Can Brazil Have an Influential Role in the Energy Transition in a Fragmented World?

The year 2026 marks a tipping point (Eurasia Group 2026). The world remains highly integrated, with global trade fluctuating at near-record levels since 2005 and reaching 68% of GDP in 2025 (World Bank 2026). However, geopolitical fragmentation is weakening multilateral governance, increasing strategic competition and undermining international cooperation. In a low-trust environment, countries and businesses are actively steering resources towards new partnerships, technologies, and supply chains to mitigate vulnerabilities, with far-reaching implications across economic sectors. 

This article explores the extent to which energy security interacts with the new geopolitical context, and the opportunities created for Brazil as a resource-endowed middle power. It first examines how the new energy security paradigm is exposing structural vulnerabilities in concentrated supply chains and reshaping global decarbonization pathways. It then turns to Brazil’s position as a hybrid energy powerhouse, drawing on its assets in energy, mining, and forests to assess its potential to integrate global low-emissions value chains. Finally, it argues that realizing this potential will not follow automatically from resource endowments alone and proposes four cross-cutting recommendations to strengthen the institutional capacity needed to convert Brazil’s advantages into lasting economic and geopolitical influence.     

THE NEW ENERGY SECURITY AND TRANSITION SCENARIO

The world’s energy needs continue to grow. Global energy consumption increased by 1.3% in 2025, while electricity demand rose by nearly 3%, above the 2.8% average of the last decade (IEA 2026a). Much of this growth is concentrated in developing economies, driven by rising living standards, industrialization, and accelerating use of air conditioning. In recent years, increased demand from data centers and artificial intelligence (AI) has reversed nearly two decades of stagnant development in advanced economies, while electrification has expanded global power needs, led by the growth of electric vehicles (EVs) and heat pumps. 

Against this backdrop, the world has experienced two major energy disruptions over the last four years, marked by the weaponization of fossil fuel supplies. In 2022, the Russia-Ukraine war led to a sharp rise in oil and natural gas prices, triggering global inflation and economic recessions in major European economies that were highly dependent on energy imports (Rojas-Ramagosa 2024). More recently, the conflict between the US, Israel, and Iran led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which 25% of global seaborne oil trade and 19% of liquified natural gas (LNG) exports flowed in 2025, mostly to Asia (IEA 2026b), resulting in a supply disruption larger than the combined oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 (IEA 2026c). 

In this context, a new energy security paradigm emerges (Lins 2026). In the short term, countries are set to prioritize trustworthy partnerships to diversify and guarantee energy security and economic stability. In the long term, the energy security architecture is likely to accelerate decarbonization, as electrification, coupled with low-emission power capacity led by solar, wind, and batteries, offers the clearest pathway towards reducing dependence on fossil fuel imports and preserving economic competitiveness amid geopolitical uncertainty. Sustainable fuels provide a complementary solution in sectors where electrification is not a viable alternative, particularly in hard-to-abate sectors including aviation, shipping and steelmaking, but closing the competitiveness gap with incumbent fossil technologies still requires continued innovation and policy support.

Diversification emerges as an imperative response to a more volatile environment. For net fossil-importing countries, which represent around 75% of the world's population, seeking a wider range of suppliers is crucial to curb overreliance on a single country or chokepoint and reduce vulnerability to shocks (Walter, Butler-Sloss & Jones 2026). As importers rebalance their portfolios, oil and gas (O&G) producers in the Atlantic Basin, including the US, Brazil, and Guyana, stand to benefit in the short to medium-term due to their growing production and distance from geopolitical conflicts. In April 2026, following the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, US exports of crude oil and petroleum products reached 13.6 million barrels per day (mb/d), a 15% increase from the previous record set in March (EIA 2026). 

As price fluctuations affect businesses, households, and public budgets, the case for energy self-sufficiency becomes clear. In this context, low-emissions power generation, led by renewables, stands out as a key pathway to greater independence, driven by economic competitiveness and fast deployment timelines. In 2025, over 90% of utility-scale renewable projects delivered power below the cost of the cheapest new fossil fuel plant in their markets (IRENA 2026). At the same time, over US$ 250 billion in fossil fuel import costs were avoided thanks to cumulative investments in renewables, nuclear, electrification and energy efficiency in the largest energy-importing regions (China, the EU, Japan and Korea, Southeast Asia, and India) since 2015, and the benefits are set to be considerably larger in 2026 (IEA 2026d). 

