. We believe the institutions created after 1945 have been weakened due to issues of representativeness and the exclusion of many relevant actors from their decision-making processes.

The second purpose is more tangible: to encourage deeper cooperation among its members in many subjects. Examples include health, education, infrastructure, agriculture, economic and business ties, among others. Since its first Summit in 2009, the group has significantly expanded its areas of activity.

Taking into account this dual purpose, the Brazilian presidency has pursued initiatives that not only contribute to strengthening multilateralism and global governance, but also bring tangible results to our people. 

Thus, we are focusing on two main pillars: Global South Cooperation and BRICS Partnerships for Social, Economic, and Environmental Development. These pillars break down into six priority areas: Global Health Cooperation; Trade, Investment, and Finance; Combating Climate Change; Artificial Intelligence Governance; Reform of the Multilateral Peace and Security Architecture; and BRICS Institutional Development.

These are the current priorities, in which we aim to deliver results during Brazil’s one-year presidency–actually, slightly less, since we will focus on  COP30 during the second half of 2025.

Although thematically diverse, these areas are interconnected by the urgency of coordinated action among BRICS countries. These subjects face significant challenges in an international context marked by the erosion of multilateralism and the rise of unilateralism.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted that threats to global health must be addressed in a coordinated effort. The same is true of the climate crisis and the need to ensure ethical and inclusive standards in the development of new technologies, such as artificial intelligence. These are cross-cutting challenges that require concerted and multilateral responses.

All concrete initiatives go hand in hand with BRICS' role in defending multilateralism and reforming global governance, in order to make international institutions more effective in their respective jurisdictions. It is not acceptable that, 80 years after the end of World War II, we still have institutions that lack adequate representation from the Global South.

In this context, BRICS upholds the need to reform the United Nations, particularly its Security Council, and the Bretton Woods institutions. It advocates for the importance of a multilateral trade system based on clear and predictable rules, as opposed to unilateral measures. We must adapt all these institutions to the realities of the 21st century, ensuring their legitimacy, effectiveness, relevance, and capacity to respond to global challenges effectively.

By articulating these diverse fronts into a coherent political narrative, the Brazilian presidency seeks to consolidate BRICS as a platform for concrete and convergent action in favor of a more inclusive, sustainable, and representative global governance. Brazil believes in dialogue, consensus, and the strength of the Global South as drivers of positive transformation in the international order. We seek neither antagonism nor protagonism. We seek balance and fair, effective institutions.

The expansion of BRICS with new members such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates raises important questions about the group's political cohesion, legitimacy, and capacity for joint action. Recently, Brazil announced the full membership of Indonesia. How does the Brazilian presidency intend to address this new, expanded configuration, especially with regard to defining criteria for the admission of future members and the impact of the expansion on the political identity of the group?

ML: I understand the expansion of BRICS precisely as a testament to the desire for greater cooperation among developing countries and also to the group's capacity to act. The interest shown by other countries is a clear sign of the relevance the group has gained since its creation, consolidating itself as an influential voice on the international stage.

Therefore, the expansion has a positive impact on the political identity of BRICS. Since its creation, the group has always been characterized by diversity in terms of geographic location, political structures, population, culture, and religion. This diversity has never been an obstacle, because what truly brings cohesion to BRICS is its shared commitment to development through cooperation, the promotion of Global South agendas, and the advocacy to reform global governance. The entry of new members who share these principles further strengthens these agendas.

The South African Presidency in 2023 already discussed the criteria for admitting new members. Then, we reached a consensus on the principles, standards, criteria, and procedures that would guide the expansion process, including support for the reform of the United Nations and geographical balance.

Our challenge now is to organize BRICS in a way that allows new participants to be fully integrated. In this sense, one of the priorities of the Brazilian presidency is the institutional development of BRICS, which includes updating the group's Terms of Reference so that they reflect its new configuration, defining criteria for the rotation of annual presidencies, and having a more detailed discussion on the forms of engagement of partner countries.

The proposal to create a permanent BRICS secretariat has been discussed as a way to further institutionalize the group and provide greater continuity for its initiatives. However, there are concerns that this could lead to the bureaucratization of the group or the concentration of power among certain members. What is Brazil's position on this proposal, and how does the Brazilian presidency intend to conduct this debate in 2025?

ML: The proposal to create a permanent secretariat for BRICS has been mentioned on a few occasions, especially in light of the growing complexity of the group, which currently has over 100 cooperation mechanisms.

However, we understand that BRICS, due to its flexible nature, has worked well without a centralized, permanent structure. Rotating annual presidencies serve as the group's secretariat. There does not seem to be sufficient political interest among members to move in the direction of a permanent structure at the moment.

For example, the G20, which also has a large number of working and engagement groups, has chosen not to establish a permanent secretariat, because it understands that the rotating presidencies have already developed flexible ways of preserving institutional memory and ensuring the continuity of the work carried out. In BRICS, we are looking for ways to improve the group's institutional memory.

Our priority in 2025 will be to strengthen coordination among existing mechanisms and improve governance pragmatically and efficiently, maintaining the flexibility that has always characterized the group.

This debate, if it occurs, will be conducted in an inclusive and gradual manner, based on the dialogue and search for consensus that are hallmarks of BRICS.

The discussion on the de-dollarization of economic and trade flows among BRICS members has gained momentum in recent years, especially in light of unilateral sanctions and the geopolitical use of the international financial system. How does Brazil’s 2025 BRICS presidency intend to address this issue? Is there room for concrete progress in promoting alternative financial mechanisms, such as the use of national currencies or proprietary payment systems, while respecting the distinct macroeconomic realities of the members?