Still, the search for domestic energy sources might provide a short-term boost to coal, particularly in the Asia-Pacific. The region, which is responsible for around 83% of global coal demand (Energy Institute 2026), is expected to increase coal use between 70 and 90 million tons (mt) in 2026 (Talukdar, Diaz & Selvaraju 2026), driven not by large-scale new capacity additions but by existing coal-fired fleets running at higher utilization rates due to the disruption of LNG supplies. The extent to which this trend will endure remains to be seen, as many Asian economies are expected to shift increasingly towards low-emission solutions.

On the demand side, accelerating electrification stands out as the primary lever for reducing fossil fuel dependence. As a result of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, heat pump sales in Europe increased by 17% and EV sales rose by 30% in the first quarter of 2026 compared to the same period in 2025. In Latin America and Asia-Pacific, EV purchases grew by 75% and 80% year-over-year, respectively, while Chinese exports of solar panels to Africa were 120% higher (IEA 2026d). Political momentum is also on the rise, highlighted by new targets of 35% electrification by 2035 proposed by the COP31 Presidency and 46% by 2040 in the European Union (COP31 2026; European Commission 2026).

Nonetheless, addressing key challenges remains critical to enable secure and widespread clean energy deployment. First, concentrated supply chains pose emerging geopolitical risks. China currently accounts for 81% of global battery production, 79% of solar photovoltaic manufacturing, and 72% of EV production, and is also the largest refiner of 19 of the 20 critical minerals for the energy transition, with an average market share of 70% (IEA 2026e). Second, renewables deployment must be followed by grids and storage expansion to manage the intermittency of solar and wind, guarantee reliability and strengthen system resilience. Globally, more than 2,500 gigawatts (GW) of renewable, storage, and large-load projects are currently stalled in connection queues (IEA 2026f). 

At the same time, climate change–sidelined by worsening geopolitical conditions–remains a central threat to energy and economic security. Global warming is rapidly intensifying, with the world on track to surpass the 1.5 °C threshold by the end of the decade (Forster et al. 2026). Meanwhile, extreme weather events continue to cause major economic harm, as average annual economic losses increased by 38% in real terms from US$ 264 billion, from 2010-2014 to 2020-2024, with an average insurance rate of 50% (Romanello et al. 2025). Looking ahead, more frequent and intense extreme weather events, including droughts, heatwaves, wildfires, storms, and floods, are set to apply growing pressure on energy and economic systems.

In this context, the new energy security architecture provides a pathway for resource-endowed middle powers to play an increasingly important role in the emerging global order (WEF 2026). Being a trusted international partner, well-established energy powerhouse, critical mineral stronghold and leading provider of nature-based solutions, Brazil stands in an advantaged position to contribute to global economic security and supply chain diversification, accelerate the energy transition, integrate emerging low-emissions value chains, and strengthen its geopolitical weight (Lins, Ferreira, Corrêa & Miraglia 2026). 

BRAZIL’S POTENTIAL ROLE IN THE ENERGY TRANSITION 

Foundations 

Brazil has managed to navigate a volatile geopolitical context with relative stability. The country stands as the world’s fourth-largest democracy, with a robust economy, anchored in abundant natural resources, a vast domestic consumer market, and a diversified set of trading partners, despite its comparatively reduced openness to international trade. Illustrating this, just under 30% of Brazil’s US$ 348 billion total exports in 2025 went to its largest trading partner–China, while 14% were destined to the EU, 11% to the US, and 7% to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (MDIC 2026). The country also benefits from the ability to navigate between North, South, East and West, fostering diverse and stable relations and achieving progress in key international fora, such as the G20 (2024), BRICS and COP30 (2025).

Given its structural strengths, Brazil’s assets stand to become increasingly valuable in the emerging global order. A more volatile international context is driving a reorientation of value chains, with a premium on trusted partnerships, resilient supply chains, natural resources, and energy security. In this context, three key areas stand out–energy, mining, and forests–in which Brazil could seize the opportunity to leverage its competitive advantages to integrate emerging low-carbon value chains and steer decarbonization (Lins, Ferreira & Corrêa 2026). Beyond its resource endowments, however, it is important to recognize the significant institutional, political and economic barriers that must be urgently addressed for the country to capitalize on this window of opportunity (Lins, Ferreira & Corrêa 2026). 

Energy

Brazil is uniquely positioned as a diversified energy power. In 2025, low-carbon sources accounted for 51% of the country’s total energy supply and 89% of its electricity, compared with global averages of 20% and 43%, respectively (EPE 2026a; IEA 2026a). Bioenergy plays a crucial role in lowering fossil fuel consumption in the transport (ethanol and biodiesel) and industrial (biomass) sectors, accounting for 26% and 44% of demand, respectively (EPE 2026a). In the electricity sector, solar and wind have grown exponentially from 3% to 26% of generation between 2016 and 2025, adding to a 51% share of hydropower (EPE 2026a). At the same time, oil production increased by 50% in the last decade (ANP 2026), reaching 3.8 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2025, anchored in competitive breakeven costs (around US$ 40/bbl) and carbon intensity (22% below the global average) (IEA 2023). Being a hybrid energy powerhouse is a comparative advantage, particularly in a polarized world, allowing Brazil to navigate between fossil-fuel and renewable-energy producers while emphasizing sustainable fuels as a complementary solution to electrification.

Mining

Brazil is a major producer of high-quality iron ore and has vast reserves of critical minerals. The country is the world’s second-largest iron ore producer, accounting for around 16% of the global total, and has the third-largest reserves globally (Demôro, Nunes & Rabioglio 2025), with high-grade deposits that position it well to supply future low-emission steel production. In addition, Brazil is home to around 26% of global graphite reserves, 18% of rare earths, and 12% of nickel (EPE 2026b), key energy transition minerals for which demand is projected to increase by 65%-100% by 2040 (IEA 2026g). These minerals play a key role in the manufacturing of low-carbon technologies, such as EVs and solar panels, but also defense and technology supply chains, having attracted global interest as countries seek to diversify supply chains away from China. 

Forests

Tropical forests carry high climate value and economic potential. Brazil hosts around 28% of the world’s tropical forest area, or 358 million hectares (Mha) (Assunção, Arbache, Chiavari, de Miranda & Zangiski 2025), equivalent to the total landmass of India and storing over 171 billion tons (Gt) of CO2 (Assunção, Arbache, Chiavari, de Miranda & Zangiski 2025; Our World in Data 2023). Since peaking in 2022, deforestation decreased by 1.2 Mha, a 47% drop, with significant progress in the Amazon (-75%) (MapBiomas 2026). Beyond preservation, the economic importance of nature is also increasingly clear. In 2025, Amazon forest-related product revenues reached US$ 7.2 billion, tapping into a US$ 234 billion global bioeconomy market (Amazônia2030 2025), while the Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), launched by Brazil at COP30, gathered nearly US$ 7 billion in pledges to financially compensate developing economies for forest protection (TFFF 2025). These ecosystems also enable a wide range of economic activities in the country, including agriculture, hydropower, commercial river navigation, and freshwater supplies to urban centers. 

Looking ahead

Building on its foundations and assets, Brazil is uniquely positioned to combine energy security, industrial decarbonization, and climate leadership. Its status as a hybrid power–providing both the energy sources that remain essential to the global energy system and the rapidly expanding low-carbon solutions that will define its future–is a strategic advantage in a world where competition for all forms of energy is intense, energy security has become a central priority, and climate change is urgent. However, geopolitical relevance depends not only on natural endowments but also on the institutional capacity to enable large-scale private investment and to competitively integrate into low-emissions value chains. Brazil's greatest constraint is its ability to transform its assets into productive investment, industrial competitiveness, long-term geopolitical influence, and climate leadership. Realizing this potential requires the country to address long-standing barriers while the window of opportunity created by the current geopolitical realignment remains open. Four actions are suggested in this direction.

(i) Establish a clear long-term vision for Brazil, anchored in independent and stable institutions and aligned with the country's climate, energy and socioeconomic objectives. The absence of a clear and shared long-term vision among key stakeholders exacerbates short-term trade-offs, creates policy uncertainty, and weakens investment confidence. It also fosters an environment in which institutional independence and the rule of law are undermined by short-term political priorities rather than long-term national objectives. This challenge is illustrated by the lengthy and politically contentious permitting processes surrounding major energy and infrastructure projects in the country. Most recently, oil exploration licensing in the Equatorial Margin highlighted the tensions between Brazil's international climate commitments, the development of new oil frontiers, and regional economic development opportunities (Lins, Ferreira & Corrêa 2024).