ML: This topic requires clarification. We are not currently discussing the "de-dollarization" of trade flows, nor the creation of a common currency.

The focus of the Brazilian presidency in 2025 is to foster intra-bloc trade relations through the development of more efficient payment mechanisms, as outlined in the Johannesburg (2023) and Kazan (2024) Declarations. In other words, we seek cost reductions in our transactions in trade, finance, and investment.

To this end, the BRICS Payments Task Force, created in 2020, has been working to improve systems that facilitate transactions between member countries, promoting greater financial integration. Currently, this initiative is coordinated by the Central Bank of Brazil, which seeks to promote solutions aligned with the priorities established by BRICS. The Task Force has been promoting seminars and studies on alternatives for improving payment systems, with support from the BRICS Think Tank Network for Finance (BTTNF), coordinated by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), a Brazilian think tank in the field of economics. Among the ongoing discussions, a key priority is enhancing interoperability between national payment systems to ensure faster and more efficient transactions.

The use of local currencies for payments already takes place bilaterally between some BRICS countries. Expanding these mechanisms could strengthen financial ties within BRICS.

Furthermore, BRICS central banks are discussing the possibility of creating a shared financial data platform to monitor transactions and increase transparency of financial flows.

It is important to note that BRICS’ financial initiatives aim to complement the role of organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, with the aim of promoting a fair and balanced international economic order. The same motivations led to the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) in 2014.

The NDB has an authorized capital of US$ 100 billion, of which US$ 52.7 billion has already been subscribed. To date, the bank has approved 96 projects, totaling US$ 32.8 billion in financing. It has sought to expand financing in local currencies to reduce costs and risk. In its General Strategy for 2022-2026, it set a goal of conducting 30% of its total financing in local currency, which has led the bank to issue more bonds, helping stimulate the capital markets of its member countries.

The CRA is a mutual support mechanism among BRICS countries, with a US$ 100 billion fund designed to provide financial assistance in the event of liquidity pressures or currency crises.

The Brazilian presidency has sought to improve existing mechanisms and initiatives, as well as explore ways to reduce transaction costs and, thus, boost economic relations between BRICS members.

In 2025, Brazil will simultaneously hold the presidency of two multilateral processes that combine decisive agendas for the stability of international relations: BRICS and COP30. However, there is criticism that points out some BRICS members, such as Russia, India, and China, have a carbon-intensive energy matrix and a relatively conservative stance on the climate agenda, especially regarding the reduction of fossil fuel use. How does the Brazilian BRICS presidency plan to coordinate on this issue in order to encourage constructive outcomes at COP30?

ML: Before addressing the question, we need to remember developing countries are not the main cause of the climate emergency. Therefore, it makes no sense to point the finger at the BRICS countries. All of its members are committed to the climate agenda, but they also seek a balanced vision of sustainable development that combines economic, social, and environmental aspects. We must also always remember the unfulfilled financing commitments of the countries that have historically emitted the most CO2 and the need to heed the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).

The climate agenda within BRICS, under the Brazilian presidency, was formulated as a structuring element of COP30. However, the connection between the two processes is broader than commonly thought. BRICS will not only serve as a platform for articulating negotiating positions at COP30. Its main function will be to produce concrete solutions capable of leveraging decisive action against climate change in Belém.

COP30 should be understood as the culmination of a strategic framework launched at the beginning of President Lula's administration, which encompasses Brazil's role at COP28 and COP29 and the Brazilian presidency of the G20 and BRICS. This strategic framework is defined by a key objective: to revitalize climate multilateralism and enable its transition to a new paradigm.

Amid the acceleration of climate change and the universalization of its impacts, it is urgent to move from negotiations to implementation, from promises to action. COP30 will be the milestone of this shift. 

With this objective in mind, the BRICS climate agenda was conceived as an agenda for action. Its main proposal consists of a specific leaders' declaration on climate finance, through which we will launch an ambitious, high-profile work plan to leverage financing for mitigation and adaptation efforts within the group. We will also explore innovative intellectual property arrangements, such as patent pools, to ensure the widespread and rapid dissemination of technologies needed to combat climate change.

Finally, the agenda includes the establishment of a BRICS Laboratory, based on economic modeling, to promote trade policies that converge with environmental objectives,  without protectionist tendencies, and to facilitate collective responses to unilateral measures by other countries; and to adopt principles to ensure that our emissions are measured using fair, inclusive, and transparent metrics.

Our agenda focuses on the gaps in international support left by developed countries. We will demonstrate viable and replicable solutions to overcome the economic, financial, and technological bottlenecks that hinder climate action, including the energy transition and the replacement of fossil fuels. The diversity of the BRICS countries—political, economic, and environmental diversity, including the composition of their energy matrices—is representative of the Global South. Therefore, BRICS will be able to show the way to an effective, fair, and inclusive transition, which is the objective of COP30.

Interview originally in Portuguese, sent by written media on October 29, 2024.

Translated by Catarina Werlang with the support of digital machine translation tools and subsequently reviewed by the author. Tools employed: Google Translate (initial draft), Grammarly (grammatical and syntactic revision), and ChatGPT (selective phrasing refinements).

Copyright © 2025  CEBRI-Journal.  This is an  Open  Access article distributed under the terms of the  Creative  Commons  Attribution  License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original article is properly cited.