Strategic alignment should be built through continuous engagement with a broad range of stakeholders, including government officials, the private sector, civil society, and academia. In parallel, safeguarding the independence and strengthening the implementation capacity of State institutions, such as regulatory agencies, are essential to reduce uncertainty and mobilize long-term private investment. Over time, greater policy coherence, stronger long-term planning, enhanced institutional capacity, and more effective governance would improve Brazil's competitiveness and reinforce its differentiated position in the low-emissions economy. 

(ii) Promote a stable and competitive macroeconomic and business environment capable of mobilizing long-term private investment. As global competition for capital intensifies, Brazil continues to face structural barriers, including infrastructure bottlenecks and high financing costs, which increase project risks, raise the cost of capital, and undermine competitiveness. This environment can discourage investment even in sectors where Brazil benefits from clear comparative advantages. In the electricity sector, for example, uncoordinated and overlapping subsidies for decentralized solar generation, obsolete regulatory frameworks, limited system flexibility, and gaps in grid and storage infrastructure have contributed to growing operational challenges. In 2025, curtailment rates reached nearly 23% of solar and wind generation, resulting in approximately US$ 1.3 billion in financial losses (Maisonnave & Rathi 2026).

Brazil has the opportunity to improve its investment scenario, reduce perceived risks, and attract private capital. Doing so, however, requires a sustained commitment to macroeconomic stability, regulatory and legal certainty, as well as accelerating infrastructure modernization and resilience. A more attractive investment environment would accelerate the deployment of low-carbon technologies, such as battery storage, to improve power system flexibility, support industrial development, and enable the country to capture a larger share of global investment flowing into the energy transition. 

(iii) Accelerate Brazil's integration into emerging low-emissions value chains by fostering innovation, trade integration, and industrial competitiveness. Despite abundant renewable energy resources and reserves of strategic energy transition minerals, such as rare earths and high-grade iron ore, its participation in low-emissions value chains remains very limited. For example, Brazilian biofuels and sustainable fuels face challenges demonstrating their environmental and climate credentials to integrate into international markets, while a lack of geological mapping and failure to move forward with a comprehensive critical minerals policy have delayed investments in the sector. 

Brazil must address persistent bottlenecks by strengthening innovation, technological development, international engagement and trade integration, as well as developing targeted, efficient policy frameworks and market designs needed to support the growth of new low-emissions industries. Expanding research and development (R&D) should reinforce links between academia and the private sector, including by redirecting R&D levies from O&G production to low-emissions technologies. Most importantly, efforts should be anchored in strong governance and institutional capacity and focus on low-emissions technologies in which Brazil has clear competitive advantages. 

(iv) Strengthen public security and combat organized crime as a prerequisite for low-emissions economic development. Criminal activities increasingly affect Brazil's strategic assets, including illegal deforestation and mining in the Amazon region. These activities not only generate environmental damage but also undermine the country's economic competitiveness and institutional credibility. In the energy sector, they extend beyond fuel theft and distribution fraud. Estimates show that deforestation has reduced the annual generation potential of the Itaipu and Belo Monte hydropower plants by a combined 3,700 GWh, equivalent to around R$ 1 billion in annual losses (Pinto & Arbache 2025). Beyond their direct economic costs, organized crime erodes the rule of law, discourages private investment, distorts markets, and weakens Brazil's credibility as a reliable supplier of sustainable products and climate leader.

Moving forward, preserving stable public security and environmental policies across successive administrations will be critical to ensure Brazil's assets generate sustainable economic development rather than rents captured by illegal activities. Combating organized crime through stronger institutions, improved enforcement, and greater coordination across levels of government would enhance legal certainty, protect strategic assets, improve the country's international credibility, and create a more secure environment for long-term investment across energy, mining, and forest-based value chains. 

In conclusion, Brazil's strengths provide a strong foundation for international relevance. The country's natural resource base, continental scale, and industrial capabilities anchor this position. As a hybrid energy powerhouse, a reservoir of critical minerals, and a steward of the world's largest tropical forest, Brazil holds a unique combination of assets to advance both energy security and decarbonization. 

However, assets alone will not determine whether Brazil succeeds in translating this potential into lasting geopolitical and economic influence. Only deeper integration into global markets, supported by a strong long-term vision, robust institutions, clear market signals, and a predictable investment environment, will enable Brazil to emerge as influential in the transition to a low-carbon economy. Ultimately, leadership in the energy transition will be defined not by potential, but by implementation capacity.     

References 

Amazônia2030. 2025. “Para proteger a Floresta Amazônica, precisamos rematar as áreas desmatadas.” Amazônia2030, November 13, 2025. https://amazonia2030.org.br/para-proteger-a-floresta-amazonica-precisamos-rematar-as-areas-desmatadas/.

ANP. 2026. “Anuário estatístico brasileiro do petróleo, gás natural e biocombustíveis 2026.” Gov.br/ Ministério de Minas e Energia, June 26, 2026. https://www.gov.br/anp/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/publicacoes/anuario-estatistico/anuario-estatistico-brasileiro-do-petroleo-gas-natural-e-biocombustiveis-2026.

Assunção, Juliano, João Pedro Arbache, Joana Chiavari, Giovanna de Miranda & Gabriela Zangiski. 2025. “O nexo floresta-clima: uma arquitetura sob medida para a ação climática.” Climate Policy Initiative Report. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/O-Nexo-Floresta-Clima.pdf.

COP31. 2026. “COP31 Presidency Announces “35% by 2035” Electrification Target as Part of Action Agenda Launch.” COP31 Türkiye Antalya, June 9, 2026. https://cop31.tr/news-detail/bonn-electrification-target-2026.

Demôro, Luiza, Vinicius Nunes & Rafael Rabioglio. 2025. “Brazil Energy Transition Factbook 2025: The Numbers Behind the Ambition.” BloombergNEF Report, March 31, 2025. https://about.bnef.com/insights/clean-energy/brazil-transition-factbook-2025-the-numbers-behind-the-ambition/.

EIA. 2026. “U.S. Exports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Reached Record in April.” EIA In-Brief Analysis, July 8, 2026. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67825#%5D.

Energy Institute. 2026. “All About the Statistical Review of World Energy.” Energy Institute. https://www.energyinst.org/statistical-review.

EPE. 2026a. “Balanço energético nacional 2026.” EPE Publicações. https://www.epe.gov.br/pt/publicacoes-dados-abertos/publicacoes/balanco-energetico-nacional-2026.

EPE. 2026b. “Minerais críticos e estratégicos para a transição energética.” EPE Publicações, March 20, 2026. https://www.epe.gov.br/pt/publicacoes-dados-abertos/publicacoes/minerais-criticos-e-estrategicos-para-a-transicao-energetica.

Eurasia Group. 2026. “Top Risks 2026.” Eurasia Group, January 5, 2026. https://www.eurasiagroup.net/issues/Top-Risks-2026.

European Commission. 2026. “Electrification.” European Commission. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/eus-energy-system/electrification_en#electrification-action-plan.

Forster, Piers M. et al. 2026. “Indicators of Global Climate Change 2025: Annual Update of Key Indicators of the State of the Climate System and Human Influence.” Earth System Science Data 18 (6): 3889-3933.  https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-18-3889-2026.

IEA. 2023. “The Oil and Gas Industry in Net Zero Transitions.” IEA Report, November 23, 2023. https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-net-zero-transitions.

IEA. 2026a. “Global Energy Review 2026.” IEA Report, April 20, 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2026.

IEA. 2026b. “Strait of Hormuz.” IEA Factsheet. https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz.

IEA. 2026c. “Sheltering from Oil Shocks: Measures to Reduce Impacts on Households and Businesses.” IEA Publications. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/01fe3dd7-21c1-4b16-8c5b-7df1aca6d6ff/Shelteringfromoilshocks.pdf.

IEA. 2026d. “World Energy Investment 2026.” IEA Report, May 28, 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2026.

IEA. 2026e. “Energy Technology Perspectives 2026.” IEA Report, March 26, 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-technology-perspectives-2026.

IEA. 2026f. “Electricity 2026. Analysis and Forecast to 2030.” IEA Publications. https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/b73798cb-e452-42b9-9d8a-07542de7a041/Electricity_2026.pdf.

IEA. 2026g. “Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026.” IEA Report, July 16, 2026. https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026.

IRENA. 2026. “Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2025.” International Renewable Energy Agency, Abu Dhabi. https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2026/Jul/IRENA_TEC_RPGC_in_2025_2026.pdf.

Lins, Clarissa. 2026. “(In)Segurança energética em tempos de guerra.” Valor Econômico, March 9, 2026. https://valor.globo.com/opiniao/coluna/in-seguranca-energetica-em-tempos-de-guerra.ghtml.

Lins, Clarissa, Guilherme Ferreira & Bernardo Corrêa. 2024. “Equatorial Margin: A Necessary Debate.” Catavento Factsheet 20. https://catavento.biz/en/papers/factsheet-20-margem-equatorial-um-debate-necessario/.

Lins, Clarissa, Guilherme Ferreira & Bernardo Corrêa. 2026. “Oportunidades para o Brasil na transição energética”. Em Caminhos do desenvolvimento: estabilizar, crescer, incluir. Volume 2: reformas para aumentar a produtividade, CDPP (org.): 108-117. https://site-be.cdpp.org.br/uploads/cdpp_caminhos_desenvolvimento_vol2_2be6e44e3b.pdf.

Lins, Clarissa, Guilherme Ferreira, Bernardo Corrêa & Maria Luiza Miraglia. 2026. “Climate Intelligence: Reflecting on Brazil’s Potential Role in the Emerging World Order.” Catavento Factsheet 29. https://catavento.biz/en/papers/factsheet-29-reflecting-on-brazils-potential-role-in-the-emerging-world-order/.

Maisonnave, Fabiano & Akshat Rathi. 2026. “Brazil Is Set for a Battery Boom. China Is Poised to Benefit.” Bloomberg, January 23, 2026. https://www.energyconnects.com/news/utilities/2026/january/brazil-is-set-for-a-battery-boom-china-is-poised-to-benefit/.

MapBiomas. 2026. “RAD 2025: Relatório anual do desmatamento no Brasil.” MapBiomas Report, May 27, 2026. https://doi.org/10.58053/MapBiomas/YMT6I2.

MDIC. 2026. “Resultados do comércio exterior brasileiro - dados consolidados.” Gov.br, August 6, 2026. https://balanca.economia.gov.br/balanca/publicacoes_dados_consolidados/pg.html.

Our World in Data. 2023. “Land Area in Hectares 2023.” Our World in Data/ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://archive.ourworldindata.org/20260814-211926/grapher/land-area-hectares.html.

Pinto, Gustavo R. S. & João Pedro Arbache. 2025. “Quando a fonte seca: as ameaças do desmatamento da Amazônia para a economia brasileira.” CPI, October 10, 2025. https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/pt-br/publication/quando-a-fonte-seca-as-ameacas-do-desmatamento-da-amazonia-para-a-economia-brasileira/

Rojas-Ramagosa, Hugo. 2024. “Macroeconomic Effects of Russia’s War in Ukraine and How It Affects Energy Security and Global Emission Targets.” IMF Working Papers 039. https://doi.org/10.5089/9798400264269.001.

Romanello, Marina et al. 2025. “The 2025 Report of the Lancet Countdown on Health and Climate Change: Climate Change Action Offers a Lifeline.” The Lancet 406 (10521): 2804-2857. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(25)01919-1.

Talukdar, Tonmit, Carlos Torres Diaz & Kartik Selvaraju. 2026. “Asia's Coal Demand to Rise by 100 Million Tonnes in Wake of Middle East Conflict.” Rystad Energy, June 8, 2026. https://www.rystadenergy.com/news/asias-coal-demand-to-rise.

TFFF. 2025. “COP30 Ends with over US$ 6.7 Billion for the TFFF.” Tropical Forest Forever Facility, November 27, 2025. https://tfff.earth/cop30-ends-with-over-us-6-7-billion-for-the-tfff/.

Walter, Daan, Sam Butler-Sloss & Dave Jones. 2026. “The Energy Security Fallout: From Fossil Fuel Fragility to Electric Independence.” Ember, March 18, 2026. https://ember-energy.org/latest-insights/the-energy-security-fall-out-from-fossil-fuel-fragility-to-electric-independence/.

WEF. 2026. “Davos 2026: Special Address by Mark Carney, PM of Canada.” WEF, Jan 20, 2026. https://www.weforum.org/stories/forum-institutional/davos-2026-special-address-by-mark-carney-prime-minister-of-canada/.

World Bank. 2026. “Trade (% of GDP).” World Bank Group. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS.

Submitted: July 30, 2026

Accepted for publication: August 25, 2026

Copyright © 2026 CEBRI-Journal. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original article is properly cited.